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Traditionally, improvements in the quality of life in Britain
i~:!sul.ted

from the temporary fusion of sometimes opposite interests

which spurred Parliamentary action.
party iasue..

Therefore, refonn was rarely a

Each refor:n question was t.reated separately and nev9r

as a part of a body of similar measures.

Individuals were :free to

support or oppose particular reforms according to their own intereats
and motivations.

The result of this lack of ::itrong consistent reform-

ist sentiment was a pattern of piece-meal legislative action with a
notable absence of comprehensive social planning.

The First World War,

however, brought new challenges to British society.

As the traditional,

haphazard method of dealing with problems of social organization failed
to meet the needs of a nation enga§ed in a total war, British society

came to accept a high degree of central control and guidance under the
banner of national efficiency.

This acceptance of social planning opened

up new opportunities to those reformers who had long sought to undertake
the cure

or

Britain's social ills on a massive scale.

The reformers saw the establishment of a ministry

or

health as the

key to their success in the struggle against poverty and disease.

After

more than two years of political infighting the ministry- was-finally
established in June 1919, and a housing program which promised to provide
500,000 new homes was placed under its authority.

Launched with the

approval of every political interest in the nation, the housing scheme
proved to be a rout from the beginning and by the spring of 1-921 the
project came to an ignoble end.
commitment to social planning.

With it came the end of the national
The movement for planning failed because

old political and social differences proved to be a much more potent force
than what remained of war-time harmony.

While the nation was willing to

tolerate rigid economic and social control in the name of victory over
the Kaiser, no matter how much reform was desired, it would not accept
centralized control and be swayed by appeals for national sacrifice in
peacetime. Without the impetus provided by total warfare, massive social
planning, rooted in a desire to use all the nation's resources efficiently,
collapsed, drained of its political vitality.
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PREFACE

.A.ny attempt to evaluate the impact of the First World War on
British society is perhaps a futile effort to measure the immeasurable.
'Ihe sheer magnitude of the struggle, the sacrifice of life and the loss
of wealth overwhelm even the most casual observer.

Despite this, h::.s-

torians have been unable to escape the "siren song" produced by the
unmistakable death of one world and the birth of another in four short
years.

As a result uncountable studies have been done which attempt to

retell the losses to Britain and the vorld duriLg those bloody years.
Yet while mourning the terricle waste of modern warfare, few have recognized the war as an agent for domestic social reforJil in Britain.
Traditionally, improvements in the quality of life in Britain
stemmed from the temporary fusion of sometimes opposite interests which
spurred Parliamentary action.

Therefore, reform was rarely a party issue.

Each reform question was treated separately and never as part of a body
of similar measures.

Individuals were free to support or oppose particular

reforms according to their own ir.terests and motivations.
this lack of strong consistent reformist

s~ntiment

The result of

was a pattern of piece-

meal legislative action with a notable absence of comprehensive social
planning.
society.

The First World War, however, brought new challenges to British
As the traditional haphazard method of dealing with problems of

social organization failed to meet the needs of a nation engaged in a total
·...-ar, British society came

'tO

accept a high degree of central control and

v
guidance under the banner of national efficiency.

This acceptance of

social planning opened up new opportunities to those reformers who had
long sought to undertake the cure of Britain's social ills on a massive
scale.

The aim of this present study is to trace, during the war years

and after, the struggle for social pl&nning which received its impetus
from the wartime desire for national efficiency.
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CHAPTER I
BUSINESS AS USUAL
Britain entered the First World War completely unprepared to meet
its demanc1.s on her military forces, industrial machinery, or civilian
population.

In response to the emergency created by the war, the Liberal

government, serving under Herbert Asquith, devoted the bulk of its energies to the task of recruiting and training additional men for the army's
expeditionary force.

In August 1914, British land forces numbered little

more that 250,000 regular troops, the bulk of which were spread
around the world in the various crown colonies.

~hinly

The active territorial

force was limited to a garrison of 63,000 soldiers backed up by a 150,000
man reserve force and a separate ready reserve army that a.mounted to no
mor.e than another 63,000 trained officers and men.l

Conscription, modeled

after the continental system, was not the "British way", and the cabinet
realized that all new recruits had to be volunteers.
Traditionally the War Office had been responsible for the raising
of new recruits.

However, the resignation of J. E. B. Seely during the

Currah trouble in Ireland left the nation without a Secretary of State for
War.

Upon Seely's departure,

Asquith had himself taken the War Office

temporarily to avoid making a new appointment tmtil the lnternal trouble
was over, but the outbreak of hostilities made a new appointment im-

lArthur Marwick, The Deluge (New York:
p. 15.

W.W. Norton & Co., 1970),

2
.
2
perat ive.

In order to fill the ranks of the royal army, a full-time

secretary for war who could inspire confidence in victory and attract
volunteers to the colors was needed.

Asquith's first thought was to send

R. B. Haldane back to the War Office.

Haldane had been responsible for

organizing the expeditionary force under a general staff and Asquith felt
that his experience and proven ability would be ideal for the post.
Nonetheless, the politically sensitive Asquith found that he could not
appoint Haldane to the War Office.

The popular press had turned against

Haldane, suggesting that his well-known interest in German philosophy
meant that he was pro-German.3

The temper of the early days of the war

was such that this wholly unfounded claim was enough to prevent the
appointment.
Public opinion, while rejecting Haldane, turned to Lord Kitchener,
an authentic military hero.

Kitchener, who was known as the conqueror of

the Sudan, had been Commander-in-Chief of British Forces during the last
two years of i.he Boer War, and still had a high standing in the public
mind.

Furthermore, Kitchener happened to be on leave from his post in

Egypt when the war began.

His presence in the country made him the

natural focal point of popular attention.

Christopher Addison, then ser-

ving in the government, observed that
When the country had recovered from the feeling of unreality
engendered by the declaration of war, all eyes were instinctively
turned towards Lord Kitchener 'the strong, silent man'. No man
in the empire probably possessed the confidence of the 'man in the
2Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years, Vol. II (New York:
Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1925), pp. 69-70.
3rbid., p. 70.

3
street' quite the same way as he did. Pu.bJic opinion clearly
said that he was the man to organize the country for war.4
Even if the public was convir.ced of the necessity of Kitchener's appointgovernmen~,

ment to the War Office, many within the
were not.

ir.cluding Asquith,

Politically, Kitchener was a Tory and had strong support among

the conservative opposition.

Asquith, in spite of the war, still intended

to play party politics, and the thought of diluting his cabinet with a Tory
did not sit well with him.

The Prime Minister was also aware of Kitchener 1 s

lack of practical political experience
less than a brilliant administrator.

a.~d

his reputation for being something

Public pressure, though, had rallied

behind Kitchener and Asquith, in the name of national unity, decided that
Lord Kitchener should go -co the War Office.
Asquith had hesitated for so long that Kitchener had already reached
Dover and was preparing to return to his command.

He was called back to

London and, amid a great deal of popular excitement, was installed as Secretary of State for War.

Asquith, despite his concessions to public opinion,

still had strong doubts about Kitchener's abilities.

Asquith, who thought

it strongly possible that Kitchener would bungle the job, wanted to be sure
that the blame would not fall on the Liberal party.

He publicly made it

clear that Kitchener was appointed in light of the national emergency, as
a non-partisan member of the government.
in the House of Commons on August

He delicately reminded all parties,

6, that

Lord Kitchener, as everyone knows, is not a politician.
His association with the Government as a Minister of the
Cabinet for this purpose must not be taken as in any way
identifying him with any set of political opinions. He
has, at a great public emergency, responded to a great
public call.5
4christopher Addison, Politics From Within, Vol. I (London:
Herbert Jenkins, Ltd., 1924), p. 41.
5House of Commons Debates, August 6, 1914, (col. 2082).

l+

Asquith was hedging his bet, but his reservations would prove to be a
shrewed political judgement.
Kitchener set to work immediately.

Within hours of his appointment,

he recommended to the cabinet that the initial call for volunteers be fixed
at

500~000

men.

He also made it known that an additional 500,000 troops

would be needed in the following months, raising the number of new recruits
needed to one million men.

This request caught the cabinet totally off

guard and Lord Grey commented afterwards that
Kitchener foresaw, to an extent that no one else did at first,
the need for raising a great Army, larger than anything that had
yet been contemplated. He based his demand for men on the opinion
that the war would last for three years. That seemed to most of us
u...11likely, if' not incredible. We thought only of a war of movement,
that would bring a military decision one way or the other in less
than three yea.rs; it also seemed to many of us that the terrific
output of men and treasure that modern conditions made possible
would bring exhaustion to every belligerent in much less than three
years. 6
The cabinet, doubtful of the need for such a huge army, approved Kitchener's
proposal anyway, thinking that before

a

million men could be trained,

equipped, and put in the field, the war would be over.

That same day,

August 6, Parlia.'llent accepted the proposal and authorized an initial
;bl.00,000,000 in war credits.7

The next day the first recruiting posters

were put up throughout the country, calling for
teers to join "His Majesty's Regular Army".

an

initial 100,000 volun-

Within hours, men in large

numbers began to line up in front of recruiting offices ready to give
service.
The

vol~u1teers

came forward so rapidly that the whole of the recruit-

ment machinery was partially paralyzed and Kitchener was unwilling, if not

6Grey, 2P.· cit., p. 71.
7House

ot>

Commons Debates_, August 6, 1914, (col. 2100).
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unable, to straighten out the problems.

"'.Jay after day, men were forced

to queue and stand, moving at a snail's ps.ce towards the recruiting
of'fice, only to be frustrated and sent home at the close of the day.8
The lines soon became permanent and the volur..teers stayed the night,
hoping to enlist the next day.

Addison, complaining in his diary about

Kitchener's leadership in the War Office and the general inefficiency
of' his staff, concluded that "They have probably sent their best staff
men on the E. F. (expeditionary force), but some of the retired colonels
and majors whom they have put in charge of recruiting are 'the limit'".
Rather acidly he pointed out that "If anybody could dampen down the enthusiasm to enlistment, these a.re the men to do it. 11 9
The conditions in the standing camps,as the enlistment lines ca.me
to be called, grew worse as more and more men decided to join the ranks.
The Local Government Board and some private charitable organizations,
notably the YMCA, approached Kitchener and asked permission to organize
concerts and educational lectures for the men.

Grumbling something about

not wanting civilian interference, Kitchener and his War Office staff refused all offerH of aid.10

As a result of this confusion and inadequate planning, the first
8John Redmond, the leader of the Irish nationalists, spoke before
the House of Commons on August 3, offering the aid of the Nationalist Army.
The Irish Unionists did the same a few days later. The War Office, in a
:miscalculation that would cost Britain dearly later, refused the support
put forward by the Nationalists and accepted that of the Unionists. From
this point on relations with the Nationalists, who were at first willing
to delay Home Rule, grew more strained. House of Commons Debates, August
3, 1914, (cols. 1828-1839). A. J. P. Taylor, English His to.EX_, 1911+-1945,
(Oxford, 2965), p. 21.
9christopher Addison, Four and a Half Years, Vol. I, 3rd ed. (London:
Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 1934), diary entry, October· 21, 1914, pp. 37-39.
lOil?id., diary entry, October 22, 191L., pp. 38-39.
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100,000 men were not recruited
men was issued on August 28.

u.~til

August 2).

A call for another 100,000

The response was so great that by September

15 500,000 men had volunteered for service, and the War Office asked for
an additional 500,000 men.11

The new flood of men now not only taxed the

recruitment procedures, but also the facilities i'or training new soldiers
for combat.

Men moved from standing camps in front of recruitment offices

to standing camps at training centers.

By October, despite the high patri-

otic feelings and willingness to sacrifice, the standing camps were quickly
falling into disorder.

Finally, unable to make the War Office act, the

government put together an advisory committee to investigate the possibility of having the County Education Authorities organize activities within
the camps.

The afternoon of October 22, the Committee on Standing

Ca..~ps

met with representatives of all the departments and several local authorities to draw up plans for recreational and educational activities in the
camps.

The Admiralty and the War Office were also invited, but only the

representatives from the Admiralty were present.

Al though the navy only

had men at the Crystal Palace and at camps in Dorset, they promised to
cooperate with any efforts made by civil authorities to alleviate ca.mp conditions.

The primary purpose of the meeting was to create some sort of

coordination between the War Office and civilian authorities; the absence
of a representative from Kitchener was more than just a conspicuous oversight.
Mid-way through the meeting a messenger arrived saying that the
representatives from the War Office were on their way.

A few minutes

11Arthur Marwick, Britain in the Century of Total War (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1968) , p. 5 8.
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later a letter from Kitchener arrived.

Joseph Peas·:::, chairman of the

committee, reportedly read the note and then nsat tight for a few minutes
to collect himself and then read the material parts r'or the Committee. 1112
The letter from Kitchener, "in not over-polite language", said that "he
had not understood the general composition and purport of the Committee".
Addison asserts that
The purport of the letter was that he did. not want civilians
interfering! He did not think the Committee was necessary,
and the War Office could do all that was required. He intended
to build some huts; to give the men military lectures in the
evenings and, as he was going to keep them at work all day,
they ought to go to bed when they had finished.13
Kitchener's obstinance had put the committee in a delicate position.

They

could not openly challenge his authority because of his great popularity.
On the other hand, they could not allow conditions to continue as they
were or, what might be worse, to let Kitchener's proposals be implemented.
There was a general fear that Kitchener's "woeful lack of imagination" might hinder recruiting and take the edge off' the volunteers' "keenness".

To keep the men at military duties from dawn to dusk would, as the

committee rightly argued, quickly tire the men of military life, even if
Kitchener were able to organize such an operations staff.

As yet, the War

Office had not even managed to provide shelters against the rain, which
led many on the committee to believe that any plan of Kitchener's would
probably end in folly.

Having no other rec0urse, Pease concluded that

the committee's only hope was to appeal directly to the Prime Minister.
This course of action won the support of the committee and immediately
12

Addi son , Four and a Half Years, £2.. cit.· , diary entry, October
22, 1914, pp. 38-39.

13Addison, Politics from Within, £2.· cit., p.

43.

8
after the meeting ended, Pease went to see Asquith to ask for his personal
interventio~.

Asquith was found

~o

be in full support of the committee's

position and consented to see both Kitchener and Pease the next day, following a cabinet meeting, in order to secure the War Secretary's ,~ooperation.14
The following day the conference between the three was held as Asquith
promised.

After the meeting Pease told Addison that the meeting was qcite

stormy, but the Prime Minister had supported him.

Later in the day, after

the anger of the meeting had worn off, Kitchener informed Asquith that
the War Office would cooperate with civil authorities through a committee
established to coordinate civil and military actions.

This committee would,

he promised, consult the Board of Education and the Local Education Authorities in an effort to make the standing camps more orderly.

Furthermore,

he agreed to establish local camp com_m.ittees w"'..th laymen as members.

These

committees would organize activities for off-duty soldiers.

Despite these

concessions, Kitchener still dragged his feet on the matter.

On Monday,

November 16, Addison's diary reveals that KitchenP.r was still recalcitrant
with regards to military and civilian

Addison commented

coopera~icn.

Every day that goes, however, shows what a terrible stumbling
block Kitchener and his methods are to a real rallying of
national enthusia3m. Our National patriotism is coming to the
rescue of Europe not as the result, but in spite of the War
Office.15
Later, on November 24, Addison adds to his evaluation that "there is no
fathoming the thick-headedness of the War Office. 11 16

14Addison, Four and a Half Years, op. cit., diary entry, October
23, 1914, p. 40.
15Ibid., diary entry, November 16, 1914, p. 45.
16Ibid., diary entry, Novemcer 24, 1914, p.

47.

9
Even though those inside government circles continued to bemoan
Kitchener's obstinate presence in the War Office, they really could do
very little but learn to work around him.

By mid-November, the recruit-

ing effort seemed to be going well and measures were being taken by civilia.n authorities to provide outside activities for the huge number of new
recruits.

The difficulties first encountered because of Kitchener's

ineptitude and later as a result of his stubborness seemed to slowly
resolve themselves as Britain adjusted to war.
The war not only brought chaos to the War Office; it also played
havoc with the home economy.

The uncertainty that accompanied the out-

break of hostilities caused a near panic throughout British industrial
life.

G. D. H. Cole commented, in his contemporary account, Labour in

the War, that
When the war broke out, the workers,the capitalists and
the government seem to have been equally in the dark as to
its probable effects upon industry. No one knew what would
be its reaction upon the credit system and external trade; no
one knew how far the home demand was likely to suffer contraction; no one foresaw the scale on which the war would be
carried on, or the immense demands it would make upon production.17
At the same time as the first calls for volunteers for the army were being
made, the war was making itself felt on the home front.
goods, and especially food prices, began to rise rapidly.

Domestic consurner
On August 8,

prices averaged 15 percent higher than those during· the same week the month
earlier.

It was not, however, a uniform increase for all commodities.

Milk rose an average of only a single percentage point, whereas sugar, in
the larger towns, shot up 83 percent over its July price in a matter of
days.

This uneven advance was due partly to hoarding and shortages of

17 G. D. H. C·Jle, Labour in the War, (London:
Ltd., 1915), p. 63.

G. Bell and Sons,

10
certain goods, but as things calmed down after the initial shock of the war,
prices fell off again.

By the end of the first month of the war prices had

slipped to an average of 11 percent higher in the larger towns and had
retreated to an increase of only 9 percent in those with under 50,000 inhabitants.18
The unsettling effects of the war were not limited to a rapid increase
in consumer goods; they also affected the rate of unemployment.

Although

certain industries, such as ship building, saddlery and harness, boot and
shoe, military clothing and the hosiery trades, found that overtime was
needed to keep up with the orders, generally the level of employment fell
in most industries during August.

Trade union 1memployment jumped from

2.8 percent in July to 7.1 percent in August.

The total number of unem-

ployed people on the labor exchange registers as of August 14, 1914, was
194,580, in comparison to 112,622 on July 17 and 89,049 during the same
week in August 1913.

Moreover, in the insured trades, where the number

of insured individuals was 2,341,508, 6.2 perceat of the workers found
themselves unemployed at the end of August.

In comparison, only 2.6 per-

cent of the insured workers had been unemployed at the end of July and 3.1
percent were out of work at the end of August the year before.19
The unemployment statistics alone do not indicate the full dimensions
of the crisis.

Many industries, rather than lay people off, chose to put

them on short time until the domestic situation settled down.

This was

especially true in the tin plate and steel sheet, engineering, printing,
bookbinding, building, pottery, and textile industries.

Individual earn-

18M. B. Hammond, British Labor Conditions and Legis.lation During
the War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1919), pp. 32-33.
19Ibid.' p. 34.
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ings, as a result, dropped and this decline did not appear in lUlemployment statistics.

One figure that is available, for example, reveals that

during one week in August, earnings in the cotton manufacturing trades
were 58.8 percent less tha.i1 the corresponding period in July and 60.9
.
20
percent b e 1 ow th e same week th
· e previous yr;:a:r.
The hardship of unemployment, however, was very unevenly distributed between men and women.
male labor

While the heavy industries, in which mostly

was employed, suffered from the early wartime industrial con-

fusion, trades employing primarily women suffered the most.

The cotton,

linen, silk, lace, tailoring, dressmaking, rdllinery, and hat making
trades all were forced to lay off their workers, mostly female, in large
numbers.

The demand for luxury goods plummeted during the first month

of the war, as people found inflation cutting into their spending power.
The rate of unemployment in other industries. further reduced the market
for luxuries.

Although no figures are available for August, when the

situation was at its most chaotic, in September only, 53.5 percent of
all women employed in full time work in July were working full time the
second month of the war; this is in comparison to 60.2 percent for men. 21
This sudden surge of unemployment among both men and women meant
that the number of people seeking public relief increased.

Claims for

unemployment benefits under Part II of the National Insurance Act amounted to 180,233 during the first four weeks in August.

This was in compari-

son to 103,730 claims made during the five weeks of July.

The insurance

fund was well able to meet these claims, but many people who were not

20

Tuid.' p. 35.

21 cole, 2£· cit., p. 68.

1 "-0

covered by the insurance act were also faced with unemployment.

4,

On August

the Prime Minister, fully expecting some dislocation to take place as

a result of the war, appointed a cabinet committee that would be responsible for the prevention and relief of distress. 2 3

The committee's chair-

man, Herbert Sa.nmel, President of the Local Government Boa.rd, put the
committee to work immedia.tely,dividing it into four sub-committees:
Committee for London, Committee for Agricultural Districts, Committee on
Urban Housing, and Committee on Women's Employment.

On August

6, a memo-

randum was sent out to local authorities throughout the country, encouraging the establishment of local relief committees.c'"'4

These committees were

to be operated by each local authority and composed of representatives
from the Board of Guardians, trade unions, philanthropic organizations,
and soldiers' and sailors' families' associations.
By August 11, numerous local committees had been established and

the central government committee began to ·issue a series of memoranda
outlining the role of the local committees.

These emphasized that working

people, as far as possible, were to be kept working full time at their
usual trades or on short time if this were impossible.25

If this could

not be accomplished, the local committees were
urged to use every effort to keep labour in the normal
channels; where the demands of the normal labour market
are inadequate the Committees are advised to consult the
23

cmd. 7603, "Memorandum on the Steps Ta.ken for the Prevention and
Relief of Distress Due to War," Session.al Papers of the House of Lords,
Accounts and Papers, Vol. 14, 1914.
24Manchester Guardian, August 7, 1914.
25Percy Allen, "War and the Wage Earner," The Contemporary Review,
September 1914, p. 379.
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local authorities as to the possibility of expediting schemes
of public utility, which might otherwise not 9e put in hand
at the present moment; it is only when these fail that recourse
should be had to relief works and only in the last resort that
relief should be given without work.26
In order to finance the relief committees the Prince of Wales made an
appeal for public contributions and appointed a special committee to
oversee the distribution of relief money.

The Executive Committee of

the Prince of Wales' Fund placed themselves under the control of the
cabinet committee, agreeing to act only on their recommendations. 2 7
As money poured into the Prince of Wales' Fund and the network of
local committees swung into operation, complaints began to be heard from
representatives of the trade union movement.

The committees, it was

charged, were largely composed of "social workers" who
had long been connected with the Poor I.aw, the Charity Organization
Society, and other relief agencies. The labour representatives,
even where they were given seats on the committees, were nearly
always swamped by the mass votes of the officials and charitymongers. The social workers, long used to the relief of a peculiar
type of distress, could not realize that the special distress
created by the war was of a quite different character and demanded
different treatment. Accustomed to bullying the very poor, the
Committees set out with eagerness to bully the regular wage-earners
whom the war had thrown out of work.28
In some cases the committees prepared case reports and made house-to-house

visitations in order to gather more information concerning those who were
receiving benefits.

The unemployed workers, always distrustful of any

charity that seemed to be like the Poor Law, often refused to ask the
local committees for aid, preferring instead to "exhaust savings and
accumulate

debts 11 ,29

26emd. 7603, 2£· cit., Appendix No. 3.

28cole , 212.. cit. , p. 86 •

27The Nation, August 22, 1914, p. 251.

29Ib·d
__1_.' p.
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The relief committees

~ay

have represented a cold

a...~d

rather cal-

culating approach toward the problem of unemployme'nt, but in the long
run they did help to ease the crisis while the nation's industries re-

tooled for war.

The Central Com.'Ilittee on Women's Employment gave

assistance to the local committees in the formulation of women's relief.
Workrooms were established for the purposes of re-training women and
girls for work in industries other than those which produced luxury
goods.30

Grants were made by the central committee to road boards,

which in turn allotted repair and construction money to highway authorities in areas of high unemployment.
to b209,259 were made.

For this purpose, grants amounting

The relief committees also received bl58,266 for

the purposes of employing and training persons experiencing distress.31
The government, a.side from the format ion of the relief

COl"lmi ttees,

made an effort to encourage war contractors to use the maximlllil nlllilber
of workers in their factories.

In late August a memorandum was issued

from the War Office to all contractors, making certain suggestions for
the minimization of unemployment.

The note asked all employers to act

upon the following as quickly as they reasonably could:
(1) Rapid delivery to be attained cy employing extra hands
in shifts or otherwise, in preference to overtime, subject
always to the para.mount necessity of effecting delivery within
times requisite for the needs of the army. (2) Subletting of
portions of the work to other suitable manufacturers situated
in districts where serious unemployment exists, although contrary to the usual conditions of army contracts, is admissable
during the present crisis.

30Arthur Patterson, "War Funds Co-orJ.iriation of Chaos , " The
Nineteenth Century, October 1914, p. 740.

Diart

31Hammond, ~· cit., pp. 42-44. Lord Riddell, Lord Riddell's War
(Ivor Nicholson: Watson, 1933), diary entry, August 10, 1914, p.12.
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The memorandum also issued e. stern warning t.o employers, telling them
that the government would not tolerate those who

~oak

advantage of the

labor situation.
(a) The main contractor to remain solely responsible for
due execution of the contract as regards to quality, dates
for delivery and in every respect. (b) The fair wages clause
to apply strictly with the exception of the passage permitting
subletting. •rhe main contractor will undertake to observe the
other provisions of the fair wages clause. (c) Na.mes and
addresses of all firms to whom it is proposed to sublet work
to be submitted for approval before work is actually given out
to them.32
The object of the memorandum to contractors was to make use of as much
manpower as possible until the industrial situation calmed down.

During

the early days of the war the government was primarily concerned with the
worsening military situation in France and had little time for home affairs.
It was hoped that the limited measures taken would enable the economy to
recover from the shock of the war by itself.
The government's attempts to deal with unemployment at home seemed
to do the trick.

By the end of August, it appeared as if the panic had

passed and the economy was readjusting itself to wartime conditions.

Trade

unions, which had experienced a 7.1 percent unemployment rate during August,
reported that the total had decreased to 5.6 percent of their membership
by September.

Near the end of October, it had again declined to

4.4 per-

cent, in November to 2.9 percent, and by the end of the year it had fallen
off to 2.5 percent.

The December figure was about the same as the rate of

unemployment for the Decembers of 1912 and 1913.33
recovery was even more rapid.

In the uninsured trades

From a high of 6.2 percent in August, the

unemployment rate slipped to 4.2 percent in October and by the end of
32Ha.mmond, 2£.• cit., p. 36.

33Ibid., p. 38.

December, it had fallen to 3.3 percent.
The economy had not collapsed as many bad predicted it would
during the early part of August.

As

the governnent began to place its

war contracts, industry began to come out of its depressed condition.
More and more labor shifted to the boom industries and in many cases
unemployment proved to be short-term.

The Manchester Guardian report-

ed on August 25, 1914, that the
Government and other orders arising out of the war itself are
exerting a widening influence on the engineering trade. Naturally
the direct government orders fall mainly to regular contractors
who are as a consequence, exceptionally busy. As a result they
are leaving to other firms a proportion of the work they normally
compete for, aI1d are, to a certain extent, passing work to subcontractors. Like the ring waves created by the dropping of a
stone into a pool, the influence of the Government orders is
spreading through in aiminishing strength to the farthest boundaries of the trade.3
The elimination of foreign competition, especially that of Germany,
further stimulated Eritish industry and enabled it to pick up the slack
in the employment statistics.

Moreover, Lord Kitchener's recruiting

efforts siphoned off large numbers of men into the army.

Soon the sur-

pluses in the labor market had, in some industries, become labor shortages and some skilled men in the engineering trades and the cloth trades
were turned out of the army in order to return to work.35

The way in which

the economy was recovering created a sense of confidence in the minds of
many that Britain would adjust easily to the demands of war time.
As early as August 11, H. E. Morgan of W. H. Smith and Son, suggested, in a letter to the Daily Chronicle, that the country's best

34Ma.nchester Guardian, August 25, 1914.
35Lord Askwith, Indust:r.ial Problems and Disputes
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1921), pp. 360-361.
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economic policy would be to allow business to perform much as it always
had.

Government~

he pointed out, ought to practice non-'interference.

It was hoped that after the initial shock and dislocation caused by the
war, conditions would settle down to normal.

The market, Morgan co:i.-

eluded, would be self-adjusting to both the needs of the war and those
of the home economy.

Later in August, a meeting of business leaders

"resolved that together in tuli ty, they would fight the war on the slogan
'business as usual 111 .36

Soon the snappy phrase, "business as usual",

was being promoted by the government and the press.37

At first the

government espoused the concept in order to rebuild confidence in the
home economy.

There was

what seemed to have been

a

natural desire by the public to return to

d~ys

of stability and normalcy before the

terrible convulsions of the war.

The government played up to this pub-

ic nlood and "business as usual" caught on amazingly and everybody felt
that to carry on as usual was a patriotic duty.38
By mid-September "business as usual" could be heard on every corner.

As

it became evident that.the economy, £:.lthough badly rocked by soaring

inflation and a high unemployment rate, would not collapse, "business as
usual" became more than calming rhetoric.

The Liberal government, seeing

that the economy was slowly recovering and that its emergency relief
measures were working, adopted a "'business as usual" economic policy.
Already the protectors of free trade

a.~d

governmental non-interference,

the Liberals readily accepted the suggestions made by the nation's

36 Marwick, Deluge, 52£.· cit., p. 39.
37Ibid.' p. 38.
38Addison, Four and a. Half Years, 2£· cit., diary entry, August 4,
1914, p. 36.
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business leaders who were "anxious to unite dt!.ty with profit. 11 39

The

government was told that industry could meet the demands of war and that
industrial readjustment would take place rapidly if only the government
would stay out of industrial affairs.

By November, the economy had

clearly regained some of its lost strength and a.ny temptations the government might have had to tinker with the economy disappeared.
The first official endorsement of a "business as usual" economic
policy came on November 16, when Lloyd George unveiled the government's
first war budget to the House of Commons.

On that occasion he told the

House that the government would propose to "levy no taxes that will interfere with any productive industry".40

Rather, he proposed that

additional revenues be raised from increased personal taxes a..."ld duties.
Lloyd George, standing before the House, asserted that
It does not require very much courage to tax ourselves,
to give part of our incomes to fight the enemy, but let us
show that we civilians of all classes are perfectly prepared
to take our share of the burdens of this war. It is for
these reasons that the Government propose to submit to the
House of Commons proposals for raising a substantial sum by
means of taxes. On the ground of policy, as well as justice,
it is expedient that a great war, involving national honour
and existence, should be financed by contributions lf:vied upon
a section--upon a minority of the population. It is peculiarly
a case for every class, every condition, every grade, to bear
their share of the burdens. I therefore submit proposals which
will bring in, so far as we are able, all classes of the
community.41
The new budget proposal sought to raise an extra
purpose of prosecuting the war.

~225,000,000

for the

This of course was in addition to the

I.100,000,000 already voted by the House.
The money was to come from two sources.

War loans could have

39Marwick, Deluge, .2E.· cit., p. 39,

41Ibid., pp. 357-358.

40House of Commons Debates, November 17, 1941, (col. 357),
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probably raised the total o.;nount, but the

gcv~rnment

felt that, if at all

possible, the war should be put on a pay-as-you-go basis.
only part of the a.mount was to be raised through loans.
in his memoirs, claims that at the time he (the

Therefore,
Lloyd George,

govern.~ent)

reasoned

that
War-time demands would stimulate our industries to unprecedented
activity; ai.~d in addition, the closing down of the international
commerce of Central Europe and the crippling of the industrial
capacities of France and Belgium, would, for the time being,
mean that a heavy extra demand for goods by other countries
would fall on us.42
The result of this furious industrial activity, Lloyd George concluded,
would be that more money would be circulating in the economy, thus making
it easier "to pay for the war while this ste.te of things lasted than later
on".

With this reasoning in hand, and the ideological palatability of

raising the income tax schedule and commodity duties, the goverrunent put
before the House a budget which was designed to maintain ''business as
usual".
Before the war, people earning between ±.160 and :i;,500 per year were
taxed at a rate of 9d. per pound.

Those with incomes above b500 but below

b3,000 paid a rate of ls. 3d., and all incomes exceeding
charged with an additional super-tax.

~3,000

were

Lloyd George proposed that all

income brackets should have their rates doubled.

This new rate would be

payable until the conclusion of the fiscal year which ended on March 31,
1915.

This meant that the new rate of taxation would apply only to in-

comes received the last third of the year.

The other two-thirds were to

be taxed according to the old, pre-war rate schedule.

In order to supple-

42navid Lloyd George, War Memoirs of Da-vid floyd George, vol. I,
3rd ed (Boston: Little, Brow11 and Company, 1935), p. 106.
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ment the increased income taxation, the governmer.t further moved to
raise the tax on certain commodities.

The duty on beer was raised the

equivalent of a pP.nny a pint, increasing the average price per pint to
4d.

In a show of national unity, the Liberal government, to placate

the Tory brewing interests, also placed a heavier tax on tea.

The

rate was increased from 5d. to 8d. per pound.
The government arg .ied in the case of beer and tea that although
1

they were asking consumers of those two products to bear a heavy burden,
for the most part they, in the past, had escaped added taxation.

In 1909

tax on spirits, Lloyd George said, had at first caused a decline in
revenue from the sale of hard liquor.43

He noted that

Inasmuch as we are raising taxes for the immediate necessities
of the time--for the conduct of the war, I am advised that to
attempt to raise money by means of putting a co11side:::-able additional duty on spirits would be futile, and that you would not
get your revenue but, on the contrary, F~ght lose by it.44
Lloyd George further argued before the House that any tax on wine might
damage the economics of wine-producing colonies and Portugal, France,
and Spain.

Pointing this out he suggested that a heavy tariff on wine

might be "undesirable for diplomatic reasons and would not be very pro.
d UC t l.Ve

,

•

•

11

45

The wine market, moreover, was primarily the preserve

of the monied classes within society, and the government did not wa.'1.t to
appear to be asking one class to sacrifice more than others.
As to the proposed tax on tea, the government assumed that "teetotalers" were not beer drinkers and therefore it was a tax on hereto43House of Commons Debates, November 17, 1914, (col. 367).
44Ibid.' p. 367.

45Ibid.' p. 368.
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fore untaxed class of people.

Lloyd George claimed that "one's only

chance at getting at the teetotaler is by taxing ;ea".46

He reminded

the House that in 1904 the rate of taxation on tea had been at Bd. per
pound and only recently had the rate fallen to 5d.

The government, he

said, "regretted having to propose an increase of this duty".

But he

added that if he "could find any other way of levying a contribution
upon every class of the community I would
to this particular levy". 47

~ertainly

adopt it as opposed

.tv'.tr. J. E. Allen expressed the view of many

who thought that new taxes might be needed when he suggested that
The Cinematograph, s.n exceedingly foolish kind of entertainment
and one which, in the opinion of elementary school teachers,
is specially bad for children, cries out for taxation. Travelling
shows and 'roundabouts' are undertakings which ought to pay in
taxes what they save in rates, and music-halls should not be
overlooked.48
Despite Mr. Allen's suggestions and those of others, Lloyd George and.
the government refused to impose new taxes, choosing rather to increase
those already in existence.
Most orthodox opinion in the country felt that the government's
proposals were reasonable and prudent.

Money could be raised to finance

the war through the regular channels and business could proceed as usual.
The Econorrdst remarked that the
Government deserves all credit for having boldly faced an
unprecedented emergency by calling upon the nation to make

46The Liberal government was politically expected to tax tea, if it
planned to tax beer, in order to prove that both Liberals and Conservatives
were going to pay for the war. House of Co:rmnons pebates, November 17, 1914,
(col. 368).
47rbid., p. 369.
48J. E. Allen, "How to Pay for the We..r," The Con~orary Review,
December 1914, p. 765.
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a.~ u,.~precedented sacrifice.
And we must commend Mr. Lloyd
George, not only for promptitude and courage,. but also for
the directness and simplicity of the scheme which he laid
before the House of Commons on Tuesday.

The journal concluded that
There is no nonsense about it, no dodging, no attempt to
impose taxes which will be profitable to certain interests
and therefore popular with a section of the community. There
are none of those pe~ty devices which hamper trade without
helping revenue and above all none of those protective duties
in which the Exchequer shares with favored im:;erests the
plunder of the poor.49
From the other side of the political spectrum, The Nation noted in its
November 21 issue that the budget seemed "admirably devised 11 ,50

The budget

was the affirmation of the official acceptance of "business as usual" as
an economic policy.

The government intended to let the economy float

through the war adjusting "naturally" to each new situation as it ca.me
along.
In lat.e 1914 it seemed to the government as if all the immediate
problems had been worked out.

Although prices continued to rise at a

steady rate, the shock to home industry which had caused so many people
to be thrown out of work was wearing off,

The efforts to relieve dis-

located workers and their families had been largely funneled through the
normal agencies and they, as far as the government was concerned, had done
a more than adequate job.

Kitcheqer's problems in the War Office, despite

the friction between the Secretary and civilian authorities, also seemed
to be moving towards settlement.

The question concerning the position of

labor during the war, although widely discussed, was generally shunted
into the background during the first month of the war.

Patriotism demanded

49,l'he Economist, November 21, 1914, p. 907.
50"P8.ying for the War," The Nation, November 21, l• 14, p. 237.
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that labor should try to cooperate with the government and industry
during the war.

Moreover, the position of labor at the beginning of the

war was not exactly a strong one.

Massive unemployment was the major

threat to the working cle.ss, not exploitation.

Hopeful of a short war,

labor closed ranks with the rest of the nation, ·willing to make its share
of sacrifices.
As soon as the war began, industrial and labor leaders with some
prodding from the government moved to conclude an industrial truce.

At

the beginning of August there were over one hundred ongoing labor disputes
in Britain.

By the end of the month only twenty remained unsettled.

Lord

Askwith, Chief Industrial Commissioner for the g::ivernment, claims that
"disputes melted away as fast as the hours of the day and often of the
night".5 1

The London building trade dispute and the employers threatened

nation·-wide lockout was averted and both employers and the union asked for
arbitration.

The Marine Engineers' Union proclaimed a truce and their men

went back to work.

Electricians, shop repairers, boilermakers, and dock

laborers all made quick settlements in the name of national unity, or at
least went back to work.

Electricians, shop repairers, boilermakers, 8.Ild

dock laborers all made quick settlements in the name of national unity,
or at least went back to work pending further negotiation.5 2

The Times

reported to its readers that by Auglist 8,
The coal trimmers and tippers in South Wales have intimated
that they will work at any time, during day or night. The
General Workers' Union are getting their men to remain at
work, ar.d are avoiding the raising of new questions. In
South Wales the Miners' Federation have decided that a.11
existing questions, inc:uding those relating to non-unionism,
should be dropped. The Scottish coalowr.ers have intimated

51 Askwith, ~· cit., p. 358.

c:-2
~

The Times, August 8, 1914.
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to the miners in Scotland that in view of the existing position
they will no~ proceed with their claims for a ~eduction in wages.53
All over the nation it looked as if the trade unions and the industrialists were prepared to postpone their long-standing conflicts.

Patriotism~

common sacrifice, and a desire to do one's bit was in the air.

On August 28, a

con~erence

of top labor leaders was held in orde+

to more fully develop a wartime industrial policy.

It was agreed by the

representatives at the meeting
• • • that an immediate effort be made to terminate all
existing trade disputes whether strikes or lockouts, and
whenever new points of difficulty arise during the war
period, a serious attempt should be made by all concerned
to reach an amicable settlement before resorting to a strike
or lockout.54
Fully expecting the war to be short aud the peace

a

temporary one, the

unions, e,s a rule, quickly moved to settle all outstanding trade disputes.
Even as the truce was being worked out, many in the trade unions
were beginning to reconsider the concessions that had been made in the
name of patriotism.

Rising food prices and the abuses some experienced

at the hands of the relief committees made the unconditional truce that
labor had agreed upon look less than advantageous by October.
The results of the first half-million and then the second
half million men being withdrawn from industries, the knowledge
slowly sinking into some minds that the war would not end without a long and bitter struggle~ the hope in other minds that it
would soon end and business must be preserved, losses in one
business, profits in another, competition for skilled men, efforts
to fulfill contracts at any price, all the many dislocations of a
sudden great war began to have an effect.55

53Ibid., August 8, 1914.
54Askwith, ~·cit., pp. 358-359.55co1e, .212.· cit., p. 108.
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Labor opinion bega.."'1 to become unsettled and nervous over the prospects of
a prolonged war.

The industrial truce had been proclaimed primarily on

impulse without much forethought.
any conditions and

110

provisions had been made in case of inflation or

profiteering by industrialists.
the employers and
terms.'

sa~,

There had been no attempt to lay down

"They did not go to the government and

'If you wish us to keep the peace these are our

Rather they said, 'We will keep the peace,

Government, cap in hand. 11 56

1

and then went to the

The realization of this tactical error caused

some of the union leaders to challenge the peace treaty with capitalism.
The Chief Industrial Commissioner, who had helped to settle many of the
August disputes, stepped in on behalf of the government in order to patch
up the deteriorating industrial harmony.

Ask:with's efforts were generally

designed to shore up the status-quo and insure uninterrupted production.
Thus, the government's "business as usual" policy was being extended to
mean "labor as usual 11 , but the trade unions were slowly coming to the
conclusion that the policy was asking them to make all the sacrifices.
As a result, industrial tensions gradually

inc~eased

during the fall months

of 1914.57
In the ship-building and engineering trades, conferences had been

held between employers and employees in order better to organize the
industry.

Attempts were made to deal jointly with questions concerning

production, work
power.

restrict~ons,

and better use of increasingly short man-

However, the series of meetings failed to produce any significant

recommendations.

In December ship-builders and unions met again, this

time to discuss the suspension of work rules, but here again the two

56 Cole,££•
...

cit.,~·

47.

57.fbid. , p.

l'+o.
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parties failed to reach common gr01md.

Near the end of the year the

general industrial situation appeared to be "a complete deadlock, and
something like despair in the minds of those who had been most energetic
in attempting to effect an agreement. 11 58

Perhaps the most dangerous

problem was developing in the munitions industry where skilled men were
needed everywhere, not only because of the soaring demand but because
in the first days of the war many munitions workers had rushed off to
enlist.

Although many of them were being turned out of the military

and returning to their old jobs, the increasing demands for munitions
by the army could not be met.

Long hours were being required and

workers were often pirated by competing firms.

In all industries by ·

the end of the year there was conf'usion, hardship and uncertainty.
Anxiety had generally replaced the almost rabid patriotism of most
English working people and the government did very little to ease their
conf'usion.
By the end of 1914 the industrial situation had become increasingly

more critical, though the government and many observers were still

painting pictures of industrial peace.

John B. C. Kershaw, writing in

the Fortnightly Review in December 1914, suggested to his fellow countrymen that "We may face the f'uture with some degree of confidence that
during the period for which the war lasts we will be able to maintain our
mills and factories in fairly regular operation."59

This widespread

belief was based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the war in which

59John B. C. Kershaw, "The Effects of Warfare Upon Commerce and
Industry,"Fortnightly Review, December 1914, p. 1024.
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England fom1d herself.

Most planning, except Kitchener's, had been

geared to a short war.

Addison, in his diary, -writes of a dinner in

late November, at which goverrurcen.t officials were still counting the
months until peace would be declared.
There was an interesting little group at dinner in the House-L. G., Simon, the Reas and l'Jeedham (Sir George). The whole
talk, of coll!'se, was of the war. Simon has a fixed notion that

peace will be declared on July the 18th of next year, whilst
Montagu has decided on August 13th. Lloyd George thought it
might be some time between the end of the summer and Christmas
--probably nearer Chri stma.s. An;yhow, he felt it would last
longer than most people thought.bO
Few people were speculating on the effects of an extended war on British
domestic life.

A prophetic exception to this prevailing attitude was

Ramsey MacDonald, who in a letter to 'rhe Nation on September 8, wrote
In every respect, we have gone to war without counting the
costs. We a.re to be menaced with military domination in
Great Bri ta.J.n including compuJ.sory !n.ili tary service, and
with financial obligations--including debt to the dependants of the dead and to the maimed themselves--which are to
be colossal • . . Peace appears to be far off, and national
disaster threateningly near.61
MacDonald, however, was on the fringes of the political spectrum and most
refused to listen.

Instead, the government continued to pretend that

society could cperate as usual long after it should have become clear that
the war wouid demand much more of British society.6 2
The experiences

of'

the first four months of the war had shown the

Liberal government that wartime domestic problems could work themselves

6oAddison, F'our and a Half' Years, SE.· cit., diary entry, November 23,

1914, pp. 46-47.
61Ramsey Mac:Donald, Letter to the Editor, The Nation, September 12,

1914'

p.

841.

62Askwith, 2l'.· _9.it., p. 259.
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out through normal channels.

A huge: new arm;y had been raised and was

being put in the field despite the initial confusion in the War Office.
The economy, severely shaken, had not collapsed and appeared to be readjusting to the war.

Moreover, the U..Tlem:ployment among the working class

had prQved to be short-term and the resulting distress had been eased by
the regular authorities.

The government had also watched labor disputes

melt away in a great expression of patriotism, self-sacrifice, and
national llllity.

This course of events blinded those in the government

to the danger signals and they concluded that the domestic situation
would care for itself and adjust to each new situation.

They ignored in

December the rising dissatisfaction among the working class and especially
the trade lUlions.

The government also closed its eyes to the growing in-

ability of industry to meet production schedules.

Under the banner of

"business as usual" the government pursued what was in reality a non-policy
towards domestic affairs.

Planning was on a short term basis only.

The

Liberal government all but ignored the possibilities of a protracted conflict requiring national organization and maximum efficiency at home as
well as on the battlefields in France.
Despite the general tendency during the first four months of the
war to let the domestic situation drift and readjust itself to wartime
conditions, a body of war laws was created by Parliament.

The government

saw that some measures were needed in order to ensure domestic security
against enemy subversion and possible sabotage.

In response to this need,

the government introduced in the House on Au~st 8, 1914, the first
Defence of the Realm Act, otherwise affectionately known as D.O.R.A.

The

act was passed amid a landslide of other war-related legislation, receiveing little in the way of individual attention, either in the House, by
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the major journals, or the large daily newspapers.

However, the first

D.O.R.A. would soon take on a much larger role within British society
than any of its sponsors had anticipated or imagined.
The Secretary of State for the Home Department,

~tr.

McKenna, in-

traduced the Defence of the Realm Bill on August 8, saying that its
purpose was to make regulations during the war for the defense of the
realm.

The bill was simple and straightforward, having two goals.

They

were:
(a) to prevent persons communicating with the enemy or
obtaining information for that purpose or any purpose
calculated to jeopardize the success of the operations
of any of His Majesty's Forces or to assist the enemy;
(b) to secure the safety of any means of communication or
of railways, dock or harbours.63
The bill was broad. and. wide open, allowing the military to see that these
two goals were met.
it without debate.

After a short explanation of the bill the House passed
The new act did not allow the imposition of the death

sentence and the government promised that sufficient safeguards against
the more abrasive qualities of martial law would be erected.

Nonetheless,

judgement for those accused of violations was to be based on military law.
Almost no concern about the vagueness of the act was expressed; it seems
that all parties in the House were convinced that the act would be used
only against spies and saboteurs and could not possibly affect loyal
Britishers.
On August 25, :Mr. McKenna again went before the House, this time in
order to propose an amendment to the original bill.

63

House

er

The amendment was a

Commons Debat_-=.§_, August 8, 1914, (col. 2192) •
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refinement of the earlier version, providing for an even wider exercise
of military authority on British soil.

Under the first act, power was

given to enable the military, in conjunction with the civilian government, to exercise a degree of control over communications and transportation.

The addition to the act extended these povers "to all areas in

which trade is being carried on".

The government's newest proposal

sought to amend the earlier act by adding to paragraph (a) the words,
"or to prevent the spread of reports likely to cause dissaffection or
ala.rm".

Following paragraph (b) the government asked that the phrase

"or of any area which may be proclaimed by the Admiralty or Army Council
to be an area which it is necessarily to safeguard in the interests of
the training or concentration of any of His Majesty's Forces" be added.
A third paragraph (c) was also proposed.
Admiralty to

re~uisition

storehouses.64

This would enable the A.."'filY or

vacant buildings for military barracks or

The only objections raised to these amendments to the

act had to d.o with the position of the press.

Mr. C. P. Trevelyan asked

if the bill might be used to "prevent the expression in speech or in writing of any political opinions on the actions of the government 11 .65

~~.

McKenna replied by giving his assurances, noting that the provisions would
be used only in the most blatant of cases, "which may cause disaffection
and do cause harm". 66

This explanation satisfied Mr. Trevelyan and the

amendment to the Defence of the Realm Act passed easily.

64 11 Defence of the Realm Act," Sessional Papers of the House of
Commons, Public Bills, Vol. I, 1914.
65House of Commons Debates, August 26, 1914, (cols. 87-88).
66Ibid., (cols. 88-89).
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On November

16, the

DE::.~ence

of the Healn Consolidation Bill, which

sought to combine D.O.R.A. with the Aliens Restriction Act, was introduced,
It received its second reading on November 23, with the government's representative, Mr. McKenna, again in the House.
was

ce~tered

During the debate, attention

on the possibilities of government censorship of the press as

a result of the bill.

Already some correspondents had complained bitter-

ly·that they were unable to observe the fighting at the front because of
the army's failure to cooperate.

Moreover, the press in general and

especially the Liberal press, had become extremely sensitive to what it
considered to be overzealous censors.67

Lord Robert Cecil said of the

previously enacted clause of D. 0 .R.A., that "They practically enable the
Government to suppress any reports of any kind of which they ~he government censorsJ disapprove".

He added to this that, "It does not matter

whether or not the reports are true or untrue.

They may be perfectly

true, but the Government are still entitled • • • • to suppress them altogether, and not only to suppress them, but to bring anyone who spreads
them before a court-martial 11 .68
ment had been

ve~y

extreme discretion.

To this McKenna replied that the govern-

careful and felt that it had exercised its powers with
He noted that the only time so far the government

had attempted to "muzzle" the press was in the case of one newspaper that
was preparing an issue which declared there were 250,000 Germans in London.
McKenna added that he did not think it was abuse of power for the government

67 11 The Press Bureau", The New Statesman, November 21, 1914, pp. 156157.
~·

68YJouse of Commons Debates, November 23, 1914, (col. 910).
cit., diary cnt:!'y, November 20, 19li+, p. 41.

Riddell,
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to pre-empt that particular issue of the newspaper in question.69
Action on the bill wa.s deferred for two days until November 25, when
the House again took up the issue.

During the debate, McKenna put forward

two new amendments to the Defence of the Realm Act.

it shall be lawful for the Adrn.iralty or

A:rmy

He proposed that
Council:

(a) to require that there shall be placed at their disposal
the whole or any part of the output of a..~y factory or
workshop in which arms, ammunition or warlike stores or
equipment, or any articles required for the production
thereof, are manufactured;
(b) to take possession and use for the purpose of His Majesty's
Naval or Military Service any such factory or workshop or
any plant thereof? and Regulations under this Act may be
made accordingly. 0
McKenna commented after presenting the government's proposal that these new
powers were being requested so as to ensure an abundant supply of munitions
for the war effo::::-t.
of dissent.

The amendment was quickly approved with only one voice

One M.P., a Mr. Holt, representing Northumberland, noted that

the military, when given control of anything, "are most unreasonable".
While pointing 01it to his fellow members that "the requirements of the
civil population are just as important to the Crown as any other section
of the population", he was shouted down with a loud "NO!".
for Holt's objection are not clearly defined.

The motives

What is clear, though, is

.that most of those in the House overlooked the possible wider applications
of the amendments proposed by the government.
Following the passage of the consolidation bill, an article appeared
in the December 12 issue of 'I'he New Statesman, entitled "War Law".

69House of Coillillons Debates, November 23, 1914 (col. 914).
70Ibid. , November 25, 1914 (cols. 1274-1275).
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remarkably perceptive i;iece seated. simply a larger view of the Defence of
the Realm Consolidation Act, which the House, for the most part, had overlooked.

The commentator wrote that, "Put shortly, the point of the Act

lies in the fact it gives the Cabinet pcwer to legislate, within certain
wide limits, without the cumbersome necessity of passing Acts through the
House of Parlia.ment. 11 71

Adding a hopeful prophecy, the writer supplements

his evaluation by saying that
It would appear, therefore, that so far at any rate as quite
a large sphere of the national life is concerned the democratic
fabric of our government has been quick~y, decently and legally
transformed into a bureaucracy with wide legislative and judicial powers. There is, however, not much reason to anticipate
that the actual exercise of these new drastic powers will itself
be unduly drastic . . . . The Government have simply allowed a
wide margin for contingencies; they have given themselves an ell
in order that they may take several inches.
Continuing the analysis, the article is concluded by the author, who notes
that
They have abolished trial by jury, the liberty of the subject,
the liberty of the Press, but they have proceeded with a
certain commend.able discretion, masking the howitzers of their
martial law behind the theoretically inviolate citadel of the
British Constitution.72
The shroud of the constitution, however, was not to cover the howitzers of
D.O.R.A. for long.

The government, during the first months of the war, had

not finally resolved any of its domestic problems and i t had failed to develop an effective policy towards either hone industry or labor.

As a result,

industry was totally unorganized and not meeting the production demands of
the War Office, whereas labor was growing increasingly restless with inflation and low wages.

As these factors threatened to impede the war effort,

D.O.R.A. would take on a new importance by the spring of 1915.
7l"Wa.r Law", The New State~~. December 12, 1914, p. 239.
721oid., p. 246.

CHAPTER II

THE END OF BUSINESS AS USUAL
The two issues of production and labor persistently

pl~gued

the

Liberal government during the first four months of the war and these
problems were carried into the new year.

Labor, led by the trade unions,

began to bring the industrial peace to an end, while at the same time the
government was discovering that the troops on the front did not have
enough munitions to carry on the war.

Each of these problems had differ-

ent root causes, but as they grew they tended to inflame each other,
overlap and become a single complicated issuP..

Tne government, after

months of try:Lng to deal with them separately, found that its efforts
had been fruitless.

Finally, in the spring of 1915, the government

dropped its ·"business as usual" policy towards the home front, realizing
that, in modern tota..l warfare, domestic efficiency was as important to
victory as the

soldi~rs

in the trenches of FrA.nce.

Af'ter the outbreak. of the war in August, labor had agreed to participate in an industrial truce.

It was expected by workers, but never

guaranteed by the government or industrial employers, that existing rates
of real wages and profits would be maintained.

Prices from the beginning

of the war corrtir.ued to climb unabated, at a steady inflationary rate,
whereas wages ror the vast majority of workers did not keep pace with the

increased cost; of living.

Using

~Tuly

1914 as the normal price standard,

prices on the first day of each month until June 1915 rose by the follow-
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ing percentages:
September, 1914
•
October, 1914
November, 1914 • • •
December, 1914 • • •
January, 1915

10%
12%
13%

16%
18%

Februacy, 1915 • • • 22%
. 24%
March, 1915
24%
April, 1915
•
•
•
26%
May, 1915
32% 1
June, 1915

Though organized labJr had lain down the sword of industrial action, in
an effort to do their bit during the war, it was always suspicious of
both government and industry.

As early as August 5, 1914, a group of

labor leaders met to form an ad hoc group to voice the concerns of the
English working class.2

The Workers' National Committee proposed that

the responsible central authorities should take measures for officially
controlling " (a) the purchase and storage of food; (b) the fixing of maximum prices of food and trade necessities; and (c) the distribution of food."

The committee further promoted the idea that citizen committees be set up
to "guard against the exploitation of the people by unnecessarily hi.gh
prices."3

Later in the fall these demands were expanded to cover the full

range of working class consumer goods, but the call for controls went decidedly against the grain of the government's expressed domestic policy.
As a result the connnittee's demands concerning prices and profits "were
treated either with a bare denial of their possibility or with a contemptuous 'wait until June'".4 '
Labor could not wait.

Many among the working class, noting that the

rapid advance in the price of necessities, especially foodstuffs and coal,
1

M. B. Hammond, British Labor Conditions and Legislation Dm·ing the
the War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1919), p. 61.
2G. D. H. Cole, Labour in the War (London:

G. Bell and Son, Ltd.,

1915), p. 118. The committee was made up of trade unionists but they envisioned that their role was to speak for all members of the working class.
3Ibid.' p.

99.

4Ibid., p. 115 •
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were not accompanied by ru1 equal rise in their wages, began to suspect
many industries of profiteering.

Opinion differs·as to how widespread

profiteering was, but the psychological impact of the confirmed cases on
an already doubting working class began to sheke the foundations of the
industrial truce.

I'he trade unions took up the battle to bring prices

down by ending what they saw as an inequality of sacrifice.

While they

were being asked to absorb a cut in real wages, they charged that their
employers were making huge wartime profits.

On January 14, 1915, the Work-

er's National Committee reissued a series of demands they had first made
on October 5, 1914.

The resolution declared that

The price of wheat having risen to a figure (38s. to 45s. per
quarter) which allows a reasonable margin of profit for homegrowers, who are being advised, against the truest interests
of the nation, to refrain from growing more wheat until prices
rule considerably higher, this Committee is of the opinion that
the Government should appoint a Royal Corrunission on Wheat • . • 5
The resolution suggested that the objectives of the royal commission should
be to commandeer all stocks of English-grown wheat at prices from 35s. to
40s. a quarter.

The committee also asked that the proposed cormnission then

sell all the wheat at the current prices, paying a 5 percent bounty to the
growers, and that the balance of the profit should be placed in the national treasury.

Finally, the workers' cormnittee insisted that one-fifth of all

cultivated lands, other than market gardens under 5 acres, be set aside
exclusively for wheat production.

In addition to these specific recommen-

dations, the committee reasppointed the Food Prices Sub-Committee, which
had been previously

aba.~doned.

The sub-committee was charged with making

an intensive investigation into the causes

5Ibid., p. 241.

o~

high food and coal prices.
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Two days later, the Manchester Guardiem, in a rather lengthy ar-

ticle, condemned the government for its inaction ifith regard to the rate
of inflation.

Th~

paper told its readers thc.t

Whatever the causes may be, the result is a serious addition to
the burden which the poorer classes of the country have already
been called upon to bear. The Government has dcne m~ch to safeguard the producing interests of the community. For the consumer
they have so far done little.
The article continued to name what it assumed to be the causes of the continuing advance in the price of constuner goods, noting that
The employment of a very large number of ships on transport
work and the loss by capture or internment of other ships (equal
probably to the new construction of two or three years) have reduced the merchantile marine of all the belligerent colL~tries
to such an extent that ship owners are able to dictate terms as
they have never been able to do before. This is a kind of monopoly profit wrung from the shipper of goods and through him from
the consumer, for which there is no moral justification at all.6
Tb.is conclusion was echoed by the Sub-Committee on Food and Prices, which
within a week of its reappointment delivered its first report.7

The commi-

ttee conceded in their memorandum that shipping costs had indeed gone up
due to dockside congestion and the shortage of ships, but they pointed out
that this alone did not justify the prevailing high shipping charges.

In-

flated food prices, the committee charged, were exacted by the ship owners
from shippers, and therefore from consumers . 8

6Ma.nchester Guardian, January 16, 1915.

7.An interesting, but rather callous response to labor's and the
Liberal Press' charge of profiteering is, Edwin Cannon, "The Good Si de
of Hig..'1 Prices, 11 The Contemporary Review, March 1915, p. 312. He likens
Britain to a siege town and argues that high prices eliminate the need
for rationing by eliminating the waste from the diets of the people. He
notes that "nearly as much has been eaten".

81ord Askwith, Industrial Problems and Dis utes, (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and Company, 1921 , pp. 372-373. A more moderate view is presented
here but he explicitly denies that excess profits were being made.
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After issuing their initial report, the committee turned their
attention to the question of high coal prices, the subject of their
second report published on January 28.

The committee's investigation

revealed that three distinct groups were ma.king larger than usual profits
from the sale of coal to the public:

~line

owners, coal merchants, and

coal shippers who had all unduly raised their prices.

In most cases, the

committee suggested that the greatest profits were being made by the coal
merchants and manufacturers who sold their excess or low quality coal to
the public.

The committee also discovered that nearly all the coal being

sold for household use in London had been contracted for at pre-war coal
prices.

When the war-inspired inflation began, those with existing coal

contracts raised their prices even though they were still paying pre-war
wholesale prices.9
Though the committee reported that the retail coal dealers were
making larger than usual profits, they found that the mine owners and the
coasting shipowners were not gaining as much.

Even so, the report argued

that they too were ta.king advantage of the situation.

The workers' commi-

ttee, as a result of these findings, issued a series of recommendations
to the govermnent for its consideration.

They urged

1.

That maximum prices for coal should be fixed by the Government.

2.

That railway trucks, belonging both to the separate railway
companies and to private traders should be pooled to run
at their fullest economic use.

3,

That in fixing shipping freights for vessels under their
control, the Government should have regard to normal
rates, rather than the excessive rates inflicted
by private shipowners. We also reiterate

9cole, 912.· cit. , p. 127. See comparison chart of both retail and
wholesale pric~s before and after the beginning of the war.
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our demand for public control of general merchant shipping.

4.

That the Government commandeer coal suppiies and distribute
to the household consumers throu~Jl mu....~icipsl er co-~perative
agencies.

5.

That district conferences on this and kindred subjects be
organized in various industrial centers.lO

The fifth point was added in order to force the findings of the report
into the public view and to create pressure on the government which would
force it to act.

It was hoped that the meetings, which were slated to

be held on February 13, would help to solidify working class opinion
around the committee's report and behind the larger actions of the Worker's National Committee.
Events, however, began to move much faster than the workers' commi ttee or anyone else had anticipated.

Labor disputes during most of

January had been kept at a minimum, but near the end of the month new
disputes began to break out.

The day after the committee's final report

was made public a long festering coal miner's controversy in Yorkshire
became infla.rned.11

The mine owners had proposed a cut in wages for the

miners, while the workers demanded more money to meet the rising cost of
living.

A strike was threatened but the miners had mixed feelings about

breaking 7.he industrial truce.

One of the leaders of the miners' union

is quoted by the M3.Ilchester Guardian as saying that
At this moment of national crisis the men are exceedingly
reluctant to take drastic action, but after months of delay
a.nd the failure to obtain anything definite we feel the time
has come to enforce the carrying out of our agreements, even
·at the risk of a strike. Our one desire from the beginning
of the war has been to maintain the industrial truce, but the
lOib·d
_i_.- · , p. 129.
llThe New Statesman, February 6, 1915.
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actions of the coal owners has compelled the men to insist upon
the carrying out of agreements.12
Prior to the war, certain wage agreements had been made between the miners
and their employers.

The miners' claims were dropped at the start of the

war, a.rid further negotiations took place.

As the union leader noted,

nothing came of the meetings and the trade unions felt they had no choice
but to demand that employers honor all previous agreements.
On January 26 the Engineers' Union refUsed to go along with a suspension of their trade rules, despite a shortage of labor.

They feared

that an influx of cheap labor into their shops might destroy the power of
the unions which would result in lower wages.

The Salford section of the

Dockers' Union threatened to go out on strike if they did not receive a
raise amounting to ls. a day.

The Ship Canal Workers announced that they

too were considering asklng 'for higher wages and called a meeting of their
members to discuss the issue .13
Cou.~cil

Finally, on February 2 the Executive

of the National Transportation Workers' Federation announced that

they had decided to call an emergency conference of their affiliated
unions.

The purpose of this meeting was to consider "the necessary measures

_to obtain such an advance of wages amongst transport workers as to meet
the increased cost of living".14

This announcement presented the prospects

of the most serious breach of the industrial peace yet.

The Federation,

which consisted of 28 different unions with a total membership of 400,000
workers, were moving towards a strike that could play havoc with the
war effort.
12Manchester Guardian, January 25, 1915.
13Ibid., January 27, 1915.

14Ibid., February 3, 1915.
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In February the rank e.nd file membership of the railway workers, a
member 1i.rlion of the Transport Workers' Federation·, demanded that their
leaders secure for them an increase in wages.

In November the union had

agreed to suspend their long-standing demands for better conditions, but
by February they were asking the ra.ilowners for a.n increase in wages.
The hesitant union leadership was pushed by their membership into threatening a strike if the employers did not come forward with an advance, which
the companies flatly refused to do.15
al

Fearing the consequences of a nation-

rail strike, which might easily spread to the entire transportation

industry, the government stepped in and proposed a system of war bonuses.
At first the union balked, arguing that the bonuses were only temporary
and not permanent raises, but by mid-February the railway men accepted
the compromise and entered into the nation's first war bonus agreement,
thus avoiding a strike.
per week to all

me~

The railway companies agreed to pay a 3s. bonus

earning less than 30s. weekly and an extra 2s. each

week to all men whose incomes exceeded 30s.

This increase was not enough

to bring the men back to pre-war real income levels, but, still swayed by
patriotism, the men settled their dispute in the national interest. 1 6
The more radical labor leaders objected to the war bonus compromise
settlement, fearing that it would set a new precedent and make it much
harder for unions to bring real wages back up to pre-war levels.

Robert

Williams, Secretary of the Transport Workers' Federation, commented at
the time that
In London the position was certainly not helped by the settlement of the Railwaymen's proposals. Fo~ us as transport workers,

l5Hammond, ~· cit., p. 63.

16cole, ~·cit., p.143.
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the position has been app:!'.'eciably worsened by this example.
In Hull, Bristol, Leith, Cardiff, advances have bee~ secured
ranging from )+s. to 7s. per week. In London, "the Employer's
Committee countered the claim by the Dockers' Union for an
increase of 2d. per hour by saying that the cost of living
had not increased more for dock labourers than for railway
men, and the increase was accordingly fixed at 3s. per veek
for the permanent men and 7d. per day for casuals.
Williams continued by complaining that an unsatisfactory precedent had
been established by the railway workers.

He rather gloomily forecast

that
There is not the slightest doubt that the Manchester Ship
Canal Co. will adhere to their similar offer to the Salford
Dockers, en the same lines, and there is a warrentable presumption that the demands submitted in Liverpool for an increase of ls. per day will be dealt with similarly.17
The fears expressed by Williams proved to be well founded.

Throughout the

first two weeks in February the government advised employers to make similar settlements with their employees in order to assure uninterrupted production.18
Patriotism was a strong restraining factor among most of the working
class.

They hesitated to resort to the pre-war tactics of work stoppages,

slow downs and strikes, even though as each day passed they were being
asked to accept a reduced salary despite overtime.

The promise of ws.r

bonuses helped to ease the sting of inflation, but they- were insufficient
to keep up with its steady advance.

If there had been any doubt about the

reality of profiteering in the minds of the working class, it had disappeared
by early February.

Mr:-. H. I. Mitchell, a contemporary commentator, pointed

out that "the labour difficulty has been largely ce.used by the men being of
the opinion that, while they were being called upon to be patriotic and

l

7Ibid.' p. 144.

18The New Statesman, Feb. 20, 1915, p. 475.

refrain from using the

strm~s

economic positi:)n they occupied, employers,

merchants, and traders were being allowed. perfect· freedom to exploit to
the fullest the nation's needs. 1119

"The Government," The Nation wrote,

"might prove its good faith by intervening to prevent the exploiting of
the workers • • . • It should now be possible to consider the interests
o"i' the workmen and offer them a wage in some way commensurate with the

r~se in prices. 11 20

Two days before the labor conferences called by the Workers' National Committee were due to meet, the government finally stepped forward with

an official statement.

In an effort to patch up the industrial truce the

Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, went before the House to explain the government's position.

The Prime Minister drew attention to two points in his

address which he felt mitigated the need for strong action from the
Liberal government.

He argued first that the rise in the cost of living

stated in its most extreme terms which the facts permit,
is, I think, substantially below the level at which the
most somberminded and the best informed judgements in the
country would have apprehended or anticipated if they had
been told that a war upon this scale . . • • had been continued for so long a time as six months.
,Asquith further noted that, even though there had been substantial rises
in the prices of food and other commodities, that

The level they have obtained, or are likely to obtain,
so far as one can form any forecast a.t all, does not
exceed, and in many respects falls short of, the level

19r. A. Mitchell, cited in Asquith,££· cit., p. 373. ~litchell
was a civil servant in the Industrial Commissioners' Department of which
Askwith was head.
20The Nation, February 13, 1915~ p. 607.
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which those of us who are living now, and still more those
who went before us have experienced and been accustomed to
in times of profound peace.21
Adding insult to injury to those who had hoped for some decisive
action, the Prime Minister predicted that by June prices would level off
as the new crops became available.

Asking for patience until then, he

concluded his remarks by calling on the nation "to make the sacrifices·
which patriotism and public spirit demand. n22

This was blatant denial

of the claims of injustice being made by working people throughout the
country.

It was clear that the government was refusing to act and was

hiding its inaction behind appeals to working class patriotism.
Feeling somewhat abused, Mr. J. R. Clynes, a Labour M. P. from
Manchester, rose and took Asquith to task for trying to minimize the
problem.

Clynes charged that whereas most Members of the House were for-

tunate enough not to feel the effects of the change in the cost of necessities, the poor were not so lucky.

He pointed out that a 10 to 20 shilling

rise in the cost of nearly all basic commodities had the effect of reducing many workers to a bare subsistence level, thus wiping out recent advances made in the average laborers' standard of living.

Furthermore, he

accused the government's policy of allowing a free play of competition
of being just the opposite of that.

Clynes asserted that "What we have

got is combines, syndicates and ririgs, which arrange for prices for
themselves. 11 23

The Labour M. P. issued the following warning to his

colleagues in Parliament:
2lHouse of Commons Debates, February ll, 1915, (cols. 758-759).
22 Ibid., p. 776.

2 3Ibid. ' p.

779.

We are as anxious as ar1yone in the country to keep trade and
business going without disruption, disturbance or quarrel with
the employers, but it is quite patent to us, who are perhaps
a little nearer to the conditions of the working men than other
Members of this House, that a bid truce in industry cannot be
continued unless some effective relief is given.24
The implications of the M. P. 's warning were clear, but the general opinion
among both Liberal and Tory members was that the government could do little
to curb the rate of inflation.

After some debate the House ad,journed,

agreeing to meet the following Wednesday, February 15, in order to continue
the discussion.
Before the House again took up the issue of prices, the meetings
sponsored by the Worker's National Committee were held as planned, on
February 13, 1913.

'I'he conferences were held in the larger cities, London,

Liverpool, Bradford, Cardiff, Leicester, Birmingham, and Portsmouth.

The

trade unionists, socialist societies, cooperatives, and industrial women's
organizations who came together were angry at the government's insensitivity towards the working class.25

1'he New Statesman pointed out that

"What seemed to be the cold heartlessness of Mr. Asquith's speech--notably
his assumption that a rise of twenty percent in prices, after all, a small
hardship for the ¥age-earners to bear as the result of a world war, has
considerably embittered those workmen whom it has reached. 11 26
of Asquith's statements the meetings on the 13th passed a
2 4Ibid., p. 753.

25.Manchester Gua.Tdian, February 13, 1915.
26Tlle New Statesman, February 20,

.1915~p. 474.

As a result

strongly~worded
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resolution, which stated
That this conference expresses its deep indignation and
disappointment at the refusal of the Government to take
effective measures to deal with the alarming rises in the
cost of food and fuel. It appeals to the House of Commons
to force the Government to take immedia~e steps to relieve
the unsupportable burden which the cost of the necessaries
of life is imposing upon the working classes
The resolution added that the recommendations of the sub-committee on
prices be accepted by the House in place of "the policy of inaction put
forward by the Government. 11 27

Several of the meetings proved to be more

militant than had been expected and these made further demands.

The

London conference congratulated Mr. Clynes on his stand ir. the House and
proposed the Labour M. P.'s try and force the conference's recommendations
through the House.

In Manchester a resolution was passed that urged a

nationwide work stoppage if drastic action was not forthcoming.
The debate in Parliament was renewed on February 17.

An amendment

was moved by Labour, advocating the fixing of maximum prices and government
control of basic commodities, which might be subject to artificial costs.
The government, represented by Mr. Runciman, opposed the motion and the
Labour attempt to secure a division was defeated by the speaker with the
support of both Liberals and Conservatives.28
had passed the Commons by.

The time for talk, however,

On the previous day (February 16), the first

real break in the industrial truce had begun.

The Amalgamated Society of

Engineers employed in the Clyde Shipyards, after having their application
for a 2d. per hour wage increase denied by the owners and ignored by the
government, went on strike.
27cole, ~· cit., p. 131.
28House of Commons Debates, February 17, 1915,(cols. 1151-1224).

Before the war the Clyde workers had bt!er1 promised a 2d. increase
per hour, but implementation was delayed when hostilities began.

Prior

to the war, engineers in other districts had secured large wage boosts
by renegotiating earlier contracts, but the Clyde workers had adhered to
their original contract dating from 1912.

Because of this they found that

they were earning considerably less than fellow workers in other districts
and" were at a marked disadvantage when the war came.

As the nation wea-

thered the last four months of 1914, the Clyde workers waited patiently
for the promised raise, which was made increasingly meaningless by inflation.

Finally, after months of waiting, on December 16, 1914, the union

made their application for the 2d. raise.

The employers, taking advantage

of a technical flaw in the application, delayed their response until
December 30, when they finally informed the union that the demand was unreasonable.

The refusal issued by the owners had come so late that there

was not enough time for the union to submit the dispute to the governmentsponsored Central Conference for Arbitration, whose next meeting was not
scheduled to be held until February 12.

This meant that the workers, if

they waited, would have to go another month without receiving an increase
in wages .29
The union's district committee, seeing the cost of the delays, sought
to bring the issue to a head.

They ordered the men to cease work on January

20 if a settlement could not be reached.

The employers became frightened

of the possibility of a strike and agreed to meet the union at a local
conference to be held on January 19 the day before the union's deadline.

29cole, .2E.· cit., p. 148-149.
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The meeting was held, and following it the workers' representatives postponed the strike and decided to sit down once again with the owners in
order to work out an agreement.

At this second meeting on January 22, the

employers put forward their proposal.
a farthing per hour,

They offered an immediate raise of

which would after three months be supplemented by

an additional farthing.

Then after the passage of three more months the

owners said they would increase the workers' wages by another 1/2 d.
The labor representatives rejected the offer, demanding the promised 2d.
advance immediately.

The two sides were at loggerheads and the question

was again put aside, to be submitted at the February 12 meeting of the
central conference.30
The membership of the union, unhappy with the long delay and the
small sum offered by their employers, took the matter into their own
hands.

An

unofficial meeting was held and the men in attendance voted

to refuse to work overtime
the dispute.

u.~til

a special conference was called to settle

The union officials, fearing that the refusal to work over-

time would be interpreted as a work stoppage, argued that the men should
wait.

They refused and in the larger shops overtime crune to an end.

Finally on February 12, the central conference met to arbitrate between
the Clydeside owners and their employees.

The employers raised their

previous offer but refused to increase wages more than 3/4 d. per hour,
while insisting that the raise be classified as a war bonus and not as a
permanent

adva.nc~.

The union negotiators, aware that their constituency

would not accept the new deal, agreed to recommend the terms of the offer

30roid., pp. 149-150.
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to the membership.

Apparently afraid of the government's reaction if the

compromise was turned down, they asked the workers· "to accept a settlement
which they knew to be wholly unjust and inadequate. "31

The union officials

sent out ballots with their recommendations, which were not due to be returned until March 9.

Again the issue was postponed for nearly a month.

'rhe result of this added delay was a wild-cat strike, aimed as much
at the

u..~ion's

leadership as at the shipyard owners.

On February 16, work

stopped and strikes quickly spread to all the shops until almost 10,000
men were idle.32

Led by shop stewards who were often socialists, the rebels

created a new authority called the Shop Stewards Committee.

Around this

committee, the industrial unionists, syndicatists, and guild socialist elements

rallied~

claiming to represent the largest group of Clyde engineers.

DemandiLg that they exclusively carry on all f'uture negotiations, the committee denounced the A.S.E. Executive Committee as not having at heart the
best interests of the Clyde workers.

The leaders of the union, faced with

open insurrection, forced the issue.

The date for the counting of the

ballots was moved up to February 24, and the results confirmed the membership's disaffection.

The men decisively rejected the wage settlement offer

and their leadership, by a vote of 8,927 to 829,33

The crisis had reached

a critical stage and it seemed that the government now had no choice but to
step in and try to restore the industrial truce.
The Liberal gcverr1ment did act, and to everyone's surprise it acted
decisively to bring the controversy to an end.

Nonetheless, its motives

for involvement were far different than anyone suspected.

The government

did not involve its elf because it thought the ;:-orkmen were being unjustly

32The New Statesman, February 27, 1915, p. 498. 33Ha.mmond,.2E_.cit.,p.65.
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treated; nor was it motivated by a desire to protect the interests of the
owners or even the fragile industrial truce.

The government's actions

were guided by the stark realization that !!bu3iness as usual" could not
produce enough shells for the front.

As a

result~

a new policy came into

being that treated both domestic industry and labor as a valuable national
resource which had to be mobilized for total war.
Britain was short of many of the necessities of war in August 1914,
but none of these shortages had to be remedied as quickly as the inadequate
supply of munitions.

Machine guns, heavy artillery rifles, and ammunition

of all sizes were needed immediately if British forces were to be able to
help slow down the German advance into Belgium a..11d France.

Lord Kitchener

and his War Office staff not only had the responsibility of raising new
recruits, but also of securing supplies for them.

Unhappily,just as the

War Office was hampered by traditionalism and an abhorrence of civilian
interference with the raising of volunteers, similar handicaps hindered
its effort to procure armaments.

The policy of the War Office seemed to

be to prepare for the previous war rather than for the present engagement.
Just as the military planners of the Boer War had been guided by the mentality of the Crimean War, Kitchener and his colleagues were governed by
their irrelevant experiences in the African veldt.

Lloyd George wrote in

his War Memoirs that
Todleben's famous earthworks at Sebastopol had no meaning for
them, nor had the trenches of Magersfontein and the Tugela, where
our massed troops were slaughtered by riflemen they never saw. But
the thin red line of Inkerman and the glorious charge which sabered
the gunners at Balaclava, and the Boer horsemanship which rushed
Methuen's ca.mp at Klip's Drif't dominated the military mind.

Mili-

tary imagination makes up in retentiveness what it misses in agility.34

34navid Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, vol. 1, 3rd
ed. (London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 1935), p. 113.
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Most of the leading military 1:'j_gures had made
men.

~heir

reputations as horse-

French and Haig were cavalrymen, while Kitchener had been a sapper.

Collectively, their wartime experiences had taught them the value of
ruobili ty as a more than adequate c01mterweight to gun emplacements and
high

e~losive

shells.

As a result of this emphasis on speed, lightness

and mobility, the first munitions orders placed by the War Office were for
small arms and artillery shrapnel.

The high explosive shells being used

by the Germans against the fortresses of Liege were thought to be experimental and in short supply.

The War Office, noting the successes of the

Belgian tactical retreat, became obsessed with shrapnel as the key munition
in the arsenal of a light, mobile army.

Shrapnel, of course, had been very

effective against Boer horsemen as they charged British positions on the
African plains.

The military had been caught short of shrapnel shells in

1900, and Kitchener himself had complained.

The War Office, determined

not to be caught again, ignored all suggestions for other types of artillery
shells and ordered its contractors to produce as much s:b..rapnel as possible.
By the first week of September 1914, British general headquarters in
France was writing the Master-General of Ordinance in the War Office for

an increased supply of high explosives.

This request for 15 percent of

all shells to be high explosives was repeated again on the 15th and the
21st of the month.

By November 6, as the trenches became deeper, the

Commander of the Expeditionary Force was asking that fully 50 percent of
all shells for field guns be high explosives, but the War Office steadily
refused to meet these demands from the front, declaring that "the nature
of the operations may again alter as they have done in the past 11 .35

35Ibid.' p. 127.
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military planners in London

rE~fused

to listen ':,o their field commanders

and chose to ignore the fortified trenches stretching across Europe, from
the Alps to the North Sea.

Not only did the War Office not

tal~e

the advice

of its own field commanders, but it passively ignored the French General
Deville, when on October 22 he informed them that the French General Staff
was giving up shrapnel completely in favor of high explosives.

Nothing

seemed to shake the olympian certainty of the aging veterans in the War
Office.
Y10re devastating to British military operations in France than the
lack of high explosives was a more general insufficiency of all types of
shells.

As early as September 17, Sir John French was writing the War

Office, warning of the increasing shortage of shells for his howitzers;
his reserve, he wrote, had fallen to about ten days' supply and further
stores of ammunition should be sent immediately.

The War Office replied

that it could do nothing to remedy the situation because the manufacturers
had not yet reached their maximum output.36

By September 28, French was

writing letters to London almost daily in an effort to draw attention to
the pending ammunition shortage.
could have 15,000 rounds per week.
that his guns could fire less
more.

tha.~

The War Office responded by saying he
This allotment, French replied, meant
seven rounds per day and he pleaded for

French pointed out that

During the last fortnight there has been an average daily
expenditure of 14 rounds per gun, notwithstanding the fact that
these guns, as a whole, have been comparatively speaking, but
lightly engaged during the action on the Aisne • . • • in order
to maintain the Army in an efficient fighting condition I am

36Ibid., p. 128. The French had expected that the British arl!JY would
be of little use and slow to mobilize. They felt the greatest contribution
Britain would make would be from her industry. Tne French were surprised
when the contrary happened. Lord Riddell, S?.E..· cit., diary entry, April 25,
pp. 81-82.
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compelled to :::·epresent that the proposed rate of amm:uni ti on
supply cannot possibly 3uf'fice to meet demands. 37
All through October and November French wrote the War Office, literally
begging for more shells for his guns.
London continued to reply that it was doing the best it could under
the circumstances of industrial readjustment.

Finally, French, exasperated

at the seeming lack of concern for his position, bluntly wrote the War
Office on December 31, that
The present supply of artillery ammunition has been found to be
so inadequate as to make offensive operations, even on a small
scale, quite out of the question. Recent experience has shown that
the ammunition available suffices for scarcely an hour's bombard:rnent
of a small portion of the enemy's line, and that even this operation
leaves no ammun~tion to repel a counter-attack or to give assaulting
columns sufficient support. Owing to the nature of the operations
in which we are, and shall continue to be engaged, the supply of
artillery a.mrnuni ti on is the governing factor . . . . It. is on the
supply of ammunition for artillery that the future operations of
the British Army will depend.38

The War Office kept the field reports of shortages secret even from the
cabinet who were unaware at the time of the gravity of the situation.

None-

theless, some members of the government, notably David Lloyd George, had
already heard rumors of the shell shortage developing at the front.
Already in September, Lloyd George had urged the cabinet to appoint
a special committee to look into the production of guns, shells,

a..~d

rifles.

Kitchener had objected so strenuously to so-called cabinet interference that
the matter was dropped, but

a~er

the War Minister's prestige had faded among

the cabinet ministers because of his continued ineptness, Lloyd George again
brought up his proposal.

In October the ministers approved his plan, and a

37Ibid.
38Ibid., pp. 130-131.
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committee consisting of Lord Xitchener, Lord Hallane, Lloyd George, Winston
Churchill, McKenna, Lord Lucas, and Runciman was formed to explore ways to
meet future munitions needs.39
ent occasions from October 12,

The new. committee was to meet on six differ1914~

to January 1, 1915.

It soon became clear to the members of the committee that the :means

of securing armaments were less than adequate.

The munitions firms were

ready to accept war contracts, but tl"ey already lacked the manpower to
deliver on time the quantities needed at the front.

A badge system was

instituted so as to protect able-bodied male munitions workers from overzealous recruitment officers and ladies as they handed out white feathers
on the street corners.40

But the badge system was ineffective in the

face of the rapidly rising demand for :r.mni tions.

The War Office insisted

that the problems were due not to any organizational problems, but that
delays in delivery were the result of small unforeseen difficulties, such
as machinery failures and temporary labor shortages.
insisted, could be overcome in time.

These, the War Office

The cabinet committee, on the other

hand, argued that more manufacturers should be given munitions contracts,
if the established firms could not keep up with the demand.

The War Office,

still contending that only expert firms were able to produce munitions,
asked the Board of Trade for help in securing more labor for the armaments
firms.

The request was made in order to stave off increasingly hostile

criticism from the committee, which military men viewed as enemies challenging their authority.

In the end, however, the result of the War Office's

39Lord Lucas was the President of the Board of Agriculture. He was
later killed in action. Runciman was the President of the Board of Trade.
40Lord Beveridge, Power and Influence, (London: Hodder and Stoughton,
1953), p. 126. Women appeared on busy street corners and passed out white
feathers to men of military age who were not in uniform as a sign cf cowardice.
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tactical retreat was the complete undercutting of its position.

Lord

Beveridge later wrote that
The Board of Trade, having used all the men on the labour
exchange registers, canvassed engineering firms throughout the
country inviting tbem to release men for the armaments factories.
The chief result was to provoke a Yigorous demand from the firms
canvassed that, in place of surrendering men, they should be
allowed to tender for contracts.41
The board made its report to the War Office on January 23, 1915.

It recom-

mended that the production methods of some of the simpler shells and fuses
be exhibited in engineering centers throughout the country.

This, the

Board of Trade told the War Office, would show outside firms what was needed, so that they in turn could tell the
skill to produce munitions.

govern~ent

whether they had the

The War Office had no choice but to go along

with the proposal and exhibits were slated to begin on March 10, 1915.
The industrial problem of how to produce sufficient munitions for the
front was two-fold.

Expanded and more efficient production was despa.:rately

needed; in order to accomplish this more workers were needed.

Labor was

already growing short in key industries due primarily to enlistments and
the lack of skilled workmen.

Production, even if new methods were devised,

could not be greatly increased unless some answer to the labor shortage was
found.

The first response was to call on the trade unions to suspend their

shop rules and allow non-union workers, primarily Belgian refugees, women and
unskilled men (although these too were becoming scarce as a result of enlistments) to work at semi-skilled or skilled positions in the munitions factories • . The unions of course saw this as a threat to their very existence and
would ha.ve rejected any proposal that even slightly resembled dilution.

The second possible alternative was to recall even more men from service in

41Ibid.' p. 122.
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the army and put them to work no.king munitions.

The recall of skilled

workers would, some suggested, have to be accompan:i:ed by placing restric-·
tions on civilian laborers in vital industries in order to keep them at
the most important jobs.

Such a solution smacked of conscription, which

was not only feared by labor but ran strongly against the grain of British
volu..".lteerism.

In an effort to work out some way to accommodate all conflicting
interests with the needs of the nation, the government appointed the
Committee on Production in the Engineering and Ship Building Establishment on February 4, 1915.

Headed by Sir George Askwith and having as

members Sir F. Hopwood and Sir G. Gibb, the committee was a collection of
the government's best industrial arbitrators.

Their duties were to

inquire and report forthwith, after consultation with the
representatives of the employers and workmen, as to the
best steps to be taken to ensure that the productive power
of the emplo;>rers in engineering and. ship building establishments working for governmeet pur:poses shall be made fully
available so as to meet the needs o~ the nation in the present
emergency.42
The appointment of this committee by the cabinet meant that for the first
time, after months of struggling with the War Office, the munitions question
was seen as one of organizing both manufacturers and labor.

Sir George

Askwith, the committee's chairman, viewed the committee as having two primary
goals.

First, to make the best use of the available skilled work force, and

second, if not enough of these could be found for munitions employment, to
find ways to fill in with semi-skilled and unskilled labor.43

The committee

issued four reports, from February 16 to March 4, dealing with the subjects
of (1) Irregular Time Keeping, (2) Shells and Fuses and Avoidance of Stoppages

42Hammond, 5212.· cit., p. 65.

43Askwi th, .912.· cit., p. 367.
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of Work, (3) Demarcation of Work and (4) Wages in the Shipbuilding
Trade.44
Before the committee made their first report public, Mr. H. J.
Tennant, Under Secretary of State for War, delivered a speech in Parliament that suggested that trade union rules be lifted.45

He urged that

the Labor Members help the government to "organize the forces of labour,
so that where one man joins the colours, either another unfitted by age
or disability, or a woman, may take his place. n46

He promised that the

government was asking that this be done only for the duration of the war,
but Tennant made no mention of the delicate issues involved.

Nothing was

Said about inflation, excess profits, or protecting the unions during the
war.

The Labour representatives in the House saw Tennant's remarks as

just one more effort by the government to run the war at the expense of
the working class.47

Although an error in tact, Mr. Tennant's speech

seemed to mark something of a turning point in the government's relations
with the working class and specifically the trade unions.
Shortly after the under secretary's speech, the first report of the
Committee on Production appeared, on February 16.

Dealing with the prob-

lem of irregular time keeping, the committee's report noted that the
failure to attain maximum output in the shipyards was due partly to time
lost by riveting squads.

Riveting, the committei:.; disclosed, was carried

on by squads and when any one man was absent from a squad, it stood idle

44cole, 2£.· cit., pp. 155-158.
45House of Commons Debates, February 8, 1915,(cols. 282-286).
46Ibid., p. 285.

4 7Cole, .£E.. ci ~. , p. 1 73.
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until his return.

'l"'he c.:owJJJ.itteE= poir:.ted out '.;hs..t this caused a consider-

able amount of lost time and urged both employers a.nd laborers to resolve
the problem by working out a more efficient system.

If an agreement could

not be arrived at within ten days, the committee asked that the issues
be sub!p.itted to them for arbitration.
The second report of the committee concerned the production of shells

and fuses.

Released en February 20, the study, like its predecessor, dealt

with the limiting effect of union rules on production.

The committee

wrote that
Restrictive rules or customs calculated to affect the production
of munitions of war or to hamper or impede any reasonable steps
to achieve a m9.Ximwn output are under present circumstances
seriously hurtful to the welfare of the country,and we think
they should be suspended during the period of the war, with proper
safeguards and adjustments to urotect the interests of the work
people and their trade unions.48
The committee furthermore recommended in the second part of their report,
"Avoidance of Stoi: :page of Work," that labor disputes should never be allowed
to become strikes or lockouts, insisting that employers and trade unions
should "under no drcumstances allow their differences to result in the
stoppage of work."

In order to secure continued production, the Committee

on Production proposed that all government contractors and their workers
ad.here to the following statement:
With a view to preventing loss of production caused by disputes
between employers and work people, no stoppages of work by strike
or lockout should take place on work for government purposes. In
the event of differences arising which fail to be settled by the
parties directly concerned, or by their representatives, or under
any existing agreements, the matter shall be referred to an impartial tribtmal nominated by His ~1ajesty' s Government for immediate
investigation and report to the government with a view to a

settlement.49

48if ammond, ~. cit, p. 71.

49Askwith, !21?.· cit., p. 375.
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The committee also drew up a s'::.ateL1ent of goc:i :'aith designed to further
protect the positions of the trade unions, and they suggested that all
industries sign.

The statement assured the unions that "Any departure

during the war from the practice ruling in our workshops and shipyards
prior to the war shall only be for the period of the war."50
The third report issued by the commit.tee in many ways reiterated
the two reports previously released.

It urged that demarcation of work

be suspended on all government contracts for the dut>ation of the war.
The second part of the third report dealt with the utilization of semiskilled and llllskilled labor in situations where skilled labor could not
be secured.

The committee also proposed that greater use of women be

made in jobs that they were physically able to perform.
Before the fourth and final study, concerning wages in the shipbuilding trade, was prepared, the government armolUlced that it co:icurred
with the committee's earlier reports.

As a result, the cabinet appointed

the three members of the Committee on Production as the tribllllal that was
to a.rbi trate labor disputes.

Acting 'Under this authority, ·the committee

intervened in the Clyde controversy.

Unsure of his power to impose a

settlement, Askwith moved quickly, hoping to bluff his way through.
dra~ed

a strongly-worded letter and sent it to all parties.

Askwith

wrote:
From inquiries which have been made as to the position of the
disputes in the engineering trade in the Glasgow district, it
appears that the parties concerned have been unable to arrhre
at a settlement. In consequence of the delay, the requirements
of the nation are being seriously endangered.
50Hammond, 2£· cit., p. 72.
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I am instructed by the Government that ir:iportant munitions of
war are urgen-::ly required by the Navy and the.Army are being held
up by the present cessation of work, and that they must call for
a resumption of work on Monday morning, March i.51
The letter added that representatives of the several parties were to meet
with the committee in order to settle the dispute.

If the owners and the

union could not come to terms, Askwith threatened that the committee wouJ.d
impose a settlement.

No mention was made of where the committee had gotten

such far-reaching powers; in fact, the committee themselves doubted their
authority.

As G. D. H. Cole notes, "The Government was 'trying it on'" and

left "a loophole for escape should the men prove obdurate."

Their "command

had no binding force; it was at most a threat of future action. 11 52

The

government seems not to have had any clear notion of what it would do if
the unions or the employers refused to cooperate, but it huffed loudly
about taking "stronger measures 11 .53
The government's new tone frightened the Executive Committee of the
Clyde Engineers Union and they called for a resumption of work.

The shop

stewards leading the strike, acting under the name of the Withdrawal of
Labour Committee, told the men to stay off the job until March
after the government 1 s deadline.

4,

three days

They also instructed the men, once back

in the shops, not to work overtime until the dispute was settled.
resumed on March 3, but the discontent remained.

Work was

On March 6, a conference

was held, but neither the employers or the union were willing to budge from
their previous positions.
on Production.

The question was then referred to the Committee

The employers agreed that the committee had the authority

5lAskwith, £1?.· cit., p. 375.

52cole, £1?.· cit., p. 152.

53 11 The Times Cure for Labour Troubles," The New Statesman, March 6,
1915, p. 525. The Times, March 3, 1915.
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to settle the question, but
to their membership.

~r.e

union, still badly split, put the question

1ne withdrawal committee opposed the whole process

and asked the men to vote "no" on the issue, but with only a small number
of men voting, the ballot was decisively in favor of accepting the government's authority.

The committee moved quickly and on March 24 settled the

Clyde strike by awarding the engineers a war bonus of ld. per hour.

The

union complained bitterly that the raise was not sufficient to bring the
standard rate up to the level paid in other parts of the country and that
it was well below the amount needed to meet the higher cost of living.
Despite the union's complaints, the dispute ended.
The final settlement of the Clyde strike was somewhat overshadowed
by the government's activities earlier in March.

Tne final report pro-

duced by the Committee on Production was c:i.rculated among the cabinet
ministers on March 8.

The committee proposed far-reaching governmental

controls over war-related industries.

They concluded that "The Govern-

ment should assume control of the principal armament and shipbuilding
firms."

They pointed out that

The general labour unrest of the previous few weeks was accompanied by a widespread belief among work people that abnormal
profits were being made, particularly on Government contracts.
There were consequent demands for higher wages. It seemed to be
thought that limitations of profits might be decided to be impracticable, and the men were claiming the freedom to ask the
maximum price for their labour.54
In order to remedy this situation, the committee recommended that amendments
be made to the Defence of the Realm Act, which would make it possible for
the government to assume control
over the principal firms whose main output consists of ships, guns,
54The History of the Ministry of Mun:'..tions, cited in Askwith,
378.

~· cit.,· p.
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equipment or munitions c:' war . . • . Jm Executive Com..ilittee,
on the lines of the Railway Executive Committee, should be
established (a) to search for new sources of' ·supply,and (b) to
exercise continuous responsible supervision.55
The committee concluded that if such steps were ta.ken, some important
advantages would be gained.

First of all, trade unions would be more

willing to lift their trade restrictions if it were understood that
only the government and not private industry would benefit.

Secondly,

a central executive would be better able to (!Oordinate production arid
utilize labor to its maximum efficiency.

Finally, small manufacturers

would hopefully do with less labor if they were assured of the national
need.

"Such control," the committee promised, "would enable a confident

appeal to be made to work people, and would restore national unanimity.
It would also impress upon the nation that the country was at war and
industrial resources must be mobilized. 11 56
The recommendations of the committee were promptly accepted by the
cabinet, but it was decided not to release the report until af'ter the
government had a chance to meet with industrial and labor leaders.57

Tne

Treasury Conference sponsored by Lloyd George was to be held on March 1719; he hoped to convince those in attendance that they should cooperate
with the government.

Before the conference met, however, the entire tone

of the nation's understanding of the war seemed to shift.

On March 8, the

Manchester Guardian ran two large photographs of munitions at a naval dock
yard.

The caption under one of these read:

"an aspect of the immensely

55Ibid., cited in Askwith, p. 378. 56Tuid., cited in Askwith, p. 379.
57The report was never released to the public.
footnote, p. 377.

See Askwith,
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important work of supplying the country's
tials of war. 11 58

e..l'J:::!:~d

forces with the es sen-

The Suectat.or wrote in an artiele:

Experience shows that greater efficiency and greater profit
are secured by private than by public management, but in certain
cases it is necessary to superadd public control to private
management in order to protect the consumer against possible
extortion on the part of monopolistic producers. In time of
wer the whole situation is altered. Then the questions of profit
and of economy are thrown to the winds. All we have to think
about is how to secure the materials we want of the required
quality in the quickest possible time, and with this end in
view direct ma:c.agement by the State may be essential.59
The nation finally seemed to understand the nature of total war and the
demands that would have to be made upon the civilian population.
On March 15 the Defence of the Realm Act, Amendment No. 2, became
law.

It was approved essentially without opposition, even though it gave

the government almost unlimited power.60

The government was empowered

( c) to require any work in any factory or workshop to be done
in accordance with the directions of the Admiralty or Army
Council, given with the object of making the factory or
workshop, or the plant or labour therein, as useful as
possible for the production of war material; and
(d) to.regulate or restrict the carrying on of work in any
factory or workshop, or remove the plant therefrom, with
a view to increasing the production of war material in
other 1'actories or workshops; and
(e) to take possession of any unoccupied premises for the purpose
of housing workmen employed in the production, storage, or
transport of war materia1.61
The measure was the strongest ever taken in Britain and, if proposed before

58Manchester Guardian, March 8, 1915.
59 11 The Defence of the Realm," The Spectator, March 13, 1915, p. 391.
60House of Connnons Debates, March 9, 1915, (cols. 1281, 1283, 1293,
1296).
6l 11 nefenC'e of the Realm Act, Amendment No. 2," Sessional Papers of
the House of Loras, Public Bills, Vol. 3, 1914-16.
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the war, it would have been d>::clc-1.red unconstitutional.

In 1915 no one

questioned the government's need for such far-reaching powers.

Lord

Landsdowne remarked that the "Government waE amply justified in Mking
for powers to deal with labour employed in factories and workshops."
He added that he trusted "it would not be necessary to exercise the
powers; but if the occasion arose, he felt sure that they would be exerc;ised fearlessly" because there "should be some power in the Government of the country to intervene if abuses took place. 11 62

Lord Kitchener

expressed the same sentiments while standing before the Lord's during
the bill's second reading; he pointed out that the war effort had been
jeapordized by a lack of home industrial organization and now the government at least had the means to increase the munitions output.63
Armed with the persuaslve

n~w

powers, Lloyd George and Runciman,

President of the Boar.d of Trade, called for a Treasury Conference.

The

purpose of the meeting was to "consider the general position in reference
to the urgent need of the country in regard to the large and larger increase
in the output of munitions of war, and the steps which the government propose to take to organize the industries of the country with a view to
achieving that end."64

Nearly all those invited came the first day.

Be-

sides government officials there were representatives from thirty-three
trade unions, among whom were some of the largest:

engineers, shipbuilders,

iron and steel and other metal trades, wood workers, laborers, transport
workers, boot and shoe makers and woolen mill workers.

The Miners' Feder a-

62The Times, March 16 • 1915, Lloyd George, ~· cit., p. l 71.
63Ibid., :tt.:arch 16, 1915.
(cols. 719-724).
64Hammond,

~·

p.
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tion also sent represisata.tjves, hut they wi thd:rew after the first day
because they were opposed to, and unwilling even to ccnsider, compulsory
arbitration. 65
Calling attention to the newest Defence of the Realm Act, L:oyd
George made an appeal to the workmen and their employers to sink their
differences and concentrate their energies on production.
explain that the

govern.~ent

He went on to

did not propose to ta.ke over the factories

and put admirals and generals in charge; he claimed that the government
would not have to use its new powers if there was "perfect cooperation
between employers and workers . 11 66

After three days of meetings , all but

the engineers, whose members were still on strike at the Clyde Shipyards,
agreed to recommend to their members a resolution that provided that no
stoppages in munitions-related industries would take place during the war.
The conference also accepted the authority of the Committee on Production
in all disputed matters.
of trade rules where

11

Furthermore, the unions agreed to a relaxation

it is imperatively necessary".

Overtime, the em-

ployment and training of semi-skilled labor, and the hiring of women was
approved by the unions, with the provision that all labor be paid at prevailing district rates.

Lloyd George, in turn, promised the trade union

representatives that these war-time measures would only be enforced until
the war came to an end.

He further agreed that the government would

endeavor to see that the trade unions were in no way weakened by their wartime concessions.67

Tne next day Ben Tillet, the radical leader of the

65cole, 2£· cit., p. 216.
66The Spectator, March 20, 1915, p. 391.
67The Nation, March 27, 1915, p. 819.
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London dockers, published a w.anifesto in The Times.

He a.eclared that

Every delay in manufacture of guns and ammuhition or in transport will cost many lives, some of which are our members, and we
cannot afford to lose them. Humanitarianism as well as honour
imposes its obligations upon us to succor our brothers who are
fighting to make our homes and our women folk and our children
safe • • • • These men at the front and on the sea are protecting us against the ravages of bombardment and looting and it is
up to us to honour them.68
Out of the Treasury Conference ca.me a new willingness on the part of
labor to make sacrifices for the national interest.

The radical social-

ists screamed that the unions had surrendered to the government, as
indeed they had.
The failure of the Amalgamated Society of Engiueers to sign the
document was seen by the government as a serious omission, in view of
the strength of the u."lion in the munitions factories. 69

The re pre sen-

tatives of the union felt that the agreement did not sufficiently safeguard their members, and they complained that it did not effectively lay
out the government's promise to curb profits.
stand was the continuing Clyde dispute.

Complicating the union's

The union leadership, already

badly split from their rank and file membership, might well have been
stalling until a settlement was reached.

The government, however, wanted

their signatures on the agreement and Lloyd George and Runciman asked to
meet again with the engineers on March 25.

The Clyde dispute was settled

on March 24, the day before the meeting, and the union's executive
committee, reassuming their leadership role, worked out a separate agreement with the government.

This new document was similar to the earlier

68The Times, March 20, 1915.

69Harnmond, !?.£.• cit. , p. 77.

one, though it contained what the union felt were more explicit safeguards.
The major new provision in this amended version added that "profits will
be limited with a view to securing that benefit resulting from the relaxa-

tion of' trade restrictions or practices shall accrue to the state. 11 70
The conclusion of the Treasury Agreement marks the end of a flurry
of government activity during March, which resulted in the scrapping of
"business as usual".
the role of

a.11

Fer months, the Liberal government hesitantly played

interested mediator trying to balance the needs of industry,

labor, and the war with some justice.

This proved to be a futile effort,

but by the end of March, the government had become the most powerful of
the three quarreling partners.

It had increased its own power, not be-

cause it wanted to, but because war-time pragmatism demanded it.
ty let ideology

a...~d

liberal dogma go by the boards.

Neces si-

Even so, the govern-

ment did not replace its "business as usual" policy immediately with one
that made full use of its newly acquired unilateraJ. powers.

The Liberals,

constrained by Asquith's inability to act decisively, refused to make
effective use of their recently granted authority, and instead used it as
a supplement to their older policy.
government

empo~ered

As a result, April began with the

to take charge but refusing to act, waiting, hoping

that threats would produce sufficient munitions and maintain the industrial truce.
Beginning on March 10, British forces in France, having saved shells
for weeks, launched an offensive at Neuve-Chapelle.

After only three

days, Sir John French wrote Kitchener that he was forced to stop his

70!bid., p. 78.
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attacks on the German lines b0cause his force.3 were fatigued and "above
all by the want of 8.r"umuni tion."

In a Via.rch 16 communique, he wrote the

War Office that "The supply has fallen short, especially in 18-pounder
and 4.5-inch, of what I was led to eA-pect a.Dd I am, therefore, compelled
to abandon further offensive operations until sufficient reserves are
accumulated. 11 71

This note was follmved up by one on March 18, in which

French stated that the scale of offensive operations demar!ded a huge
increase in the supply of ammunition if any results were to be obtained.
He added bluntly that up until March the combined effect of mud and the
lack of shells had limited British operations.
ty of his remark to be misunderstood, he

cl~imed

Not allowing the subtlethat

The weather and the state of the ground have no longer to be
reckoned with as limiting the scope of our operations . •
I desire to state with all tee weight of m;.v authority as
Commander-in-Chief of the British .A:rmy in France, that the
object of His Ma,iesty' s Government cannot be attained '.Ulless
the supply of artillery a.r:m.unition can be increased sufficiently to enable the Army to engage in sustained offensive
operations and I further desire to impress on them the very
serious nature of the effort that it is necessary to make to
achieve this end.72
Kitchener replied angrily to this letter by insisting that the Commander
had wasted ammunition by using in the first sixteen days of the month,
which included the short-lived offensive, from 200 to 220 rounds per gun,
or about 13 rounds per gun for each day.
The cabinet knew nothing of these letters from the front, but the
ministers were well aware of the staggering casulty figures.

The total

ground gained during the Neuve-Ccapelle offensive came to little more than
one square

mile~

and British losses amounted to 12,894 officers and men.

7111oyd George, ~· cit., p. 169.

Addison wrote in his diary on March 10, the fi:rst day of the battle of
Neuve-Chapelle, that
The adequate supply of munitions of war is the most pressing
question just now. More and more is coming to the front. L. G.
can scarcely contain himself about the War Office. I do not
know any of the details, but, apart from what is generally
known, all the indications that have come to us at the Board
support the view of War Office methods and their lack of vision.73
Despite the absence of confirmed information, rumors began to float through
the government bureaucracy and hints that a problem existed were given in
the press,74

There was "vague talk" that the operations at Neuve-Chapelle

had not been as successful as they should have been.75
The commotion soon died away for lack of confirmation, and during
the first few weeks in April, there was a lull in the reports concerning
munitions shortages.

With some digging, the cabinet might have discovered

the severity of the situation, but with the possible exception of Lloyd
George, the ministers continued to believe in the illusion painted by the
War Secretary.

In a letter to Asquith, dated April 14, Kitchener informed

the cabinet that French had asked him to tell the ministers for him that
"With the present supply of ammunition he will have as much as his troops
will be able to use on the next forward movement. 11 76

Asquith was especially

pleased with the report and, wholly believing its validity, he made his
famous Newcastle speech on April 20.

The address was extremely optimistic

and laid stress on the need for patriotic volunteerism among all of the

73christopher Addison, Four and a Half Years, vol. I, 3rd ed.,
(London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 193~-), diary entry, March 10, 1915, p.69.
74sir John French, 1914, (London:
pp. 354-355.

Constable and Company, Ltd., 1919),

75Addison, ~·cit., diary entry, March 29, 1915, p. 71.
7611 oyd George, .212..· cit. , p. 1 73.
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nation's interests.

He

ignc:r~d

the new powers held by the government,

thus giving the distinct impression that there wohld be no need to use
them because everything was going so weli.77

The following day Lloyd

George was called on to defend the government's munitions policy before the
House of Commons.

Several members roundly criticized the War Office and

Lloyd George found that he had to defend its actions.

He ended his remarks

on· a note of optimism, pointing out that the nation had already made significant progress.

He emphasized that there was no reason to think that

it would not continue to meet the new challenges of the future.78
This false illusion was

crushe~

the very next day when the Germans

opened a fresh offensive at Ypres, using poison gas for the first time in
the war.

Huge gaps were made in the allied lines and the general staff

in France found that they could not cover the retreat of thousands of outflanked infantrymen because of a le.ck of artillery shells.
the trapped infantry units were doomed to die.

As a result,

Although the government

censors blocked the reports, the public grew anxious over British "unpreparedness to cope with a foe that had at his disposal the resources of
science directed by a skilled and highly organized industrialism, and who
was resolved to make the most ruthless use of all of his advantages. 11 79
In an effort to relieve the pressure on British troops at Ypres, Sir
John French decided to attempt a counter attack at Festubert on May 9.

The

77The Spectator, April 21, 1915, pp. 577-578.
78House of Commons Debates, April 21, 1915, (cols. 277-374).
George , £e_. c it • , p . 174 •

Lloyd

79Lloyd George, .9.I?..· cit., p. 176. The British, up to this point in
the war, had displayed only occasional outbursts of hatred for the Germa...~s.
For the first time, with the introduction of gas by the Germans, a sustained
hatred is evident in the popular press. The Germans became Huns, the barbarians of the Western world.
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losses were staggering a..'1d. no significant gabs were made.

T'ne British

commander wrote later that his "mind was filled with keen anxiety."
After all our demands, less than 8 per cent of our shells were
high explosive and we had only sufficient supply for about
40 minutes of artillery preparation for the attack. On the
tower of a ruined church I spent several hours in close observat.ion of the operations. Nothing since the Battle of the Aisne
had ever impressed me so deeply with the terrible shortage of
artillery and ammm1ition as did the events of that day. As I
watched the Anders ridge, I clearly saw the great inequality of
·the artillery duels, and, as attack after attack faL!.ed, I could
see that the absence of sufficient artillery support was doubling
and trebling our losses in men.BO
The British commander could no longer stand still while the War Office ignored his demands.

He decided to circumvent Kitchener and make a public

appeal even if it meant his removal from command.

French returned to his

headquarters and found there a telegram from London.

It ordered him to

ship fully twenty percent of his scanty reserve supply of ammunition to
the Dardanelles.

This reinforced his decision and he gave orders that the

complete story of the shell shortage be given to Colonel Repington, the
military correspondent for The Times.

French also directed that copies

of the information be carried personally by his private secretary, Brinsley
Fitz Gerald, and another aide, Capitain Frederick Guest, to England, to be
put before Lloyd George, Arthur Balfour, and Bonar Law. 81
On May 14 ~ The Times released its story and laid bare the long hidden
truth about the shell shortage.

Soon all the papers were filled with the

news that "The want of an unlimited supply of high explosives was a fatal

8°French, ~· cit., p. 356-357.
81Ibid., p. 157.

Lloyd George,~· cit., p. 177.
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bar to our success. 1182

At the same time First Sea Lord Fisher, after weeks

of personal conflict with Winston Churchill over the Dardanelles campaign,
informed the cabinet that it was his intention to resign.83

Asquith, a.11ti--

cipating demands from Parliament, called t.be leadership of the opposition
to Downing Street in order to see if a coalition goverrunent could be constructed.

The arrangements went with remarkable speed and on May 19, 1914,

it was announced that a new ministry would be forthcoming.

On Ma.y 26, the

coalition cabinet was completed and unveiled to the public.
The fall of the goverrunent that had ruled Britain since the beginning
of the war was a confirmation of what should have been understood in March.
The nation needed more resolute leadership than the Liberals alone were
willing to provide.

The shell shortage, labor unrest, and even Lord Fisher 1 s

resignation were only component parts in a much larger issue that had been
developing for some time.

1~e

Liberal ministry was swept from its monopoly

on power because it had consistently failed. to consider the home front as
if it were part of the war effort and relegated it to the back seat.

They

failed to treat it with the seriousness and energy required of commanding
generals.

The maJority of Englishmen in March would have probably accepted

the goverrunent's authority, had it been exercised.

When the Liberal mini-

stry failed to capitalize on this, it lost the confidence of a large portion
of the British population.

By May, dissatisfaction with the existing gover:i-

82The Times, May 14, 1915. The Times was at that time owned by
Northcliff, who 5 Lord Riddell says, "spoke in contemptuous terms of Asquith
and Kitchener. He says that the forme:r· is indolent, weak and apathetic.
He exercises no control over the va.-rious departments. He will never finish
the war."

Northcliff was more thar: pleased t'o help make his prophecy come

true by printing the story of the shell shortage.
diary entry, April 20, 1915, p. 78.

Lord Riddell, S?.E..· cit.

5

83Peter Fraser, Lord Fisher, (London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1973),
pp. 279-287 • Llo~rd George, 2£.· cit. , pp. 198-207.
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ment had grown to such proportions that the Liberals were not able to
ride out the storm and they

W(~re

forced to bring tpe opposition into the

cabinet.
The new coalition government moved strongly to deal with the home
question.

The entire job of securing mw1itions was removed from the War

Office and placed U..'1der the control of a Ministry of M1lllitions, which was
created on June 3.

David Lloyd George, because of his long-standing con-

cern with the munitions question, agreed to resign as Chancellor of the
Exchequer and take up the ,job of Minister of Munitions.

The provisions

of the Munitions of War Act, which became law on June 23, gave the new
minister far-reaching and almost dictatorial powers over the men, women,
and machines of the nation 1 s armaments industry.

On J1Ule 3, shortly after

his appointment, Lloyd George, while on a tour of the nation's industrial
centers, said in lv:anchester
It is a war of munitions. We are fighting against the bestorganized community in the world; the best organized whether
for war or peace, and we have been employing too much haphazard,
leisurely, go-as-you-please methods which, believe me, would no~
have enabled us to maintain our place as a nation, even in peace,
very much longer. The nation now needs all the machinery that
is capable of being used for turning out m1lllitions or equipment,
all the skill that is available for that purpose, all the industry, all the labour, and all the strength, power, and resource
of everyone to the utmost, everything that would help us to
overcome our difficulty and supply our shortages • • • • When
the house is on fire, questions of procedure and precedence,
of etiquette and time and division of labour must disappear.84
The implications of the minister's remarks were wider than most of those
listening and perhaps even the speaker could have imagined.

Working people

for the first time were officially seen as a valuable national resource and.
not just as victims to be cared :for by distress committees.

84Lloyd George, 2£· cit., .PP· 226-227.

1915.

Their health

Manchester Guardian, June 4,
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and well being superceded political boundaries a.nd became important to a
larger audience than socialists, philanthropists, liberal politicians, and
assorted do-gooders.

On this matter, all interests were being welded by

the necessities of total war.

The establishment of the :Ministry of Muni-

tions gave the government, for the first time since the earliest industrial
reforms began, its own laboratory in which to carry out its social experiments.

Furthermore, it had in Lloyd George a man who, possessed of unpre-

cedented powers, could exercise persuasion, pressure, and if necessary
compulsion, upon employers to see that the newly-discovered national resources were protected.

CHAPTER III

TOWARDS AN EFFICIEifi' AND PLANNED NATION

Writing to Cynthia Asquith from France in the spring of 1915, a young
friend, Billy Grenfell, complained that "death selects our bravest and best

. . . . We

a.re a nation of foolish and courageous volunteers fighting

against the luriest of professionals, and we are paying the price. 11 1

Few

within British society would have substantially disagreed with the young
solider's evaluation of the first year of the war.

While the future held

the even more terrifying news of the Dardanelles debacle, Loos, the Somme,
and the second battle of Ypres, the realities of ten months of total war were
frightening enough.

On Jwie 9, Herbert Asquith announced before the House

of Commons that, excluding deaths caused by disease, 10,955 officers and
247 ,114 enlisted men had been killed or seriously wounded. 2
temptables no longer existed.

The old con-

Since the outbreak. of hostilities in August

1914, Britain, led by the Liberals and advocates of "business as usual",
had simply

~ssumed

that her supposed moral superiority over the Kaiser's

militarism would bring her final victory.

The British self confidence and

the bravery of her soldiers, however, were no match for German high explosives, machine guns, and fortified trenches on high ground.
By June the illusions had all but faded, and

und~r

lLady Cynthia Asquith, Diaries 1915-1918 (London:
diary entry, June 12, 1915, p. 41.

the reconstructed

Hutchinson, 1968),

2IIouse of Commons Debates~ June 9, 1915, (col. 257).
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Liberal government of Herbert Asquith, the nation, aided by the incessant
bombardment of the Nortbcliff press, bega..'1 to reshape its war effort. 3
The war had become, in most minds, a total test of national resolve that
pitted Britain's squarely against that of Germany's.

The struggle required

"

the complete mobilization and organization of material and human resources.
Confirming this, Herbert Asquith, in a surprise appearance before Parliament on June 16, firmly insisted that the first concern of the new cabinet
was to "bring to the service of the state the willing and organized help
of every class in the cornmuni ty. ,,4

Every corner of British society was to

be organized and above all wade efficient in order to bring the war to a

victorious conclusion.
A large slice of the responsibility in reaching the goal of an
ized and efficient Britain was given to David Lloyd George.

orgw~-

Stepping down

from his duties as Chancellor of the Exchequer in order to become Minister
of Munitions, he took upon himself what he later claimed to be one of the
greatest challenges of his political career.5

As the first Ivli.nister of

Munitions, he ws.s given power over the lives of individual citizens that
far exceeded any that had been previously

gran~ed

to a mini'ster of the crown.

The war had become a life or death struggle between workshops and in Britain,
the foreman in the munitions factories was David Lloyd George.

His sole duty

as Minister of Munitions was to secure an adequate supply of armaments for
3Lord Riddell, Lord Riddell' s War Diary (London:
Watson, 1933), diary entry, June 1915; pp. 99-103.

Ivor Nicholson &

4House of Commons Debates, Jnne 16, 1915, (cols. 554-561).
5David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Llo d Geor e, vol. 1 and 2,
3rd ed., (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1935 , vol. 1, p. 210.
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British forces in the field.

ine liberal press argued that the lack of

restraint on the new :ministry and its untrusted minister would impair the
hard-won rights of workers and the trade unions.

On the other side of the

political scale, the conservative spokesmen harbored a long-standing dislike for Lloyd George as author of the Old Age Pensions Act, the Peoples
Budget, the Parliamentary Act and the National Insurance scheme.

Despite

this widespread opposition, very few failed to agree that he was the only
man for the job.

A solid majority of both liberal and conservative opinion

might have, for quite different reasons, agreed with the New Statesman's
editorial assessment of Lloyd George.

The New Statesman did not

in the least quarrel with his appointment to the New Departmerit;
on the contrary, cf all the recent changes there is none that we
more thoroughly endorse. But it is certain that at this junc~ure
he is the best of all possible Minister of Munitions; i t is still
more certain that he would be the very worst of' all possible
dictators. 6
All eyes were now focused on the new minister, whose road, strewn with the
political land mines of conscription, dilution of labor, and confiscation
of private property, would prove to be an avenue towards the improvement of
the nation's quality of life, an opportunity of which Lloyd George and his
staff would take f'ull advantage.7
The Ministry of Munitions was established by the Ministry of Munitions
Act, which was approved by the House of Commons on June 8, 1915.

The act,

which gave cabinet rank to the head of the ministry, placed under its authority the undivided administrative control of all armaments production.

6The New Statesman, June 19, 1915, p. 42.
711oyd George, £12..· cit., p. 302.

Prior
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to the passage of the act, tnese responsibilities had been spread incoherently among the various governmental departments with the bulk of the
duties allocated to the War Office.

The act consolidated these respon-

sibilities by stipulating that the new ministry, if expediency req_uired,
could with the assent of the cabinet, transfer both statutory and customary
powers of the departments to itself.8

Despite this broad and sweeping

authority, specific limitations on the power and duties of the new cabinet
post remained undefined.

These were left by the government to be worked

out on a day-to-day basis, with the ministry developing procedures and
taking powers as they were needed to accomplish the end of increased arms
production.9

The prerogatives of the Minister of Munitions were only

loosely, if at all, limited by the Ministry of Munitions Act.

I,loyd George,

the almost universally mistrusted Welsh radical, found himself in the position of being bound only by the tolerance cf a disenchanted Parliament, a
wobbly cabinet, and public opinion; all of whom were desperate for victory.
In a very real sense then, the ultimate

bou..~daries

of Lloyd George's power

were those imposed by his own sensibilities.10
Even before the bill formally establishing the Ministry of Munitions
had been passed by Parliament, Lloyd George had begun to apply himself to
the task of putting together the machinery for the new ministry's efficient
operation.

Lacking even a desk for himself, he raided other governmental

8 11Ministry of Munitions Bill," Sessional Papers of the House of Lord.s,
Public Bills, Vol. 5, 1914-16. There can be little doubt that this portion
of the act, while applica~le to every government department, was specifically aimed at and resented by the War Office. Ridden, .££.· cit., diary
entries, July l-3l, l9l5, pp. 107-ll5.
9House of Commons Debates, June 23, 1915, (cols. 1217-1218).
lOMinistry of Munitions Bill, .££.· cit.
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departments for both the su:r:p:;,J.es and personnel that would. be needed to
get the Munitions Vdnistry off the ground.

Setting up a central office

was not the only obstacle before Lloyd George.

From his experiences with

labor earlier in the year, he clearly understood that their cooperation
was vital to the success of any scheme aimed. at achieving an increase in
the production of munitions.

Before and just after the passage of the

bill establishing the new ministry, Lloyd George embarked on a speaking
tour of all the major industrial areas of the country.

His speeches were

loud, patriotic, and confident; he repeatedly told the working:nen that
he had come seeking their advice and comments on the shape of his new plans
for the nation's home front.

Whether or not he already had decided on the

specific programs of his ministry is not clear, but his political tactics
were superb.

Lloyd George faced the workers with his hat in hand, wanting

nothing less than to instill a sense of participation and rekindle the
flickering patriotism among those who listened.

In Cardiff on June 11,

the minister announced to his fellow Welshmen that he "ca.me to do business",
and to tell the workers and employers alike tbe truth about the war and show
them just what had to be done.

He declared in another speech that received

(as did all his addresses) wide press coverage, that
I have often heard that time means money. Time here means lives.
The more shells, the surer the victory, and the speedier the victory. We want to turn out so much that when the hour arrives we
shall just crash our way through . . . • Plant the flag on your
workshops. Every lathe you have, recruit it. Convert your machinery into battalions and we will drive the foe from the land which
he has tortured and trampled on, and Liberty will be once more
enthroned in Europe.11
The following day Lloyd George appeared before a large crowd in Bristol &.'1.d

llThe Times, June 12, 1915.
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repeated his earlier assurances that u..11d0r his direction the Ministry of
Munitions would ask all classes to sacrifice equally.

He told his Bristol

audience, much as he had promised other crowds of workers, they could
count on this, because it was his intention to consult each interest in
the nation before taking any proposals to the cabinet.12
Although he clearly had the power to command, Lloyd George sought
out and quietly met with trade union leaders and businessmen alike, in
order to earn their trust and further solidify his position.

Soon he was

able to announce that m&-zy factory owners were volunteering to place not
only their services but their factories as well under the control of the
newly established minist:r-.r .13

The majority of trade unions also showed

a willingness to cooperate by empowering the National Labour Advisory
Committee to "agree to such measures as, without detriment to the interests of the workers, wil1 ensure a;:-. adequate supply of the necessary
munitions for the prosecution of the war with the greatest vigour. 11 14

For

the first time the trade unions, with the notable exceptions of the coal
miners and the cotton operatives, had a single, although weak voice.

To-

gether the nation's business leaders and the advisory cormnittee gave Lloyd
George their respective opinions and approved his final plans for the
Ministry of Munitions.

On June 23, in the form of the Munitions of War Bill,

Lloyd George laid the blueprint for the new ministry before the Commons.
The final draft of the bill had been delayed for a few days due to
some last minute snags in the negotiations with the trade unions.

Nonethe-

12 11 To Unite the Nation," Tne Ne.ti on, June 19, 1915, p. 375.
13The Times, June 13, 1915.
14G. D. H. Cole, Labour in the War (London:
1915)' p. 173.

G. Bell and Sons, Ltd.,
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less, by the time the proposal reached the floor of the House, nearly all
.

.

business as well as labor interests had been consulted and. had given so::ne
degree of approval to the strong measure.
three parts .15

The bill itself consisted of

Poorly drafted, there appears to have been little desire

organize the bill into a coherent and logical order.

t()

This lack of order

within the proposal, hawever, did not mute its effectiveness.

Making it

clear that the bill was an emergency measure, Lloyd George approached the
issues at hand with a shotgun approach.

While introducing the bill he

energetically pointed out that "Any obstacles, any mismanagement, any
slackness, any indiscipline, a:ny prejudices which prevent or delay mobilization of our resources at the earliest possible moment postpones victory .1116

The newly appointed minister made it clear that his measure would

not allow any barricades to block efficient industrial production.
Lloyd George, trying to give the bill some sense of order, explained
to the House of Commons that the nation had been divided into ten munitions
areas.

Each of these was to be placed under the control of local committees

of mami.gement, whose members would be drawn from the district's business
community.

In the central town of each munitions area, an office would be

staffed by engineering representatives from the ministry.

The role of these

people would be to give technical advice, coordinate production, and to give
out munitions specifications.

Furthermore, the Minister of Munitions re-

vealed to the Members of Parliament that the War Office and the Admiralty
had consented to supply military advisors, who would be assigned to serve
in the central office of each area.

These,

~loyd

George asserted, would

l5Ministry of Munitions Bill, £E.• cit.
16House of Commons Debates, June 23, 1915, (col. 1184).

82
keep the mili ta.ry c.losely tied to the production of armaments
non-partisan, patriotic flavor to the offices.

~1.d

add a

He.suggested that this

would aid in further promoting the hard-won but fragile cooperation of
capital and labor with the government.17

Lloyd George pointed out that

although the government would have the power to organize all production
from London, the most efficient method would be to delegate this power to
the committees of management and assume the role of a central clearing
house for information.

The Ministry of Munitions, he claimed, should pro-

vide "anything of expert advice, specifications, samples, inspection and
material . • • • but we must rely upon the great businessmen of each locality to do the organ.ization in those districts for themselves. 11 18
Despite this obvious preference for local management, Lloyd George
made it clear in the Munitions of War Bill that local control did not mean
autonomy.

The Ministry of Munitions, in order to better exercise its

function as a source of information and to more f'ully coordinate p:rod1;.ction,
required accurate and detailed reports from each locality.
the munitions bill, section eleven of part

three~

Wrttten into

was the requirement that

indepth monthly reports to the ministry should be submitted by every workshop producing munitions.

The section demandeQ that each employer report

as to
(a) the numbers and classes of persons employed or likely to be
employed in the establishment from time to time;
(b) the numbers and classes of machines at a...;y such establishment;
( c) the nature of the work on which any such persons are
any such machines are engaged, from time to time;

l7Ibid., (col. 1191).
18Ibid., (col. 1192).
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(d) any other matters with respect to which the Minister may desire
information for the purposes of his powers and duties.
The bill also gave the Minister of Munitions the further power to
"arrange with any other government department for the collection of
such information. 1119

any

In this way the new ministry could draw freely on

a.nd utilize all the data collecting agencies of the government in order
to reach its goal of sufficient shell production.20
In speaking before the Commons of the importance of information,
Lloyd George concluded that accurate and wide-ranging data was essential
for peak production.

He stressed tha.t by keeping a running account of in-

ventories of raw materials, machines, and workers, the ministry would be able
to ensure smooth, steady, and increased production.21

The minister also

added for his Liberal and Labour critics that with this vast a.mount of infermation, his staff would be able to detect manufacturers who were holding back
goods in a.n effort to create artificial shortages and force prices higher.
The practice, which Lloyd George admitted to the House had been occurring in
some circles, was not only taking unfair advantage of the nation's consumers
and the government, but causing immeasurable harm to the war effort.

He

asserted that "Those practices must, in the vital interests of the nation,
be brought to an end because, if there is a shortage of materials in any
one particular, the whole business, of turning out the necessary output
stops. 11 22

The minister's assurances helped to soothe those who agreed with

19 11Munitions of War Bill," Sessional Papers of the House of Lords,
Public Bills, Vol. 5, 1914-16, section ll, part three.
20Not only would Lloyd George be able to make better informed decisions concerning munitions production, but he clearly must have understood
the political advantages of such a weapon.
21House of Commons Debates, .June 23,
l9l5, (col. 1193).

22Ibid., (col. 1193).
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the necessity of the bill, but felt that the bulk of the burden was falling upon the shoulders of the working class, while businessmen were reaping huge profits.
Lloyd George's Mu..ri.i tions of War Bill also enabled the Minister of
Munitions to completely take over some armaments firms and to closely
control the rest.

Section four of pa.rt two of the bill declared that

If the Minister of Munitions considers it expedient for the purpose
of the successful prosecution of the war that any establishment i:i:
which munitions work is carried on should be subject to special
provisions as to limitations of employers profits and control of
persons employed . • • . he may make an order declaring that establishment to be a controlled establishment.23
New munitions factories were beginning to spring up throughout the country

and older firms in many cases had added new shops to their existing factories.

Lloyd George insisted that these should be placed directly under the

authority of his ministry, to be run by local managers as controlled es tablishments.
The six clauses listed under section four

of part two outlined the

specific powers that the Ministry of Munitions could exercise over the plants
designated as controlled establishments.

First, control and regulation of

the net profits of each shop was placed in the ministry's hands.

All money

deemed to be in excess of a reasonable profit was placed at the disposai
of the Exchequer.24

Second, all disputes involving labor, such as wage

rates, had to be submitted to the Minister of Munitions and the Board of

23Munitions of War Bill, .£12.· cit., section
24Ib.
d
.
_1_.,
sec +Jion
5, part two.

4,

pa.rt two.

.
d eman d s
one o f ....•J h e me.Jar
of the trade unionists at the time of the Treasury Conference, earlier
in the year.
Tinis
.
was
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Trade for binding arbitration.25

Third, any rule, practice, or c:ustom

not having the force of law, which the government ·considered to restrict
production or suspend employment, vas declared j_llegal.

This clause had

the effect of removing from the trade unions the power to strike, and any
person or group failing to comply with the anti-strike provision of the
third clause was automatically subject to criminal prosecution.

The re-

maining three clauses simply echoed the threat of prosecution by the
government of those violating any of the bill's provisions.
Thus Lloyd George, in section four of part two of the Munitions of
War Bill, was attempting to tie together the issues of industrial profit,
trade restrictions, and the right of trade unions to strike.26

1'he first

was to be tightly regulated and the second a...!d third were simply outlawed.
Good draftmanship should have dictated that the profit and labor issues
be treated separately, but Lloyd George undoubtedly had a political point
to make by tying the two so closely together.

Apart :from the poor draft-

manship and the possible political message contained within section four,
the proposal meant nothing less than absolute government control over a
sizable portion of British industry and labor.
25This was in accordance with section 1 - 4 of part one of the bill,
which established the negotiating and appeal procedures. Lloyd George
clarified this before the House by ex~laining that only the major disputes
would be submitted to the central office while, to expedite matters, most
issues involving single shops or individuals would be decided by local
and regional tribunals.
26 The combination of interrelated political issues, as in this section,
is only one example of the disorderly and surprisingly careless draftmanship of this bill.
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Lloyd George le~ little doubt about how he intended to utilize
his ministry's vast powers.

While presenting the bill to the Commons,

he drew the Members' attention to idle machinery sitting in store houses,
unused because of a lack of skilled workmen.

He said that the first step

that had to be taken in order to increase munitions output was "to secure
the necessary skilled labour, in order to fill up the workstops, which
have plenty of machinery at the present moment. 11 27

In outlining his

ideas, the Minister asked that positions that could not be filled by
experienced workers "
unskilled labour."

. should be ecked out as much as possible by

He added that

There is a good deal of work which crui be done by unskilled men
looking after it. I was told by a firm in Bristol, which was
undertaking to turn out shells, that if they were allowed to use
unskilled labour, they could double their output, because they
could have a night shift and could use exactly the same machinery.
That happens very often. You have not enough skilled labour to
utilize the machinery except during the day.28
Lloyd George assured the Commons that under the Ministry of Munitions, not
one ounce of the natiorl' s erergy would be wasted in the struggle to increase production and win the war.

As if to underline the intention to do

whatever was needed to insure enough armaments, Lloyd George had written
into the bill the specific powers over labor that the new ministry was
assuming.

In an amendment to the earlier Defence of the Realm Acts, the

bill added that the Ministry of Munitions was empowered to
regulate or restrict the carrying on of any work in any factory,
workshop, or other premises, or the engagement or employment
of any workman or all or any classes of workmen therein, or to
remove the plant therefrom with a view to maintaining or increasing the production of munitions in other factories, workshops, or
2 7House of Commons Debates, June 23, 1915, (col. 1196).

28Ibi~., (cols. 1200-1201).

premises, or to regulate and co:i.trol the S'.l.pply of metals and
material that nay be required for any articles .r'"'or use in war .29
Workmen in munitions factories were required to wear badges and sanctions
were imposed against any individuaJ. who left a factory without the consent
of the employer.30
The debate on the Munitions of War Bill was longer than it might
have been, had the government been more popular in the House.

The debate

was used by opponents and supporters alike to vent their unhappiness with
the government's conduct of the war.31

Finally, on July 1, 1915, the bill

received the consent of' the House with only a few minor amendments.

The

government, or rather Lloyd George, was now in the munitions business, free
to take whatever steps that were needed in order to improve the output of
munitions.
There was very little in the Munitions of War Act which had not
already been implemented or previously suggested.
the Treasury Agreements

a.~d

It simply consolidated

the Defence of the Realm Acts, while accepting

nearly all the recommendations of the Committee on Production.

The result

was to place under the control of a single authority with almost absolute

29Munitions of War Bill, .21?.· cit., clause d, section 10, part three.
30Ibid., sections 6-9, part two. Lloyd George proposed the enlistment of a mobile workers' army which could be transported from one factory
to another whenever necessary.
31The passage of the bill was a foregone conclusion. The debate over
it, however, caused the government some embarrassment. 'Yne tone of the
debate was anything but friendly, reflecting Parliament's un."fiappiness that
positive, forceful action (such as the bill be fore them) had been delayed
for so long. F'urthernore, some Members were extremely distraught over the
way in which they believed the government had hidden the shell problem.
Nonetheless~ Lloyd George did use this displeasure to his adva.Dtage by
insisting that 11 llllless the new Ministry of Mrmi tions has an absolui:;ely free
hand in the matter of giving and arranging orders, his appointment will be
perfectly f'utilP. 11 House of Commons Debates, June 23, 1915, (cols. 1205-

1266).

.
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powers the legal authority to ad·vise and coordinate the activities of men
as well as machines.

The passage of the act officially confirmed the

growing conviction that in the interests of the nation, machines of

flesh~

blood, and bone were not so very different from those that were made of
steel,. fed on coal, and belched smoke.

Both were home resources in the

test of total war and each needed to be organized, exploited, and used to
their maximum efficiency if victory were to be achieved.
By the early fall of 1915 Lloyd George's Munitions Ministry had

grown to become one of the busiest departments in the government.

Shell

production was steadily increasing and the short fall, despite continued
rising demand, was shrinking as each week passed.

It had been discovered

that high explosives, now e.lmost in exclusive use at the front, were produced by a relatively simple proce3s and most engineer:.ng firms had the
machinery and skill to manufacture them.

This expanded production could

not be handled by skilled union men alone, so by the authority of the
Munitions of War Act, more and more unskilled workers were brought into
factories.

Because of the shortage of men resulting from the growing de-

mands of the military, these new legions of unskilled workers were increasingly made up of women.32
never before contemplated.

Female labor flooded heavy industry on a scale
This was especially true in the national fill-

ing and explosive factories, which were set up in August and exclusively
controlled by

the Ministry of Munitions.

With this expansion of the

female labor force in the munitions factories, and in every corner of
British

industry~

the Ministry of Munitions became acutely aware of the

32As early as March women had been asked to
ernment if they were willing to be called upon to
industries. Those women who had volunteered were
ever-increasing n-umbers. The Times~ March 18-20,

register with the govwork in essential war
being called upon in
1915.

seamy health and safety conditions which were present in many plants
doing government contract work:
few if S..."J.Y

sa..~itary

inadequate

venti~ation

and lighting,

facilities, faulty safety precautions, and excessive

work hours which tended to compou."1.d all the other deficiencies.
Although the working conditions had certainly improved over the last
hundred years, the conditions in factories were still inadequate for the
protection of the workers 1 health.

The war, with its sudden demands for

increased production had put a stop to any

improvemen~s

that were being

made and this served to increase the health problems by taxing already
strained sanitary facilities.

Excessive overtime and the new inexper-

ienced .female workers further aggravated the situation.

The presence of

women in the heavy industries gave the reformers a sentimental issue with
which they could argue for better conditions.

In most establisJ:1men ts,

Lloyd George wrote, "rough and unseemly condi t.ions prevailed and had hitherto been put up with the men workers, but it was recognized as impossible to
ask women to submit to them."33
the Ministry of Munitions, Lloyd

Backed by the almost unlimited power of
George and his lieutenants combined the

issues of female labor and national

efficien~y

to make major improvements

in the working conditions of all factory workers.
On

August 12, 1915, Christopher Addison, who had gone with Lloyd

George to munitions as his top assistant and political ally, scheduled a
meeting of government officers interested in public health.

In attendance

were Sir Thomas Barlow, a physician, Mr. Bellhouse and Dr. Collins, both
from the Home Office, Sir 3eorge Newman from the Board of Education, Sir
Walter Fletcher from the Medical Research Council, and Professor Boycott,
33Lloyd George,~· cit., vol. 1, p. 302.
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who had worked previously on various medical committees.

Addison domi-

nated the conference, suggesting to its participants that "It might be
worth wM.le in our endeavour to increase the output of munitions to see
whether something could be done to sustain and improve the physical efficiency of the workers, to examine the supply of food, facilities for
meals, hours, fatigue, ventilation, and kindred matters. n34

At the same

time, on Addison's reco:rnmendation, Lloyd George appointed a female inspecter to the ministry's staff.

Her duties were to tour all the new

national factories as quickly as possible and inform the board of manage-·
ment in each about the special needs of women workers and suggest improvements.35

The first step, limited as it was, provided information to

owners who had never employed women, and brought some immediate resuJ.ts
in many factories.

Looking beyond this beginning, Addison and his ad hoc

committee had a much more comprehensive plan in mind.
A sequel to the August 12 meeting was held on September 19, during
which a permanent committee was proposed to study all employment conditions
within munitions factories.

Addison wrote in his diary that

It has become manifest that new varieties of occupation in
connection with explosives and dangerous materials a..'1d the introduction of women and unskilled workers into all sorts of work
will soon bring up a number of questions affecting the health of
workers, and I asked Lloyd George to let me appoint a number of
people whose sole business it would be to make inquiries and give
us advice on matters affecting the health of people employed in
munitions works.36
Lloyd George readily agreed and, upon Addison's recommendation, appointed

34christopher Addison, Politics From Within, Vol. I (London:
Jenkins, Ltd., 1924), p. 212.

35Lloyd George, ~· cit., Vol. 1, p. 302.
36Addison, Politics From Within, p. 213.

Herbert

91
Sir George Newman to be chairman of the Health of the Munitions Workers
Committee.

Other members of the committee were:

Sir Thomas Barlow, M. D.
G. Bellhouse, Factory Department, Home Office
Professor A. E. Boycott, M. D.
J. R. Clynes, M. P.
E: L. Collins, Factory Department, Home Office
W. Morley Fletcher, M. D. ,:tf..edica..l Research Coirl!ll:ittee
Professor Leonard E. Hill, Medical Research Committee
Samuel Osborn, J. P. , Sheffield
Miss R. E. Squire, Factory Department, Home Office
Mrs. H. J. Tennant 37
The committee was a strongly liberal one and Newman, encouraged to utilize his personal discretion in all matters, undertook to "advise the
Ministry as to the conditions of employment that are likely to be productive of the largest output. 11 38

With this directive in hand, the committee

was able to expand the area of its concern from women in factories to the
much larger question of how environmental conditions within factories
affected industrial output. 39
The committee went to work quickly and they produced their first
report in November..

Memorandum number one was an examination of Sunday

labor and attempted. to determine the overall efficiency of increased working hours. 40

The committee had toured the large industrial centers of the

37christopher Addison, Four and a Half Years, 2 vol., 3rd edq
(London: Hutchinson and Co., 1934), Vol. 1, diary entry, September
19, 1915, p. 126.
38sir George Uewman, cited in Addison, Poli tics From Within,
p. 213. Both Addison and Lloyd George made it clear to Newman that
he was free to ma.~e a broad examinaticn of all factors affecting the
health of the munitions workers.
39Philip Whitwell Wilson, "The War and Social Revolution,"
Fortnightly Review, September 1, 1915, pp. 757-764.
40emd. 8132, "Report on Sunday Labour," Ministry of Munitions,
Health of Munitions Workers Comntlttee, Memorandum No. 1, November 1915,
Sessional Parers of the House of Lords, Reports From Commissioners,Vol.56,
1914-16.
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nation and had compiled evidence presented to them by employers, workers,
a.nd other interested persons.

During their tour th.ey f'ound that Sunday

labor was of special concern to nearly all who were interviewed.

The study

released by the committee revealed tha"t the war had increased not only weekday overtime, but had made Sunday labor a regular part of industrial life.
Although there was no general rule, most factories appeared to ask their
workers to work on Sundays and some were requiring workers to put in full
twelve-hour shifts or more.

Despite the long hours, there was no proof

that production had significantly increased.

:Much to the committee's

surprise, several employers even testified that production had decreased.
A representative from one engineering firm told the travelling committee

members that his company had even reduced the average work week from
to

65~~

hours by cutting down on weekend labor.

78~

He noted that it was his

opinion that production per man hour had increased, more than making up
for the lost time.41

Several other firms gave the same report and the

committee wrote in their first memorandum that
Though accurate figures of this kind are not generally available, statements that reductions in Sunday work, have not,
in fact, involved any appreciable loss of output, and even
the less observant of the Managers seem to be impressed with
the fact that the strain is showing an evil effect • • . •
It is becoming increasingly realized that there are limits
to hours of labour beyond which no commensurate output is
obtained. 42
In this manner, the cormnittee merged their unmistakeable social concern with

those of the national war effort.

They concluded the report by noting

that "-It is of primary importance in the interests of the Nation that they
should be allowed that rest which is essential to the maintenance of their
health. 11 43
41Ibid.' p. 4.

42 Ibid.

43Ibid.' p. 6.
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Fully aware of their unique position as an advisory body to the
Ministry of Munitions, the commit.tee emphasized their conviction that
Some action mud be ta..1<:en in regard to continuous labour and
excessive hours of work if it is desired to secure and maintain, over a long period, -Che maximum output. To secure any
large measure of reform it may be necessary to il:1pose certain
restrictions on all controlled establishments, since competition and other causes frequently make it difficult for individual employers to act independently of one another.4i1
Tlie committee insisted that direct and speedy action was needed if a
general collapse of munitions production was to be avoided.

They noted

that, owing to the strong patriotic spirit of the times, long hours had
not caused the degree of individual breakdown that might be expected
under normal circumsta.11ces.

Nonetheless, they found definite evidence

that a general fatigue was beginning to slow even the older more experienced workers, as well as the managers and foremen.45
A report entitled "Memorandum Number Three", issued in November,
dealt

with the necessity of making canteen facilities available to

workers inside large factories.

Hot food and a clean environrnent in

which to eat meals, the report pointed out, would provide nourishment and
a restful atmosphere for workers who had heretofore had to eat cold food
at their work positions.46

This report was generally included in the

memorandum issued by the committee in December as Memorandum Number Two.47
Concerned with promoting welfare supervision in each factory, the report

44Ibid.

45Addison, Politics From Within, p.214.

46cmd. 8133, "Report on Industrial Canteens," Ministry of Munitions,
Health of ~hmitions Workers Commit-tee, Memo;randum No. 3, Nov. l9l5.
Sessional Papers o~ the House of Lords; Reports from Commissioners, Vol.

56, 1914-16.
47Cmd. 8151, aReport on Welfare Supervision," Ministry o:f Munitions,
Health of Munitions vforkers Corrw..J.ttee, Memorandum No. 2, December, 1915,
Sessional ~apers of the House of Lords, Reports From Committees, Vol. 56,

1914-16.

solidly linked adverse working and living conditions with poor
ef'f'iciency.

individ~al

It argued that, "Varied and complex influences are today

adversely af'fecting the efficiency of munitions workers, and among them,
certain conditions, outside the ordinary underta.."lcings of factory management, ·appear to be almost more important than the immediate or technical
environment in which work is carried on and the length of hours during
which workers are employed. 11 48

The report went on to list some of the

outside f'actors that it claimed were adversely affecting production, such
as a shortage of low cost housing, inef'ficient public transportation, a
lack of' canteen provisions, and the general ill health among many employees.
Through their study of industrial centers, the committee found that
the sudden influx of workers in a...'1d about large munitions plants had greatly overtaxed the existing housing accommodations.

Houses that were intended

f'or a single f'amily of ten were discovered to be sheltering several f'a.milies.

Moreover, it was revealed that in some areas conditions were so bad

that many beds, which were intended for one person, were often occupied by
severa1 people, day and night.49

The committee found that these poor hous-

ing conditions had an adverse effect on the capacity of' workers to attain
maximum efficiency.

They further noted that the lack of proper housing

had not only caused overcrowding, but had compelled many workers to find
shelter long distances away from their place of employment.

This meant

that they were forced to travel every morning and evening to and from the
f'actory in overcrowded and delay-ridden trains.

48Ibid., section 1, p. A2.

The committee pointed out

49~., clause a, section 1, p. A2..
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that the failure of public transportation to meet the new demands made
upon it cost both employers and employees time and efficiency.

Memora.~

dum Three reported that "Cases have come to the knowledge of the committee
where workers have to leave home daily before five A.M., and do not return
before ten P .M., thus leaving barely six hours for sleep. 11 50

It was sug-

gested that if improved and more plentiful housing could not be found in
and around factory areas, then improved transit facilities were needed to
cut down on the workers 1 travel time.

The committee urged all large fac-

tories to compile accurate data concerning distances traveled by their
workers and to devise from this information cooperative arrangements among
workers.

Furthermore, it was suggested that the information be turned over

to the proper local authorities and transit companies for action on a
larger scale.
Although the committee's work revealed to tbem that the large issues
of housing and public transportation were factors in the efficieneJ• of
munitions workers, they also understood that these were beyond the pale cf
the ministry's effective control.

After looking somewhat longingly at the

wider social issues and interdependencies, the second memorandum tu...-:ned
towards the munitions factories them.selves.

Incorporating much of the con-

tents of the third memorandum on canteens, the committee, in their second
report, asked that hot meals be provided for workers within the confines
of the workshops.

Frequently, they had found, in the course of their study,

that arrangements for heating foods brought by indi vid.ual workers W"ere
insufficient.

Comparing the laborers to soldiers, the committee argued that

50Ibid., clause b, section 1, p. A2.

Workers who are poorly lodged may be u.1able to obtain appetising and nourishing food to take with them; others living long
distances from the factory may have little or' no time to spare
for meals, and thus have to rely on what they can carry with
them to sustain them during the day. Yet the munition worker,
like the soldier, requires good rations to enable him to do
good work.51
Moreover, pointing out that many of the workers were young boys and girls,
the report insisted that welfare advice and assistance was required in
large plants in order to improve f'eeding arrangements and working conditions in general.
In order to provide this advice, the committee urged that the Ministry of Munitions ask 'all factory managers to employ welf'are supervisors.
The sole duty of these special off'icers, who were to be neither responsible
to management or labor, was to promote individual welfare in order to increase production.

The committee suggested that as an independent agent

within each plant, the welfare supervisor's duties should be wide and farranging.

Some of these responsibilities were:

To be in close touch with the engagement of new labour, or
when desired, to engage the laborer;
To keep a register of available houses a.:::id lodgings; to inform
management when housing accommodation is .inadequate; and to
render assistance to workers seeking accornJnodation;
To investigate records of sickness and broken time arising
therefrom; and in case of sickness to visit, where desired, the
houses of workers;
To investigate, and advise in case of slow and inefficient
work, or incapacity, arising from conditions of health, fatigue,
or physical strain.52
In addition to these duties, the committee in their report asked that
welf'are supervisors assist managers in areas ranging from the improvement
of sa.ni tary conditions to the organization of' recreational and educational
51Ibid., clause c, section 1, p. A2..
52~., clause d, section 1, p.

4.
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activities.

Stressing the importance of having a welfare officer inside

each workshop, the committee noted that it should· "not be regarded as
something outside the ordinary factory management or extraneous to it, but
as a vital and integral part of the whole discipline and right organization
of the business, to be shared in by all. 11 53

Emphasizing this, the com..'Ilittee

provided evidence of increased production as a result of welfare supervision
and sternly warned er:i.ployers that "Without some such special arrangement,
there cannot fail to be diminished output, discontent, and unsmooth working."54
During January 1916, a series of new reports followed in rapid suecession the earlier documents released by the committee.

These studies

dealt in detail with Employment of Women, Hours of Work, Canteen Construetion and Equipment, Industrial Fatigue and its Causes, Special Industrial
Diseases, Ventilation and Lighting of Munition Factories and Workshofs,
and finally Sickness and Injury.

In addition, an appendix to the third

report on canteens was produced which provided diagrams and blueprints
for canteen construction.55

Ea.ch report, as did the three released in

late 1915, contained within it the clear assumption that all factors affecting the physical condition of workers were tied to output and overall efficiency.

The work of the committee had begun to make it clear to those

reading their reports, that since the outcome of the war depended largely
on the productivity of British workshops, British workers could not be
53Ibid., clause d, section 1, p. 4.

54Ibid., section 5, pp.

6-7.

55cmd. 8185, 8i86, 8199, 8214, 8215, 8216, Ydnistry of Munitions,
Health of Munitions Workers Committee, Memorandum Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
10, January 1916, Sessional Papers of the House of Lords, Accounts and
Papers, Vols. 5-6, 1916.
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allowed to function at less than peak efficiency.

Machinery could main-

tain its maximum output only so long as it was greased, fed fuel, and kept
from rusting.

The work of the Health of Munitions Workers Committee, whose

final report was entitled, Industrial Health and Efficiency, had joined
humanitarian and wartime concerns.56

This was done in such a way that the

nation had to ask itself' if it could do less for its human machinery than
that made of steel.
Based partly on the strength of the November and December reports and
certainly a knowledge of the preliminary studies of the committee's January
reports, Lloyd George introduced before the House on January
bill designed to amend the original Munitions of War Act.

4, 1916, a

After some minor

changes in the Lords, the bill was completed and was finally approved on
January 19.

'I'he amending bill served to broaden and further define the ex-

tensive powers of the Ministry of Munitions.

Contained within i t were some

new important sections that gave the minister the power to establish and
require munitions contractors to acL"!J.ere to safety, sanitation, and welfare

.

~7

standards deemed necessary./

This broad power, among other things, allowed

the Ministry of Munitions, without specific Parliamentary approval, to exercise control over all conditions of employment in all workshops which employed
women, semi-skilled, and unskilled labor for the purposes of producing munitions.58

In addition, the amendment contained within it an important pro-

vision which me.de it incumbent upon the Ministry of Munitions to inspect all

56cmd. 9065, "Industrial Health and Efficiency," Ministry of Munitions,
Health of Mu.nit ions Workers Commi ttce, Final Report, 1918, Sessional Papers
of the House of Lords, Reports From Commissioners, Vol. 15, 1918.
57 11 Munitions of War .Amendment," Sessional Papers of the House of Lords,
Public Bills, Vol. 5, 1911+-16.
58Ibid., clause 1-2, section 6, p. 3.
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workshops in order to ascertain whether or not the basic requirements
were being met.59
With the full approval and encouragement

o~

Lloyd George, Dr.

Addison and Dr. Newman used the new powers of the ministry to impose on
controlled establishments the recommendations of the Health of Munitions
Workers Committee.

As early as October 1915, canteens had been estab-

lished in national factories, and with the backing of the Munitions Ministry new canteens were being quickly added to older factories.

Lloyd

George personally pushed the owners of controlled establishments to do
the same and he even went so far as to convince the cabinet to allow all
employers to write off construction costs as "a trade expense 11 .60

Given

this tax break, the committee reports, and the personal pressure applied
by Lloyd George, many employers in early 1916 began to construct canteen
facilities.

The results were immediate.

By mid-1916 more than 500,000

workers in both national and controlled workshops were able to obtain
cheap, hot, nutritious meals under decent conditions and to sit in

a

com-

fortable room without having to go beyond the factory walls in inclement
weather.61
Shortly after the environmental measures suggested by the Health of
Munitions Workers Committee were imposed by the ministry within most
munitions workshops, a new factory bill was drafted.

The bill, entitled

the Police &c.(Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill, was a catch-all measure
that easily passed through the House in late July 1916.62
59~., section 17, p. 9.

Dealing with a

6libid.' p. 217.

60Addison, Politics From Within, p. 216.
6211 Police &c.(Miscella.neous Provisions Bill)," Sessional Papers of
the House of Lords, Public Bills, Vol. 3. 1916.
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large variety of seemingly unrelated issues,part two cf the act contains within it provisions designed to secure and improve factory conditions throughout Britain.

The first clause of section seven states

that
Where it appears to the Secretary of State that the conditions
and circumstances of employment or the nature of the process
carried on in any factory or workshop are such as to require
special provisions to be made at the factory or workshop for
securing the welfare of the workers or any class of workers employed therein in relation to the matters to which this section
applies, he may by Order require the occupier to make such reasonable provision therefor as may be specified.63
In describing some of the areas of concern, the act suggested that the

Secretary of State might order those responsible to make arrangements
for "preparing or heating, and taking of meal; the supply of drinking
water, the supply of protective clothing; ambulance and first aid arrangements; the supply and use of seats in work rooms; facilities

fo~

washing;

accommodations for clothing; arrangements for supervision of workers".64
Furthermore, the act provided the Secretary of State with the latitude
to decide whether particular regulations were to be adhered to by an
entire industry or were applicable only to a slngle workshop.
Perhaps one of the more significant sections of the act was the
provision that made each factory owner monetarily responsible for all
improvements.

No longer was the owner of a firm allowed to deduct the

cost of bettering the working conditions within the workshop from the
laborer's pay packet, such as had been allowed by the 1831 Truck Act,
which was still on the books.

With the growth of organized labor the

63Ibid., clause 1, section 7, part two.
64Ibid., clause 2, section 7, part two.
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practice had faJ.len into disuse,

thoug..~

the inability of owners to make

deductions in the face of union pressure was sometlmes used to justify
the lack of improvements.

Besides reinforcing the idea that the workers

were not responsible for their working conditions, the act also required
that

t~ey

be consulted by their employees on all questions concerning

the factory environment.65

The final section of the act made it mandatory

for an outside medical man to be called upon to investigate all deaths
and serious injuries occurring within work hours and file a full report
with the Secretary of State.

These reports were to include the circum-

stances of the accident and suggest improvements that might be made to
prevent similar injuries.
The factory provisions contained within the police bill were the
earliest legislative fruit of the work done by Health of Munitions
Workers Committee.66

During the next two years almost nine hundred fac-

tory canteens were established in workshops employing more than one and one
half million laborers.

First aid and surgical dressing stations became

coI!lllonplace, as did welfare supervisors.

The Home Office issued leaflets

giving medical and hygienic advice and significant progress was made in
dealing with the treatment and prevention of special industrial diseases.
Washing facilities, cloakrooms, seats, and protective clothing made their
appearance in the tightly regulated munitions plants and in many unrelated
industries.67

The marked improvements made in the working conditions

inside factories, and the resulting rise in the quality of the health of

65sir George Newman, The Building of a Nation's Health (London:
Millan and Co.~ Ltd., 1939), p. 375.
66Ib·d
_i_., p. <75
_, •
67Lloyd George, ~· cit. , vol. l, p. 388.
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working people, is reflected in the Factory Inspectors' Reports of 1917
and 1918.68
Protected by the extraordinary powers of the Ministry of Munitions,
industrial welfare gathered strength and brought rapid changes to British
industry.

Until 1918 the Health of Munitions Workers Coimllittee continued

to gather information, issue reports, and make constructive recoilU!lendations.

The majority of these were fully implemented in the national fac-

tories and the controlled establishments that became a national model of
enlightened management.

Other industries followed this lead in varying

degrees, marking, as Lloyd George noted, "the recognition of the fact that
the producer is not simply a person employed for so many hours and paid such
a wage, but a fellow human being, with physical needs and weaknesses inseparable from his ability to work. 116 9

'I'he advances made had been accepted

and instituted in response to a national emergency, not out of a particular
humanitarian concern.

Except for a relative handful of tireless and dedi-

cated reformers, few thought of the changes as anything more than wartime
necessities.

Nonetheless, the speed with which the wartime reforms were

made gave many social activists a new hope.

Carried by this tide of opti-

mism, Lloyd George observed that "It is a strange irony, but no small compensation, that the making of weapons of destruction should afford the
occasion to humanize industry.

Yet such is the case.

Old prejudices haYe

vanished, new ideae are abroad; employers and workers, the public and the

68emd. 9108, "Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and
Workshops f'or 1917," Sessional Pa-oers of the· House of Lords, Accounts and
Papers, Vol. 14, 1918. Cmd. 340, "Annual Report of the Chief Inspector
of Factories a11d Workshops for 1918," Sessional Papers of the House of Lords,
Reports From Com.missioners, Vol. 28, 1919.

69Addison, Politics From Within, p. 224.
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state are favorable to new methods. 11 70
Despite the success of the movement to improve industrial working
conditions, Lloyd George clearly over-estimated the reach of its achievements.

Beyond a relative

ha..~aful

of reformers and the industrial commu-

nity, few outsiders were aware of the improvements being made in

worksho~

conditions; it simply was not the type of issue that elicited public
attention when the press was filled with war news.

At the same time that

the social technicians in the Ministry of Munitions were devising schemes
to use their new-found engineering powers, public attention was becoming
excited bJr a much more sensational problem.

As early as mid-1915 the

combined problems of a high rate of infant mortality, a steadily declining
number of births, and the prospects of a lengthy, life-demanding war were
thrust into the public eye.
Accompanying the casualty reports announced by Herbert Asquith on
June 9, 1915s was the startling figure that fully forty percent of those
listed as wounded were permanently disabled and unfit to return to work.
Population comparisons, which had received considerable attention before
the war, were re-examined and those who took the time to plough through
old census figures were horrified.

The last census had been conducted

in the United Kingdom during 1911.

It revealed that the rate of popula-

tion increase in the nation was falling off dramatically.

The census re-

corded that the number of people living in the country, not including the
Islands in the Seas, was 45,216,665, with 21,942,883 male and 23,273,782
female residents.

The off-shore islands, including the Isle of Man and

70Lloyd George, .2£.· cit., vol. 1, p. 308.
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the Channel Islands, were populated by a total of' 148,934 people, divided
into 69,989 males and 78,945 females,71

In the ten-year period since the

last census, England and Wales had· shown a population increase of 10.9
percent, Scotland a.n advance of 6 .1+ percent, while Ireland showed a 1. 7
percent decline in her population.

This made the overall increase in the

United Kingdom between 1901 and 1911 only 9.1 percent.72

The rate of

increase for England and Wales, the most populous areas of the nation, was
less than in any period since the institution of a regular census in 1801.
Similarly, the advance for Scotland was lower thaz1 ru1y reporting period
except that marked by the census of 1861, which showed an increase of only

6 percent.73
A comparison showed that while Britain's population growth was declining, that of other major powers was increasing rapidly.

The German

empire's population was advancing at a rate of 15.2 percent, Austria's
census statistics revealed that her population was increasing by 9.3
percent, and the United States registered a 2l percent rise.

France,

Britain's chief war partner, was the only prominent nation which fell below the United Kingdom, with a nearly staticnary advance of only 1.6 percent.

Together, Britain and France had a population of about eighty-five

million people in 1911, while Germany and Austria-Hungary had a total
amounting to nearly ninety-five million and a higher birth rate.74

These

71 11 census of England and Wales," Administrative Areas, Counties,
Urban and Rural Districts," Sessional Papers of" the House of Lords,
Census, Vol. 60, 1912.
72Thomas Hannan, "One of the War's Warnings:
Child," The Nineteenth Century, July 1915, p. 141.
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73Ibid,, pp. 142-143.
74census of England and Wales, vol. 60, ~·cit., pp. 11-12.
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population statistics proved to be little coilifort to those who lu1derstood
that the war was one of attrition.
The unavoidable conclusion to be drawn from the census comparisons
was that British human

must be used more efficiently and waste

resour~es

cut to make up the disadvantage in numbers.

The 1911 census that had

disclosed to many people that the central powers had more "cannon fodder"
than the Allies, also pointed out that many lives were being needlessly
destroyed by controllable factors.

It revealed that during 1911, the

number of births in the United Kingdom reached 1,104,707, of which 881,
138 were delivered in England and Wales.
810 deaths in these two areas.

The same year there were 527,

Of those dying in England and Wales, it

was discovered that 114,600 were children under one year of age.

'Ihis rep-

resented 21.7 percent of the total death rate or a child mortality rate of
130 deaths for each 1,000 births.

This rate was unusually high because

the winter of 1910-1911 was extremely harsh.

Nonetheless, the ten-year

average was well over 100 per 1,000, with the

~ate

for the entire United

Kingdom averaging 125 deaths for every 1,000 births.

These high figures

were dwarfed by those that revealed that the death rate among illegitimate
children reached 245.29 per 1,000 births for the entire United Kingdom in
1911.

It was further shown that the bulk of all deaths were caused by

disturbances of the digestive organs resulting from improper feeding and
malnutrition.

Among the specific causes of death among children were such

diseases as bronchitis, pneumonia, lung infections, rickets, convulsions,
whooping cough, measles, scarlet fever, diptheria, and typhoid, either preventable or curable by a combination of a proper diet, care and sani ta-
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tion.7 5
This information, which was readily available before the war, had
at the same time only raised the ire of dedicated social reformers.

By

mid-1915, the reaction was not so limited, since civilians as well as
soldiers had become pawns in the world's first total war.

The needless

waste of any life became in many minds a misspent national resource.
Writing in the July 1915 issue of the Nineteenth Century, a conservative
commentator, the Reverend Thomas Hannan, observed:
It is accepted on all sides as the teaching of History that the
continuous drain on the manhood of a nation made in long and costly
war produces physical exhaustion or deterioration on a national
scale . • • • It is easy to realize:- that the present war will have
an adverse effec~ u~on both the nurriber and quality of our population,
unless some method can be adopted to lessen the influence of the loss
of large numbers of those who are physically the finest examples of
the manhood of our country. It will be by the most assiduous attention to the care of child life in the next few yea:cs that the ravages of the war in that direction can be in any degree repaired.76
Hannan went on to note that because the bulk of the deaths among children
were caused not by the ravages of nature but by want, squalor, and impure
food, many could be prevented.

The national interest would be best served,

Hannan implied, by saving the lives of children, so that they might be
better utilized in the factories or at the front.
The issue of child life was the kind that could draw wide public
attention because it was simple, clear-cut, and emotional.

The reading

public was bombarded from all sides with information concerning child life
and its importance to the nation.

Private charities moved to establish

75Hannan, ~· cit., p. 143. In response to a question concerning
infant mortality and birth rates in the Commons, the Government provided
Members with a chart revealing similar information. House of Commons
Debates, June 15, 1915, (cols. 551-552).
76Ib'd
_i_., p. 137.
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baby saving organizations, which were designed to provide money to the
poor for proper food and to distribute maternity information.

They also

opened clinics and served low-cost baby meals and maintained day nurseries
for working mothers.
funds.

Adds appeared in many popular journals appealing for

One typical advertisement, signed by a Dr. Barbara Tchaykovsky,

appeared in the August 1, 1916, issue of the

New

Statesman.

Making her

pitch on several levels, Doctor Tchaykovsky wrote:
We need ~5,000 a year to carry on our relief funds, our restaurants, day nursery, clinics, and we appeal to every patriot at
home and at the front to help us in the task we have set for ourselves of maintaining, as far as in us lies, the welfare of the
race in one of the poorest districts of London, where the infant
mortality rate has risen from 112 in 1913 and 127 in 1914 and to
152 per 1,000 in 1915.77
In all probability the writer would have been interested in the baby-saving
project in peace time, but the war made her appeal to "patriots" more
practieal.
The war had the effect of binding a variety of interests together.

J. Cessar Ewa.rt, a confirmed Tory imperialist, who had no previously recorded concern for child life or for east London, wrote dramatically that
history indicated that "racial stocks with a redundant fertility tend to
flow from the ancestral home to take possession of new territory.

While,

on the other hand, when, in any given race, the birth-rate falls below the
death-rate, it is only a matter of time until that race is supplanted by
another. 11 78
Ewart~

The evidence for the end of British domination was clear to

wbo contended that there were 100,000 fewer births, owing to the

77The New Statesman, August 5, 1916, p. 421.

78J. Cessar Ewart, "The Saving of Child Life," The Nineteenth
Century, July 1917, p. 117.
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great absence of men, in 1915 than in 1914.
was compounded by his assertion that in 1915
diers perished hourly at the front.

T1:e tragedy of this situation
average of 9 British sol-

.a...'1

This, he argued, was disastrous enough

for the future of the race, but it was exceeded by his estimate that in the
United Kingdom 12 babies under the age of one year died hourly. 79
Child welfare had been lifted from a contested political and
issue to one on which nearly everyone agreed.

econorr~c

Some action had to be taken,

if not for humanitarian reasons, then in the national interest.

'I'he first

week in October 1917 was declared National Baby Week during which public
attention was focused on the issue of not only child life, but public health
and the prevention of disease.

The public attention that was gained did

little but create a new topic of conversation.BO

Nonetheless, for the first

time, the usually munda..."le issue of public health had caught the popular
imagination, so as to become part of a general call for the reconstruction
of British society after the war.

Reconstruction emerged mid-way through

the war as a magic term, having no precise definition, but with a constituency that stretched across the entire political spectrum.
As long as plans for reconstruction remained vague, nearly everyone
in Britain seemed to come to support it.

Articles and speeches about what

post-war plans should be, emanated from every corner of the British political
world.

The issue of reconstruction carried with it the combined baggage of

79Ibid., p. 118.
801ord Rhondda served as Chairman of the •National Baby Week Council,
whose purpose was to study the conditions of infancy and maternity which
led to the hig..~ rate o!, inf'ant mortality. DUring Baby Week the council
produced publicly a series of recommendations aimed at cutting the death
rate among children. Despite the public attention that these captured, no
official action was taken and Baby Week. slipped by without any appreciable
gains being made. "From Hospitals to Health," The New Statesman, October

27, 1917, p. 81.
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hope, fear, and practical politics, which were welded into an unwieldy

.

mass.

The Athenaeum wrote somewhat dreamily from its leftist viewpoint

that
Reconstruction is a consecration of the materia~, mental, and
spiritual resources of the nation to the fulfillment of a great
purpose. That purpose is the realization of the ideal Britain
for which men have laboured and suffered, fought and died. When
much of the best blood in the country went to fight for Britain
it was not for a country of slums and senseless luxury, of
industrial injustices and vested interests, but a country seen
in a vision, a land of truth, righteousness and freedom, a place
of infinite possibilities . • • . Reconstruction offers an
unparalleled opportunity for overhauling our whole national life
and moulding it in accordance with the purpose and ideals of a
new age.Bl
The editors of The Athenaeum and others of like mind considered reconstruction to be a new beginning.

Some of their

fellm~

countrymen took a

less expanded view of reconstruction which was formed by political pragmat ism.
Labor unrest, or the threat of it, had never ceased to be a severe
and worrisome problem.

Even though Lloyd George and successive Ministers

of Munitions effecti'Vl'.:ly checked the unions by forbidding strikes and suspending trade rules, the radicals within the labor movement continued tc
lead small strikes and work stoppages.

Many saw the continuing efforts of

the government as only temporary dams, blocking the raging torrent of
working-class revolution.

"This w:ar," wrote one commentator in January

1917, "is a volcano in which all the political, social, and economic elements of our life are seething and boiling under the crust for a great
eruption in which the old order will disappear for good. 1182

The same

8111 The M:!a.ning of Reconstruction," The Athenaeum, January 17, 1917,
p. 9.

82nr. c. Arthur Shadwell, "The Coming Revolution," The Nineteenth
Century, July 1917, p. 40.
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"II.Titer continued by saying that "The Government might stop it but only
by changes which would be revolutionary in character. 11 83

In addition,

future prospects of several rr:il.li.on soldiers coming home after the war
only added to the fear of social upheaval.

A wounded middle class sol-

dier wrote that

Every man is doing his bit and his best, but at the back of his
head rebels against what he thinks is an arbitrary military spirit
and the knowledge that the country at home has not sought ou~ energetically the slackers earning large wages and hiding themselves
as it were in munitions works, coal mines, etc., while he runs the
great life risks for ls. a day. He swears hard and long that he
will have an easier time when the war is over. I do not think he
knows how, but very vaguely says he is not going to be a 'bloody
mug for the employer ru1y more'; and he views with grea~ dissatisfaction the material gap between employer and workman. 4
In the mire and the blood of the trenches, class and rank had tended to
disappear.

The war became a great leveller of men.

Many working-class

soldiers received temporary officer commissions as the slaughter of sublieutena...~ts

created a desperate need for men of higher rank.

Large numbers

of Conservatives, even though they had opposed far-reaching social reforms
in the past; saw the mixture of disenchanted veterans and a revolutionary
working class as a dangerous combination.85

Many came to realize that

concessions wot:ld have to be made if some part of traditional English
society was to survive the immediate post-war period.
Even the religiously anti-socialist far right in British politics
had to come to grips with the issue of social concessions to the lower
83 Ibid., p. 58.

84Ibid.' p. 50.

85on September 25, The Times began a eeries of four articles entit~ed
the "Ferment of Revolution", in which the paper warned that labor unrest
coupled with disencha..'ltment over the war could overthrow the entire political, social, and eeonomic order. 'Ihe Times, September 25, 1917.
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orders.

Motivated by his own heightened fears, Lord Syndha.m of Comb

wrote, in a half-hearted jump onto the reconstruction bandwagon,that
Dangerous fallacies and alluring promises have been made
spread broadcast among the people who have neither the time nor
the knowledge required to analyse them. That is the peril of
Socialism, which claims to have found the cure of all hwr.an ills
by methods that have left the darkest stains u:pon history. Only
by the harmonious co-operation of the best brains of all classes,
working unselfishly for the common good, can our problem of
reconstruction be solved, and never was there such an earnest
desire to seek the solution in the spirit of good-will and mutual
concession.86
National opinion had grasped on to the idea of reconstruction.

For reasons

motivated by often contradictory concerns, the left, middle, and :r.ight of
British politics each accepted the idea because the notion of a new Britain
offered every one the chance to remold the country in their own im.a.ge.
David Lloyd George, who became Prime Minister in December 1916, shrewdly
evaluated the merging of political perspectives on the vague notion of a
national reconstruction.

Lloyd George's political life had been consis-

tently dominated by his tactical desire to join diverse interests on a
fragment of common ground under his personal leadership.

The issue of re-

construction offered him another opportunity to build a broadly-based
political following.
On March 18, 1916, the cabinet had established the Committee on Reconstruction with Herbert Asquith, then still the Prime Minister, as its
chairman.

The committee did almost nothing, meeting only six times in

their nine-month existence.87

Although not dead inside government circles,

reconstruction seemed to be going nowhere until, as Prime Minister, Lloyd
George told a labor conference in Manchester on Maren 6. l9l 7, that the

861ord Sydenha.m of Comb, "The Peril of Social.ism," The Nineteenth
Century, March, 1918, p. 471.
87Lloyd George, Q.E.· cit., vol. 2, p. l97.
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time had come to begin rebuilding the nation.

Speaking to the labor rep-

resentatives, he said:
There is no doubt at all that the present war . • . • presents
an opportunity for the reconstruction of the industrial and economic conditions of this country such as has never been presented in
the life of, probably, the world. The whole state of society is
lll?re or less molten and you can stamp upon that molten mass almost
anything so long as you do so with firmness and determination.
He added that it was his belief that the settlement of the war would
direct the destinies of all classes for some generations to come.
The country· 'Wil.l be prepared for bigger things immediately after
the war than it will be when it begins to resume the normal sort
of clash of self-interests which always comes with the normal
work-a-day world business affairs and concerns of the world. I
believe the country will be in a more enthusiastic mood, in a more
exalted mood, for the time being--in a greater mood for doing big
things; and unless the opportunity is seized immediately after the
war, I believe it will pass awa.y.~8
Lloyd George insisted that things must be done on a bold and daring scale,
ready to cut away the pa.st and look fo!"..rard to the new world.
he told the labor meeting, "is the thing for you.

"Audacity",

Think out new ways;

think out new methods; think out even new ways of dealing with old prob· 1ems.

Don't always be thinking of getting back to where you were before

the war; get a new world. 11 89
In order to fulfill these vague promises for the creation of a new
post-war world, Lloyd George, on July 17, 1917, appointed his most loyal
lieutenant, Christopher Addison, as Minister of Reconstruction without

88The Times, March 7, 1917.
89M. B. He.mmond, British Labor Conditions and LegiSlation During
the War (New York: Oxford. University Press., 1919), p. 271.

ll3
portfolio.90

Although the Prime :rl..inister's motives for moving to create

a Ministry of Reconstruction at that particular time are not clear, three
issues seem to have dominated his thinking.

First of all, the war was

not going particularly well and this reality was complicated by a deepseated-war weariness, encouraging a desire to make an inconclusive peace
with Germany.

Labor unions were trying to reassert their power and the

number of strikes were rapidly rising.

Lloyd George understood that

this uneasiness would only damage the war effort further.

He was forced

by this situation to attempt to rekindle the lost spirit of sacrifice and
the easiest way to do this was to focus public attention on the idea of
a reconstructed Britain.91

Equally as menacing was the growing prospect

of a large-scale mutiny in the army.

In May the French army had revolted,

a dislocation which threatened for a short period to give the Germans the
victory in the west.

The mutinies were so widespread that the French

Minister of War, Paul Panleve, secretly reported that only two divisions
between Soissons and Paris were reliable.92
From a personal political viewpoint, Lloyd George appears to have
seen in

reconstr~ction

Liberal party.

an issue with which he might rebuild the shattered

The split with Herbert Asquith had divided the party into

two warring factions, making the party completely ineffective in the poli90By creating a Minister without portfolio, Lloyd George gave the
Ministry of Reconstruction something of an unknown quantity. It apparently had all the powers of a full-fledged ministry, but lacked some measure
of the prestige normally attached to a ministry. "Reconstruction," The
New Statesman, August 4, 1917, p. 413.
91Bentley Gilbert, British Social Policy 1914-1939 (Ithaca, N. Y.:
Cornell University Press,1970), p. 7,
92Ibid.
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tical. arena.

In reconstruction, Lloyd George had an issue that had wide

appeal among Asquithia.n Liberals as well as his own Liberal contingent.
Finally, the establishment of the Ministry of Reconstruction gave him the
chance to move Christopher Addison from his position as Minister of Mimi·tions.

Addison was not a particularly good administrator and while at

munitions he had allowed the ministry to drift into often bickering
factions and had antagonized some of the most powerful trade unions, most
notably the .Amalgamated Society of Engineers.93
liability to Lloyd George.

This made him a da.!gerous

The Prime Minister had wanted to replace

Addison for a long time with Winston Churchill, who had been in the political

wilde~ness

since the Dardanelles Campaign in 1915, but who had far

greater administrative skill than Addison.
an easy escape from this political problem.

Reconstruction gave Lloyd George
Addison had unimpeachable

radical credentials which made him the most logical and politically desirable choice to head a ministry whose task was to remold Britain.94

93Addison was more than pleased to go to the newly created Ministry
of Reconstruction and did not realize that

~or

some time Lloyd George had

been politely trying to move him from munitions. Addison, Four and One
Half Years, Vol. 2, diary entry, July 17, 1917, p. 412.
94Gilbert, 2£· cit. , p. 98.

CHAPTER IV
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH
Christopher Addison's appointment to the Ministry of Reconstruction
gave him a platform from which he could personally pursue his long-standing desire to see a ministry of health established.

Through his work in

the Ministry of Munitions he had come to more fully realize the importance
of broadly-based, powerful central authorities in implementing social
improvements.

The Ministry of Munitions had made great strides in the

area of industrial welfare, but i.t only applied preventive_ medicine within
the area of its authority.

It could do nothing about poor housing, sani-

tation, and maternal care.

Addison dreamed of a ministry of health which

would have wid.e powers to cure disease and to prevent its ravages.

With

the proven success of the industrial welfare movement and the heightened
public interest in solving health problems, Addison moved to the Ministry
of Reconstruction expecting rapid success.
Before the war, the implementation of a ministry of health armed
with broad and persuasive powers was thought by serious reformers to be
essential to the improvement of the condition of the nation's poor classes.
This was particularly true among the Fabian reformers who were interested
in the prevention of poverty, not only because of humanitarian concerns,
but because they sa:w the poor as a wasted resource.

The Fabians argued

that sickness often caused poverty and poverty gave rise to sickness;
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they claimed that it was the state's

d~ty,

a.nd in it's own self-interest,

to put an end to these intertwined problems.

As

early as 1907 when school

medical inspection was established, these reformers, led by Sir Robert L.
Morant, Sir George Newman, Margaret Mc:M.illia.YJ., and Sidney and Beatrice
Webb, had begun to plan for the day when all national public and personal
medical activities would be concentrated in a single ministry for health. 1
Their planning rarely drew the interest of those outside the small circle
of Fabians and their friends, and when the war came the ministry of health
was forgotten as the nation rushed into battle.

Health ministry advocates

took up other causes; Newman accepted a post on the Board of Liquor Control.
Almost forgotten, Morant struggled to maintain the machinery of the National Health Insurance in working order.
The new Minister of Reconstruction, Christopher Addison, assumed the
role of Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Education when the war
broke out.

Later he was asked by his political mentor, Lloyd George, to

become the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Munitions.

Accept-

.ing the offer, Addison was entrusted by Lloyd George with the responsibillty of keeping intact the minister's connections with his former radical
friends.

When the government was reconstructed for a second time in

December 1916, Addison himself became the Minister of Munitions.

From

this position, he was allowed by Lloyd George to oversee most of the
Liberal domestic appointments in the bureaucracy of the coalition govern1
· Bentley Gilbert, British Social Policy 1914-1939 (Ithaca, N. Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1971), p. 101.
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ment.2

While exercising his powers of selection, Addison was responsible

.

for several appointments that were significant to the struggle for the
ministry of health.

The most important of these was Addison's nomination

of David Thomas, Baron Rhondda, who became President of the Local Government Board on December 10, 1916.
In his political work for Lloyd George, Addison had kept close ties
with both Robert Mora..."lt and Sir George Newman.

When the presidency of

the Local Government Board became vacant, Addison saw his opportunity to
eliminate one of the major stumbling blocks on the road to unified health
services.

He asked Morant and Newman to recommend candidates for the post

who were in favor of the establishment of a health ministry.

The three

decided that what was needed was a "big organizer with both a respected
name and proven political skill".3

In Rhondda the three found a man whom

they believed would be sympathetic to their plans, a business man who had
no distinct political ties, ambitions, or liabilities.

Addison and his

friends felt that Baron Rhondda was forceful enough to overcome the tradition-bound and sometimes sedentary nature or the Local Government Board's
bureaucracy.
2Britain had three large central bureaucracies, the Local Government
Board, the Board of Education and the National Health Insurance, that often
had no clear lines of demarcation separating their authority. As a result,
they often duplicated each other's work, leading to competition and hostility between authorities. Arthur Newsholme, The Last Thirty Years in
Public Health (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1936), pp. 195-203.
3christopher Addison, Four and One Half Years, vol. 2, 3rd ed.,
(London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 1934), diary entry, December 9-10,
1916, p. 278.
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On January 16, 1917, Acidison arranged to lunch with Rhondda and
Newman, in order to introduce the two men.

During the meeting at the

Reform Club, Addison urged Rhondda "to go whole hog at the L.G.B. and
arrange for the creation of a big Public Health Department."4

Prior to

the meeting, Addison had sent Rhondda a copy of a memorandum which he,
Newman, and Morant had drawn up during the summer of 1914.

Shelved be-

cause of the war, i t argued that there was a definite need for the concentration of government health agencies into a single powerf'ul ministry.
The document showed that despite the wide variety of curative services
available to the poor, few services assumed the responsibility for preventing disease and sickness.

The memorandum pointed out that this was

especially true in the field of child and maternity services, which was
partly responsible for 50,000 need.less deaths a year.5

Doctors Addison

and Newman. put this problem before Rhondda in strong businesslike terms,

and he was deeply

impressed by information revealing to him that 1,000

children, whose deaths could be prevented, died each week.

By the end of

the meeting, Baron Rhondda had given his assurances to Addison and Newman
that he would do all he could to see that the nation's health services
were reorganized.
Addison and Newman were pleased and they told Morant that the birth
of a ministry of health was now within easy reach.

On January 23, Addison

recorded in his diary that he
had a talk with Fisher on the relations of the B. of E. with
the L.G.B. and. on the general programme of the health supervision
4 christopher Addi son, Poli tics From Within, vol. 2 (London:
Jenkins, Ltd., 1924), pp. 55-56.

Herbert

5Adm.son, Four a.i.-id One Half _Years, diary entry, January 16, 1917,
p. 317.
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of children. Rhondda h11.s taken up very ",;'c_:rmly the suggestion
that there should be a big consolidation of health services.
Fisher is prepared to co-operate in any way, and in the end,
I hope, all health matters, excepting children attending nurseries, will be dealt with by the L.G.B. Rhondda is the sort
of' man to get things done.6
The :f'ollovring day, January 24, Rhondda wrote to Lloyd George and asked to
meet with him in order to discuss the reorganization of his department.
R..~ondda

Addison f'ully expected that

would inform Lloyd George of his de-

sire for a major overhaul and consolidation of the nation's health services and then easily push the changes through the cabinet.

This, however,

proved to be a gross miscalculation of the situation and the reformers'
elation was premature.

Addison's personal judgement was clouded by the

quick and generally unopposed success of the health measures imposed by
the Ministry of Munitions.

In his optimism he overlooked the differences

between the two situations.
tions were confined to an

The welfare measures of the Ministry of Muniarea in which the ministry had almost absolute

powers, backed both by the law and public support.

On the other hand, the

proposed consolidation and expansion of the existing health services threatened to upset long-established and well-entrenched bureaucratic and private
interests.

Moreover, Rhondda was weakened by the very factors which were

·assumed to.be his strengths.

As a successf'ul businessman, he had grown

used to making unilateral decisions, and this made him somewhat susceptible
to Addison's belief that all he needed to do was issue an order calling for
major reform.

Neither man understood the subtle movements of bureaucratic

6Gilbert, ~· ci!_., p. 101. This mem<;:>randum has been lost, but
:fortunately Dr. Gilbert has managed to .piece together its contents from
both Dr. Addison's published diaries and the as yet unpublished Newman
diaries.
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political in-fighting.
Shortly after these meetings, Rhondda asked his Chief Medical Officer, Dr. Newsholme, to prepare a special report for the Local Government
Board on child mortality in England and Wales. 7

The report red.uced England

and Wales to the smallest local authorities and presented a summary of
child mortality in each area.

The report concluded by asserting that.the

local authorities, with the energetic aid of the Local Government Board,
should do more to secure the improved health of working-class mothers
and their babies,8
an additional
fare. 9

Towards this end, Rhondda inserted into his budget

~200,000

for increased attention to maternity and child wel-

This allotment and the report caused a sharp reaction among the

representatives for the industrial insurance companies.

They were fearful

that the local authorities, by moving strongly into the maternal and child
welfare field, would cut into the highly profitable work the private companies did tinder the provisions of the National Insurance Act as approved
societies.

By 1917 there were over 40 million industrial insurance poli-

_cies in force, covering about half of all insured women.

These policies

were handled by no fewer than 70,000 collector salesmen whose livelihood
depended on their direct contact with the working class.

This personal

7Addison, Four and One Half Years, diary entry, January 23, 1917,
pp. 320-321.
Bernd. 8496, "Supplement in Continuance of the Report of the Medical
Officer of the Board for 1915-16, Containing a Report on Child Mortality
at Ages 0-5 in Engla.~d and Wales, 11 Sessional Papers of the House of Lores,
Reports from Commissio~ers, Vol. 30, 1917.
9Although the report may have had no par~icular impact on Rhondda's
already deep concern for the high rate of infant mortality, it is interesting to note that in South Wales, Rhondda had the second highest mortality
rate, second only to Gla.morganshire. Ibid., p. 49.
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contact was something that was jealously guarded by the companies and the
salesmen.

Competition, whether it crune from public administrative units

or other private companies, was bitterly resented.

Lord Rhondda, through

his swift action to improve maternity care through the local authorities,
aroused suspicion and fear that these extremely profitable insurance
businesses would be ruined.

Furthermore, as the private companies becrune

aware of the proposals for a ministry of health, they began to fear for
. very exis
. t ence. 10
th eir
A memorandum was submitted to the cabinet on March 27, 1917, by Lord
Rhondda, which pointed out the urgent need for a health ministry.

His pro-

posals, which were already known, had even before the cabinet meeting
caused an uproar among the approved societies.

Rhondda, in drawing atten-

tion to the inefficiency inherent in the nation's various health services,
showed how the overlapping of authorities could be corrected by the creation of a single agency responsible for the nation's he:alth.

However, he

had unwisely chosen to use as his primary illustration the problems which
impeded effective maternal and child care, an indelicate choice only adding
fuel to the fires of the already aroused insurance industries. 11

The memo-

randum did not really threaten to replace the private companies with a
state medical service, but emotions were running high and apparently few
of the offended interests bothered to read Rhondda's suggestions. 1 2

He

lOHouse of Commons Debates, ~.arch 8, 1917, (cols. 645-646).
llGilbert, .2E... cit. , p. 106.
12The medical profession was caught up in a heated debate concerning the advisability of the creation of a state medical service. The
approved societies, meanwhile, saw on the horizon the possibility of a.
ministry of health sponsored state system that would put them out of
business. British Medical Journal, January 20, 1917, p. 86.
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argued for a simple three-clause bill which would establish a ministry
of health that would supercede all existing authorities in matters concerning public health.

Second, the President of the Local Government Board

asked that the medical and

sa...~itorial

benefits of the National Insurance

Act be given over to the proposed ministry.

As his final suggestion,

Rhondda asked that more money be given over to the local authorities to
broaden their activities.

Tne cabinet, uron receiving these recommenda-

tions, referred the issue to a special cabinet committee which was to
study the proposal.

Dr. Addison, who was appointed to serve on the special study committee, immediately backed Rhondda's proposal.

It was his feeling that the

quick establishment of the proposed health ministry would give him the
administrative tool he needed to make his own Ministry of Reconstruction
effective.

Addison felt that the compromise between national health policy

and local administration would be acceptable to all interests once tempers
within the insurance industries cooled.

The first meeting of the special

cabinet committee, however, dashed Addison's hopes for a quieting of
passions.

The committee met on April 12 in Lord Milner's room in West-

minster Palace and quickly degenerated into a bitter battle between Sir
Edwin Cornwall, who was then Chairman of the Insurance Commission, and
Rliondda.

Cornwall strongly resisted every hint of encroachment upon the

turf of the insurance companies, while Rhondda, taken aback by this rugged
defense, only wanted efficient and improved maternity care.

Addison reveals

in his diary that Cornwall was "obsessed with the idea that a ministry of
health would be inimical to the interests of the approved societies under
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the insurance act. 11 13

Rhondda, retreating somewhat, offered a compromise

which left maternal and child care out of the control of the proposed
ministry.

Led by Addison, the other members of the committee, Lord If.iilner

and Arthur Henderson, strongly objected to this compromise because it
threatened to cripple the proposed ministry severely.

Having no patience

for Cornwall's narrow view, they convinced Rhondda to withdraw his compromise suggestion and encouraged the committee to consider the issue from
the wider perspective of health.

Cornwall remained obstinate and the

committee made little headway in that direction.

Nonetheless, before

adjourning, the committee decided to sponsor a sub-committee headed by
Dr. Addison, which would compile a report devoted entirely to the health
point of view.

Accordingly, Sir Walter Fletcher, Mr. F. W. Goldstone,

Mr. John W. Hills, and Mrs. Beatrice Webb were asked to explore the issues
with Dr. Addison.

Finally, the sub-committee prepared a report and pre-

sented it to Milner on May 14, 1917.
The sub-committee's report, which was written primarily by Addison
and his young secretary, Michael Heseltine, was very favorable to a large
central health authority with strong interventionist powers.14

The report

. was fully accepted by the whole cabinet committee on May 15, over the objection of Cornwall.

Apparently, the more irate Cornwall became the less

the committee listened to him, thinking that he represented only a small
part of the insurance industry that had not given the matter the slightest

13Addison, Politics From Within, p. 222.
14Michael Heseltine was later to become Cnief Administrator of the
National Insurance Commission.
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positive consideration. 11 15 Despite this attitude, Lord Milner wanted
Cornwall's approval of the report, so he called another m.eeting of the
committee on May 23 in order to try and bring him around.

He was sorely

disappointed again, as Cornwall held fast a...nd refused to be moved by the
appeals of the other committee members.

Tired of bickering with Cornwall,

Milner sent the committee's report to the full caliinet, endorsing the
establishment of a ministry of health.

The enthusiastic recommendation

reached the cabinet in early June, but any hopes of a quick approval
melted away as the issue became tangled in a sticky bureaucratic and
political web.

Cornwall's complaints had continued unabated and the grow-

ing resistance from the entire insurance industry forced Lloyd George, in
order to avoid a bloody political fight, to delay the matter so that he
might find a peaceful compromise.16

The reformers, especially Addison,

had hoped that the Prime Minister would have been more forceful, and their
spirits fell upon hearing of Lloyd George's decision.

The proposed health

ministry was intended to be the spawning agency for the entire reconstruction program.

The decision made by Lloyd George ended all hope for the

creation of a health ministry until at least early 1918, thus effectively
denying the Ministry of Reconstruction the power to implement its plans
for a "new world".
The health ministry did not become a reality in 1917 because it
became securely lodged on a political barb.

Some of the blame for this

aborted attempt must be placed on the small circle of reformers inside
Lloyd George 1 s government, and especially on Rhondda and Addi son~

l5Addison, Politics From Within, p. 222.
16Gilbert, 2£· cit., p. 116.
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both pushed hard for the ministry, but they failed to recognize and deal
with the vested interests.

Each of these men felt from the outset that

there would be no significant opposition to their measure, which had at
its base the simple purpose of improving the nation's health.
they

~ere

Moreover,

confident that if their powers were not strong enough they could

rely on Lloyd George to give the proposal the boost it needed.
tibn proved to be a major political miscalculation.

This assump-

The Prime Minister

was shrewd enough to see the political advantage of paying lip service to
reconstruction and doing as little as possible.

A kind of political fusion

had occurred and in 1917 nearly every interest in the nation cried out for
post-war planning for a reconstructed Britain.

Lloyd George saw this

glossy surface of opinion extending from left to right and he found that
it would support his political ambitions.

His consuming interest was to

keep the nation in the war and to avoid divisive controversy.

As long as

reconstruction remained vague and ill-defined it would serve him well as
a link between all interests.

A particular issue, such as the proposed

ministry of health, meant that the Prime Minister might be forced to
alienate some portion of public opinion, thus threatening the delicate
balance within the long cultivated fusion party.

Therefore, once the

question of the health ministry became embroiled in heated political controversy, Lloyd George chose to skirt the issue by refusing to make a
firm decision.
Although the representatives of the approved societies had managed
to have the issue of a health ministry deferred, most had continually
asserted their agreement in principle with the idea.
1917, Kingsley

~ood,

During the summer of

the most influential spokesman for the entire insurance
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industry, drew up a draft of a Parliamentary bill.that would establish
a ministry of health.

The proposal, which asked that private insurance

be left as it was and that the Poor Law health service be absorbed into
the new ministry, became the basis of the industry's negotiating position.
While Wood was putting together his proposal, Morant had made it his
business to put the reformers' case before the approved societies.

By

October the two sides were ready to reopen direct and meaningful discussions .17

Rhondda, who had left the Local Government Board in June,

had exacted from Lloyd George assurances that "he would not let the Ministry wither on the vine". 1 8

On October 3, 1917, he wrote to the Prime Minis-

ter that he felt that the time had come to try again •
• • • the difficulty which made you hesitate to accept my
proposals for a Ministry of Health last spring, and postponed the fulfillment of your promise to me, when I accepted
the post of Food Controller.
The insurance people, I understand, are asking you to receive
a deputation before the end of the recess. Their publicly proclaimed desire for a Ministry of Health marks a forward setp, and
makes it easy for you to give effect to your understanding to me.19
Addison, too, felt that the time had come to renew the struggle.
Ministry

o~

His

Reconstruction was busily putting together post-war plans,

but he still lacked the mechanism with which he could bring them to fruition.

l7Addison, Four and One Half Years, diary entry, October 11,
1917, pp. 436-437.
181ord Rho~dda became Minister of Food; replacing him at the Local
Government Board was William Hayes Fisher, a Conservati-:e. Fisher had
little actual in-government service, but he had a great deal of influence
in the London County Council and within the

Con~ervative

Party.

He, un-

like Rhondda, was not particularly willing to help the reformers create
a health ministry. Gilbert, op. cit., pp. 120-122.
19Baron Rhondda to Lloyd George, cited in Gilbert, Ibid., p. 115.
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Believing that the approved societies had begun to !'realize the obvious
truth that anything which went to diminish sickness end to promote the
good heal th of their members, so far from imperiling funds, would strengthen them," Addison too renewed his pressure on Lloyd George.20
The Prime Minister finally agreed to a meeting on October 11 with
the representatives of the approved societies.

Addison, Morant, Milner,

Rhondda, Hayes Fisher, Cornwall, and Kingsley Wood, among others, were
present, but the conference yielded very little in the way of real agreement.

The industrial insurance forces wanted to confine the proposed

ministry as much as possible.

They insisted that all Poor Law activities,

except those dealing directly with medical benefits, be excluded and that
responsibility for housing and sanitation also be left out.

Addison, who,

as Minister of Reconstruction, was beginning to worry about housing problems after the war, took the lead in insisting that the health minister
have wide powers to prevent those illnesses caused by

inade~uate

shelter.

Poor housing, he objected, was a major contributor to disease and a health
ministry must be empowered to clear slums and build decent, sanitary
homes. 21

At the end of this first meeting, with the two sides still wide-

ly separated, Kingsley Wood approached Addison and suggested that the two
22
·
·
· 1 • Noth.ing co uld h ave
of them try privately
to negotiate
an acceptable b il
been more welcome to Addison,but he insisted that he be assured in advance

20Addison, Politics From Within, p. 223.
21Addison, Four and One Half Years, diary entry, October 11, 1917,
p.

437.
22Addison, Politics From Within, p.223.
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that Wood had the full

auth-:·:~ity

of his

The approved societies agreed to this

cons•~:.tuency

a..~d

to make a deal.

J. H. Thomas, leader of the

Railwaymen's Union, was appointed as the moderator.
The first attempt of this small negotiating committee to arrive at
some sort of common ground was on November 5, 1917.

Lloyd George had

given his blessing to the idea, but had again warned Addison that unless
the two parties could come to an absolute agreement, he would not back
the establishment of the health ministry. 23

Addison, somewhat distraug..lit

by Lloyd George's failure to push the issue, proceeded cautiously and
the first several meetings were cordial, lacking the bullheaded passion
of those held earlier with Cornwall.

Nonetheless, it soon became clear

that the major obstacle to agreement was the Poor Law.

Addison's proposal

gave the ministry of health the general power to absorb all the medically
related programs of the Local Government Board, including the Poor Law
medical service.

The representative oi' the insurance industry insisted

that the Poor Law be separated from the scheme.24

Furthermore, Wood

23Addison, Four and One Half Years, diary entry, November 5, 1917,
p. 442.
2 4The insurance industry, representing in some measure the fears of
their working class customers, saw the older Poor Law as more than just a
competitor. The worKing classes had long chosen private insurance over
public aid because of what most felt was the degrading nature of Poor Law
relief. Thus, the insurance industry tried to use its position to finally
destroy the Poor Law, which its patrons held in such low regard by separating it from any- new health scheme. They argued, not without some truth,
that if the Poor Law were incorporated into the new ministry the working
class might be reluctant to support its programs. Reformers pointed out
that the hatred of the Poor Law was so intense among the working class
that many people refused to take shelter in workhouses during the air
raids on London. Frank Honigsbaum, The Struggle for the Ministry of Health,
Occasional Papers on Social Administration, Number 37. (London: G. Bell
& Sons, 1970), pp. 4o, 46-49.
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reiterated his industry's earlier demand that the new ministry, when
established, be responsible for sanitation, but not housing.

On this

final point, Addison managed to persuade Wood that if housing were placed
out of the new ministry's reach it would be severely crippled in its
dealings with the nation's health.
mained unsettled.

Nonetheless, the Poor Law issue re-

Dr. Addison privately agreed as a radical that the

new ministry should be dissociated as much as possible from the hated
Poor Law, but from a political point of view, this was an impossible
proposition for the

gover~ment

to accept.

Leaving the Poor Law out of

any new health administrative agency would undoubtedly lead
Law's

~Jrther

decay and eventual break-up.

to the Poor

Addison was well aware of

the entrenched strength of the Poor Law Division in the Local Government
Board and "of its ancient ties of sympathy and mutual interest among the
thousands and thousands of borough and urban district councilors throughout England and Wales who had provided for nearly a century the grass
roots support of English liberalism. 112 5

Addison realized that Lloyd George,

both for reasons of sentiment and practical politics, could ill afford to
enter into a deal that, if accepted, would directly challenge the power
of the Poor Law interests.

Some other way had to be found.

A second meeting, which took up most of the morning, was held by
the negotiating team on November 8.

The Poor Law dominated the conversa-

tion, with Addison arguing that it could not be disregarded in any health
scheme.

He pointed out that parts of the Poor Law medical service, espe-

cially its infirmaries, were very good, and their inclusion would greatly
benefit any attempt to practice preventive medicine on a large scale.

25Addison, Four and One Half Years,
diary entry, November 5, 1917, p. 442.

26Ibid., diary entry, ~fovembe:r

8, 1917, p. 443.
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Ccu.11tering this, J. H. Thomas insisted that the public support for the
large-scale programs Addison proposed was vital and this might not be
forthcoming if the department concerned was making expa.rided use of the
old and unpopular Poor Law.

Four days later, on November 12, another

meeting was held and this time it became clear that no agreement could
be fotmd on the issue of the Poor Law and the negotiations came to a
standstill. 27
In December, however, this situation changed dramatically as the
possibility of a compromise was raised.

On December 19, a Report on the

Transfer of Functions of Poor Law Authorities in England and Wales, was
signed by the Local Government Committee of the Ministry of Reconstruction.28

Issued publicly as the McLean report in January, the committee

recommended that in order to secure better co-ordination of public
assistance in England and Wales, the Poor Law Board of Guardians be
abolished and that their duties and personnel be distributed among the
other responsible local authorities.

The report argued that the nation

was faced with unnecessary
overlapping functions and areas, and by conflicting principles
of administration. The resulting confusion has been aggravated
by the growing popular prejudice against the Poor Law--a prejudice
which does less than justice to the devoted work of the Guardians,
and the continuous improvement in Poor Law administration, especially in respect of the children and the sick. For the last decade Parliament has been unwilling to entrust the Boards of Guardians
with new functions, and the provision for new services has had to be
27Gilbert, 9E.· cit., p. 116.
28cma.. 8917, "Report on Transfer of 1i'unctions of Poor Law Authorities in England and Wales," Ministry of Reconstruction, Local Government
Committee, 1917. Sessional Papers of the House of Lords, Reports from
Commissioners, Vol. 25, 1917.
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made by ether local autho:rities--in some cases new local
authorities--often for the increase of the co~fusion and
overlapping. 29
This was essentially the same conclusion Beatrice Webb had arrived at in
her influential minority report included in the findings of the Poor Law
Commission of 1910.30

Dr. Addison, who had been ideologically ill-disposed

to the inclusion of the Poor Law anyway, fully accepted the conclusion of
the committee.
Relinquishing his previous position that the Poor Law should be ineluded in the proposed health ministry, Addison now called openly for its
disbandment.

He immediately secured the conditional acceptance of the

insurance community, and devoted most of his time during the first two
months of 1918 to securing the support of Lloyd George and the cabinet
who finally declared that the establishment of a health ministry was a
matter of the utmost urgency.31

In the meantime, Addison had given Sir

Francis Liddell, Mr. M. L. Gwyer, Morant and Heseltine the task of
ing a bill.

dra~-

Closely resembling the approved societies' proposals as

drawn up by Kingsley Wood the previous summer, the major difference was
that the Poor Law medical service was placed under the control of the
proposed ministry rather than being set adrift.

By mid-March Addison was

confident that he had gained for Lloyd George the unanimous consent of the
insurance industry and thus the establishment of the ministry of health.32

2 9Ibid. ' p. 4.
30cmd. 4983, "Memoranda by Individual Cormnissioners on Various Subjects," Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and RE;lief of Distress, Memora.'1da
by Mrs. Sidney Webb, 1919. Sessional Papers of the House of Lords, Reports
from Commissioners, Vol. 80, 1910, pp. 113-327.
31Ibid., pp. 225-226.

32Honigsbaum, 2E.· cit., p. 47.
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The Poor L9.w Division of the Local Government Board and the local
authorities had generally ignored the almost year-long battle between
the government and the insurance peop:e.

They were rudely awakened by

the realization that the new heal th agency, if established, would be
dominated by their rivals, the insurance industry, and that they were
being left out.

Like a sleeping giant, they had begun to awaken to the

dangers of the MacLean report.

By the third month of 1918, the serious-

ness of the threat to the Poor Law was realized and the bureaucracy and
friends of the Poor Law Division began their belated counter-attack.
William Hayes Fisher, who had replaced Rhondda as President of the Local
Government Board, had for months been dragging his feet on all questions
concerning the proposed new ministry.

He insisted that if there was to

be a health ministry, it could be no more than :a restructured Local
Government Board, expanded to include the National Insurance Comm.issioners. 33

He insisted that it be devoid of any new interventionary powers,

which of course would eliminate all hope for an active, prevention-minded
ministry.

Since the publication of the MacLean Report, Fisher had been

working quietly behind the scenes among his Conservative constituency in
order to foil Addison's negotiations.

He had informed Lloyd George that

should he accept the MacLean Report, and thus the proposed health ministry, the Tory M.P.'s would oppose the passage of any bill. 34

Addison was

well aware of this warning and from January to the third week in March,
while intensely negotiating with the insurance industry, he was engaged
in a running battle with the Poor Law Division of' the Local Government

33Honigsbaum, 91?..· cit., p. 47.

34Gilbert, ££· cit., p. 121.

133
Board, the local authorities, and Fisher.

Despite this battle and the

increasing level of hostility from the Poor Law bureaucracy, Addison felt
that once he had worked. out the "kinks" i.n the health ministry proposal
with the insurance industry and Lloyd George accepted the MacLean Report,
the Poor Law opposition would be overwhelmed.

He wrote in his diary that

once a scheme had been worked out, "it would experience no special oppo-

Here again, Addison, with his unending optimism, had underestimated
the strength of his opposition and the weight of wartime circumstances.

On March 21, 1918, Lloyd George accepted the MacLean Report,now ready to
see that the health ministry was created.36
feared that thi.s might happen.

The Poor Law people had long

Seeing in the Prime Minist_er 's actions

their own destruction, under Fisher's leadership they recoiled with strongly worded personal attacks on Addison, who was charged with "offensive

actions" towards their interests and with "spreading" lurid tales about
the trouble the ministry bill would cause in Parliament.37
Despite the increasing intensity of the opposition, and armed with
the Prime Minister's acceptance of the MacLean Report, Addison met on March
25 with the approved societies, who wanted assurances that the health ministry would not be entangled with the Poor Law.

The meeting concluded on

friendly terrr£ and Addison, later in the day, dictated a cabinet minute
on the proposed bill.38

Within this memora...~dum he noted that nearly all

35Addison, Four and One Half Years, diary entry, March 22, 1918, p.498.
36Gilbert, ~· cit. ,

p. 122

37Honigsbaum, ~· cit., p. 47.

38Addison, Four and One Half Years, diary entry, March 25, 1918, pp.
498-499.
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parties had come to agr.ee on the major principles of his proposal for a
:ministry of health.

He added, however, that Fisher was still an obstacle,

pointing out that the President of the Local Government Board retained
three main objections.

First, he insisted that the name of the new minis-

try be "The Ministry of Health and Local Government. 11 •

Next, he disapproved

of the dominant influence in the :ministry being that of the national insurance interests.

Finally, Addison noted that Fisher opposed any break-

up of the Poor Law administration and insisted that all local health activities of the Poor Law remain as they were, untouched by the new ministry.
This of course was unacceptable to Addison, and he urged the cabinet to
move on the issue "as soon as possible 11 .39
Addison had spent nearly a year negotiating with the insurance industry,

a..~d

the opposition of Fisher and the Poor Law interests threatened

to wreck his plans.

Neither interest really cared to see any change unless

some advantages could be gained over the other.

Addison had spent too much

time working out a deal with the insurance people to see it now go by the
board because of the sudden intervention of the Poor Law establishment.
After months of delicate negotiations, Addison considered that his dreams
of a powerful health :ministry had already been compromised by the seemingly
endless delay.

He now found himself entangled in a hopeless struggle with

two vested interests, one private and one official.

The slightest movement

to please one inevitably caused an uproar among the supporters of the
other.40.

Addison felt that the time had come to force the issue, a..~d with

39Addison mentions this memorandum only in passing in his March 25,
For a more detailed account, see Gilbert,££· cit.,
pp. 122-123.

1918, diary entry.

l~Oibid., p. 128.
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the Prime Minister's acceptance of the MacLean Report on hand, he prepared
to bring the issue to a head, despite Poor Law opposition.
plan was simple:

The Doctor's

he decided to place the issue "before the cabinet and

allow their favorable opinion, led by that of Lloyd George, to overwhelm
Fisher and the Poor Law bureaucracy. 41
Addison's plan to force the issue through was interrupted by a new
serious German offensive on the Western front.

On March 21, 1918, the

German army launched its last great attack of the war in the hope of
gaining a breakthrough.

Although an attack had been expected for months,

the British lines were caught unprepared for such a large-scale effort.
Within hours, the attackers had broken a section of the southern part of
the line and a wedge was driven between the front lines of the 5th and
3rd British armies.

Lloyd George decided the situation was so critical

that an extra 300,000 men would be requested from the .Americans to supplement the sagging British positions.42

War news from the front dominated

the cabinet to the exclusion of all else.

Even Addison found it difficult

to concentrate on his work dealing with reconstruction, and it was clear
that the health ministry would have to wait for a more opportune and less
anxious moment.43
At first thrust the German offensive made significant gains, but it
ended on March 28, with the British still holding; renewed attacks on

41Addison, Four and One Half Years, diary entry, March 25, 1918,
pp •.498-499.
42Ib·d
__
i_., diary entries, March 25-April 6, l9l8, pp. 498-503.
43Ibid., diary entry, April 1, 1918, p. 501.
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April 9 and until April 25 continued to pound. the British lines, but they
had significantly less success with these latter assaults.

While the

second phase of the offensive was raging in France, the cabinet became
embroiled in the delicate question of Irish conscription, again absorbing
time needed to deal with matters of domestic social policy.44christopher
Addison understood the urgency of the war and the Irish question,

but

by mid-April he felt that the delays imposed upoD him by the cabinet's
unwillingness to pay attention to domestic issues were jeopardizing the
success of the proposed health ministry, and he told the Prime Minister
as much during a "short" but "frank" discussion.45

After it was clear

that no one else in the government was going to take the initiative,
Addison moved to rekindle the issue on April 24.

He wrote that

After having ploughed through a maze of negotiations with
departments, Local Authorities, Approved Societies, and Medical
Men, I completed the draft of a Bill setting up a Ministry of
Health and the Memo. to the Cabinet reconL~ending it. In the
long run, I daresay, time may have been saved, but it has made
unlooked for calls on my patience and pertinacity.46
The Doctor sensed, as did most people, that after the failure of the German
offensive, the war would soon be ending.

If this happened and there was no

ministry of health, he worried that it might then be too late for recon·struction.

Addison's memorandum, therefore, reminded the cabinet of

Rhondda's call for a health ministry on March 27, 1917, and the promises
44A. J. P. Taylor, English History, 1914-h5, (Oxford:
versity Press, 1965), pp. 100-102.

Oxford Uni-

45Addison, Four and One Half Years, diary entry, April 11, 1918,
p. 309.

46Ibid., diary entry, April 24, 1918, p. 515.
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that were made to him in response to his appea.l. 4 7
In recommending his draft proposal to the cabinet he forcefully

claimed that there
is a ~~de spread recognition of the urgent need for a measure
to be framed on these lines, which will concentrate in a single
central Department the responsibility for the main health services
of the country and will enable further services to be transferred
to the Department in due course.
He added to this that
Without such a Ministry we are fighting with divided forces against
evils which menace the nation's health, some of them already upon
us, others certain to arise as a result of the war. We have to
repair the ravages of battle, and the diminished resistance to
disease caused by excessive work and strain among non-combatants;
we are faced already by a grave shortage of hospital accommodation
even for men discharged from His Majesty's forces; we ought to
provide for the harmonious development of extended health services
for mothers and infants; we ought to be forearmed against the spread
of dysentary and malaria and other diseases which may follow the
return on demobilization of the millions who have been exposed to
such infections.li.8
With regard to the Poor Law services, the political barb on which the
health ministry was caught, Addison urged that the MacLean Report be fully
adopted.

This meant, he pointed out to the cabinet, that all functions of

the Poor Law rels.ting to the care and treatment of the sick and infirm
"should be made a part of the general health services of the community. 11 49
These proposals, Addison insisted, were matters of utmost urgency and should
be dealt with as soon as possible.

This of course was an open challenge to

Fisher and his position that the Poor Law remain intact and unchanged.

47Ibid.' diary entry, April 24, 1918, pp. 515-516.
48Ibid.' dia..-7 entry, April 24, 1918, p. 516.

49Ibid.
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The President of the Lc,,:.-3.l Government E.J2rd, whose support even among
Conservatives had been eroding since January, was not long in responding.50
On May 13, Fisher sent his own memorandum to the cabinet, outlining

his

objections to Addison's plans for the consolidation of all health service
under a single banner.51

Fisher charged that the agreement of the insur-

ance industry had been purchased at too high a price and he threatened to
rally his Tory friends against the measure unless major changes, more to
the advantage of the Poor Law, were made.

This memorandum brought in turn

an angry retort from Addison, who claimed that his negotiations had not,
as Fisher insisted, "put the Minister in shackles."

Furthermore, Addison

pointed out that Fisher was picking on side issues of no real consequence
in order to obstruct the whole measure.52

This angry exchange of memoran-

da between the two men did not elicit any response f'rom the cabinet, preoccupied as it was with the war.

As June approached, Addison felt that he

was losing the initiative and seems to have doubted whether or not he
would ever achieve success.53
50Fisher and the defenders of the Poor Law were stunned on January
10, and then on January 14, 1918, when a letter, signed by a group of ten
leading back-bench Tories, appeared in The Times attacking Fisher for holding up the Ministry of Health. The group, led by Waldorf Astor, called
for a ministry very similar to the one that was being pushed by Rhondda
and Addison. This of course was met by Fisher and his fr~ends with bitter
accusations of treason to the Conservative cause. The Times, January 10
and 14, 1918. Gilbert, .QJ2.. cit., pp. 119-120.
51Gilbert, ~· cit., p. 123.
52Addison, Four and One Half Years, dia!"'J entry, May 28, 1918,. p. 534.
53Ibid., diary entry, May 29, l9l8, pp. 534-535.
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At last, Addison persuaded Lloyd George to place the question of
the health ministry on the cabinet's May 28 agenda.

The cabinet, because

of what it felt to be more pressing issues, delayed its discussion until
the following day.

By June 3, the matter had been postponed four times

and Addison was near:::.y be:side himself.

Furious at what he considered to

be Fisher's intolerable attitude, the cabinet's failure to make any decisions on home affairs, and the Prime Minister's failure to come to his
aid, on June 3 Addison wrote in his diary that domestic issues were drifting without any guidance.

He noted that

Their minds are so engrossed--and rightly so--with war issues
that they are not able to give effective consideration to Home
Affe~rs.
For all that, this and many other matters of home importance are the business of Government and must be dealt with.
The worst of it is that L. G. seems to play up to the obstructionists at the expense of his friends. I am probably his best friend
in the Government, and ought to be able to rely upon him for support, especially as he is continually urging me to get on with
the very matters of policy that he holds up, for want, not only
of decision, but of consideration • • • • I must know where I am.54
Addison, as the caretaker of radical liberalism inside the coalition government, and also the nation's chief organizer for post-war planning, felt
that he had to try and salvage the fading dream of a new Britain.

Moreover,

as Lloyd George's close personal friend he was compelled to try and save
the Prime Minister from himself.55

For these reasons he decided to resign.

On June 5, Addison wrote Lloyp_ George a long and angry letter, in
which he bluntly told the Prime Minister:
Things are now heaping up in such a way and so many matters are
nearly ripe for decision that, with what, I am afraid, I must

54Ibid., diary entry, June 3, 1918, pp. 535-536.
55Gilbert, SE..· cit., p. 124.
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characterise as the brusque treatment which I received from you
on Thursday last, I am compelled to enquire wnat hope there is
of my being able to deal with them. With a substantial measure
of support from yourself, this can be done--without it and
without the possibility of obtaining the consequential decisions,
there is only muddle and disappointment before us, and the loyal
support which I have always endeavoured to afford you will become
of no avai1.56
Reminding the Prime

¥~nister

of the promises he had given to Rhondda the

year before, Addison suggested that a harder line should be taken with
Fisher and his I'ory f'riends.

"The departmental obstruction to the Health

Ministry," Addison told his old f'riend and political ally, "comes only
from a Department which in my view, is perhaps the least helpful of all
our Departments--either to you personally as Prime Minister, or the Government as a whole."57

Dr. Addison was afraid that Lloyd George might be offended

by

the

letter, but he had come to believe that the issues involved had to be dealt
with before the end of the war.
be worth taking.

The risk of a negative reaction seemed to

To the Minister of Reconstruction's relief, Lloyd George

was not the least bit upset and replied immediately to the letter, asking
Addison to see him the following day.

The two men met in the early evening

and the Prime Minister renewed his pledge to see that a health ministry was
created and promised Addison his full support.

During the meeting Addison

suggested that since the cabinet found it difficult to deal with domestic
issues on a regular basis that some other method should be devised.58
56Addison, Four and One Half Years,
pp. 538-539.

di~.:ry

entry, June 5, 1918,

57~q_., diary entry, June 5, 1918, pp. 538-539.

58Ibid.' diary entry, June 6, 1918, pp. 539-540.
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Several days later, probably as a result of Addison's letter and
the subsequent meeting, Lloyd George established a Home Affairs Committee
in order to care for domestic policy.

.Among its members were Addison,

Stanley Baldwin, H. A. L. Fisher, and Hayes Fisher; George Cave, Home
Secretary, served as Chairman.

On June 9 the committee met for the first

time and of the first five meetings, held between June 9 and July 29,
three were devoted exclusively to discussions about the proposed ministry
of health.

Baldwin and H. A. L. Fisher were solidly behind Addison, while

Hayes Fisher continued his sniping attacks for the Poor Law interests.
George Cave showed some initial opposition to the ministry, but soon
Addison and the others managed to convince him of the ministry's imperta.nee, and he moderated his position.
The overwhelming support of the committee for a health ministry did
not crush the now almost singular opposition of the Local Government Board.
The issue became bottled up in the committee and despite repeated pleas
for help from Addison, Lloyd George showed little or no willingness to come
to the health ministry's aid.

Addison wrote on July 23 that

L. G. gives no help, and there is no denying that during the last
two or three months, he has lost a great deal of support, or at
all events of driving enthusiasm amongst some of his best friends
in the Administration, including myself. He appears to have no
real conception of the strength of his own position in the country
and is timid to the last degree in his dealings with the Tory Pa.rty.59
Addison, frustrated and feeling deserted by his old friend, was finally
coming to understand the texture of politics within the Lloyd George government at the time of the armistice.

The promises of peace were promises of

social reform and this was impossible in a delicately balanced fusion party.
59Ibid.

9

diary entry, July 23, 1918, p. 552.
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Lloyd

George had become a prisoner in a glass house of his own making.

Within it he could do no more than carefully pace the floor, always aware
that if he walked too far in one direction, the glass would break. and the
entire structure would collapse.

Any dilution of post-war planning would

meet with the resistance from the left and thus would weak.en Lloyd George's
claim to the leadership of radical liberalism.

On the other hand, if no

concessions were made to the Conservatives, even mild reform measures might
never be approved by the House of Commons.60

Moreover, the peace, which

most knew was nearing, would bring with it Parliamentary elections, and the
Prime Minister, faced by the increasing opposition of the Asquithian
Liberals, needed unity among the interests of his coalition ministry.above
all else.

Therefore, the Prime Minister fotIDd it easier to do nothing.

No matter how much he might personally have favored a health ministry, i t
was just not practical politics.61
The lack of aid from Lloyd George and the stormy arguments with Hayes
Fisher gave Addison little choice but to try and renegotiate a new ministry
of health bill.

The Poor Law remained at the heart of the problem and Hayes

Fisher refused to be moved from his position that it must be kept intact,
one way or the other.

Addison spent the remainder of the summer trying to

work out a new compromise settlement.

The pivotal idea in Addison's propo-

sal was that the administration of all heal th ser.vices in the nation should
be brought under one roof.

In order to please Fisher he proposed to the

insurance people that all statutory declarations about the break-up of the
Poor Law be dropped and that it be left alone but incorporated into the

6oGilbert, .2£.· cit. , p. 125.

61E.om·. gs
· b aum, .2£.·

"t
~·,

p. 50 .

ministry.

The representatives of the industrial insta'ance companies, led

by Kingsley Wood, readily accepted this proposal.

Their primary concern

all along had not been for the destruction of the Poor Law or even its
reform, but with the competition that might arise from improvements made
in its services.

Addison's new proposal promised that this would not

happen.
By ma.king this concession to Fisher, Addison knew that the friendly
societies and the labor unions would rise to oppose the "Poor Law taint"
of the ministry.

Both of these interests had, by and large, allowed the

industrial insurance representatives to represent their cause, believing
that their concerns were similar.

Feeling somewhat betrayed, they launched

their own offensive against any health ministry which left the Poer Law
intact.

Even though the committee had approved of his new proposal and

had voted to pass it on to the cabinet, Addison found himself caught again
between two irreconcilable forces, both of which could destroy the effectiveness of the health ministry.62

The Doctor was frantic.

He realized

that no amount of negotiation was going to find enough common ground on
which the warring interests could stand.

By early October, fearful that

with the war grinding to a halt the health ministry would be left high and
dry, Addison decided that one side would have to be discredited.63

and the Poor Law bureaucracy were his natural choices.

Fisher

He wrote a letter

62Addison, Four and One Half Years, diary entry, August 9, 1918,
p. 559.
63Tlle German Government delivered a note asking i'or Armistice terms
on October L., and on November 7, 1918, a German delegation passed through
the Allied lines. Addison, sensing the end to the war, wrote in his diary,
"I am not going to see the war end, and our being unable, at least, to tell
these splendid men what we are going to do to help them over their immediate difficulties." Addison, Four a..-rid One Half Years, diary entry, October
10, 1918, p.584.
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to Lloyd George on October 29 and asked Bonar Law to deliver it to the
Prime Minister in France.

"I am bound," Addison said,

to tell you that the more successful you are in France, the
more perilous is the state of affairs here.
Unless, with regard to these vital and most urgent matters
which I have placed before the War Cabinet and some of which
a.re long outstanding, I am placed in a position within the next
few days to obtain decisions and act upon them, nothing can save
this country from chaos and disaster.64
The implications of Addison's letter were clear to all those who were
apprised of the situation.

The Doctor was asking the Prime Minister to

choose between himself and Fisher, between a health ministry, or none
at all.
Lloyd George, who was in France to plan for the Armistice and peace
negotiations, beat Addison to the punch.

On October 29, the same day as

Addison wrote his letter, the Prime Minister decided, for reasons that are
not all together clear, that Fisher had to go.65

From Paris he had

written a letter of dismissal to Fisher, but while being carried to London
the note was intercepted and read by Bonar Law.

He returned the 1.etter to

Paris, where he told Lloyd George that it was too harsh and must be

64Ibid., pp. 584-585, diary entry, October 29, 1918.
65An epidemic of influenza hit the southern part of the country very
hard in June and contrary to the usual pattern of the summer flu, it spread,
with a second, more severe wave striking the country in the fall. Not until the third week of October did Fisher and his Chief Medical Officer,
Arthur Newsholme, issue advice to the local authorities. The death toll
was very high and the Local Government Boa.rd received a great deal of criticism from the medical community. This made it easier and less politically
risky for Lloyd George, who had fought a bout w-lth the flue himself, to
dispose of' the troublesome Fisher. Honigsbaum, ~·cit., p. 51. Addison,
on the other hand, suggests Lloyd C~orge finally just got tired of Fisher's
failure to complete the new Parliamentary Register and of his obstructionist attitude. Addison, Four and One Half Years, diary entry, November 4,
1918, p. 586.
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modified.

Fisher, he warned, had too many Conservative friends who might

cause a political row and threaten the upcoming peace negotiations.

The

Prime Minister, accepting Bonar Law's arguments, eilowed him to soften
the tone of the letter.66

The new letter made Fisher a Peer, Chancellor

of the Duchy of Lancaster, and Minister of Information, in order to
sweeten the request for his resignation from the Local Government Board.
Fisher, of course, could do nothing else but resign, and while there was
some grumbling in the back benches, the way now seemed clear for Addison
to proceed.67
Addison wanted to be appointed to replace Fisher, but Lloyd George,
in order to keep him free for election duties, made Sir Auckland Geddes
the temporary President of the Local Government Board.68

Addison was

pleased with the turn of events, and with renewed confidence he moved
quickly to finalize his ministry of health bill.

Contacting the friendly

societies and the trade unions, he announced that he had no i!;.tention of
maintaining the Poor Law as it was and that the health ministry would. not
have a Poor Law taint, even though the bulk of the Poor Law's medical
services would be incorporated into the new department.

Still suspicious,

the unions and friendly societies gave their partial approval of the
scheme. 69

The industrial insurance companies presented no problem, because

66Gilbert, 2.E.· cit. , p. 130.

68Honigsbaum, ~· cit., p. 51.

67Addison, Four and One Half Years, diary entry, November
pp. 586-587.

4, 1918,

69The f'riendly societies and the labor unions would have preferred
the complete dissolution of the Poor Law. Because of this, despite their
basic approval of the plan, they threatened to make a political issue of
the Poor Law taint on the proposed ministry. Gilbert, S2£· cit., pp.131-132.
Honigsbaum, .2£· cit., p. 50.
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their fears of competition had been quelled nearly six months before.
All seemed to be in order and on November 7, Addison finally introduced
his bill before the Commons.

The measure proposed little more than a

change in the name of the Local Government Board to the Ministry of Health
and the

tra..~sfer

try.70

1he proposal was well received, but because of the coming election

of the National Insurance Administration to the minis-

(due on December 14), it was withdrawn in order to wait for a new Parliament.

Nonetheless, the coalition cabinet was firmly committed to the

establishment of a ministry of health.71
During the election campaign each interest, having a stake in the
establishment of a ministry of health, tried to influence candidates, but
it was too late and there was little gained or lost by any side.

The

coalition won a convincing victory in the "coupon election" and the Ministry of Health Bill was assured of an easy passage through Parlirunent.

The

new coalition government moved Addison f'rom the Ministry of Reconstruction
to the Prestdency of the Local Government Board on January 10, 1919; for
the first time he held an administrative position from which he could speak
with authority.72

Beginning in February, Addison undertook to clear the

last obstacles before the Ministry of Health Bill and manage it through the

70House of Commons Debates, November 7, 1918, (cols. 2340-2343).
7lAddison, Four and One Half Years, diary entry, November 7, 1918,
p. 589.

72 Gilbert, ££.· £it . , p. 132.
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House of Commons, this time with the full support of Lloyd George.73

The

battle was over, and after more than two years of internal struggle, the
bill received Royal assent on

Ju..~e

3, 1919.

Three weeks later, Addison

was appointed as the first Minister of Health.

73Addison was determined to tie up all the loose ends. For this
reason, he surprised many of his supporters by leaving medical research
beyond the authority of the Health Ministry. Dr. Addison realized that
he could hardly afford to incur the wrath of the anti-vivisectionists
who had, as far back as 1876, and as recently as 1914, managed to cripple
research. Shortly after the passage of the bill~ however, Addison moved
to bring medical research under the guidance of the Ministry of Health.

CHAPTER V

THE FAILURE OF SOCIAL PLANNING
Christopher Addison had hoped to get the reconstruction program
under way by late 1917 so that the victorious soldiers, upon their return
home, would be able to see some immediate fruits of their sacrifices.
Under his direction, hundreds of reconstruction committees dealt with a
wide variety of post-war plans; but because of the failure to establish
a health ministry, most of the schemes withered while awaiting an implementing agency. 1

Only the plans for housing and slum clearance survived.

until 1919, and it became clear that housing would be the issue upon which
Addison as the Minister of Health would test the nation's commitment to
comprehensive social planning.
Reformers had long been concerned with the connection between inadequate housing and sanitation, and disease. 2

The pre-war Liberal government

had experimented with several small-scale, publicly financed housing schemes
and during the war the Ministry of Munitions had attempted to exert pressure on local authorities to deal with sub-standard housing near munitions
plants.

As the tide of war turned in favor of the allies, many in Britain

lPhilip Abrams, "The Failure of Social Reform 1918-1920," Past and
Present, No. 24, April 1963, p. 43.
2:8eginning with Edwin Chadwick's sanitarx report of 1842, social reformers produced endless studies on this subject. In this tradition the
most notable contribution in the early twentieth century was Charles
Booth's examination of living conditions in London's east end.
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found it unthinkable to bring the victorious army home to slums and disease after it had fought a great and sacrificial war in defense of
liberty.

This argument was continually thrust into the arena of public

debate and politidans of every stripe seemed to subscribe to some sort
of housing scheme as a means of repaying the millions of soldiers and
workers who had shouldered the burdens of the war.3

The trade unions

had, during their 1917 conference, called for a million new housing units
to be built following the war and throughout 1917 and 1918 both the
Liberal and Conservative press kept public attention focused on the
issue.4

In the general election of 1919 the housing question became a

dominant theme in all party platform.s and most candidates agreed with
Lloyd George when he announced that the task of the grateful nation was
"to make Britain a fit country for heroes to live in. 11 5

This met with

the hearty approval of the electorate who, as 'I'he Times pointed out,
recognized that
health and housing are merely aspects of the same question, the
prevention cf disease rather than its cure are showing the aim
of modern medicine. The women voters especially are showing an
interest in this subject. Thanks to the efforts of the promoters
of 'Baby Week' and the National Health Society, mothe~s have become alive to the fact that the prevention of epidemics concerns
them v;itally . • . . The great surprise of many meetings has been
the intelligent, even enthusiastic, interest shown in regard to
these topics and the clearly expressed determination of large
numbers of electors to be put off no longer.6
For the first time in Britain's history social planning on a massive scale

3Bentley Gilbert) British Social Policy 1914-1939 (Ithaca:
University Press, 1970), p. 142.

Cornell

4 11 Labour and Its Voice," The New Statesman, .January 27 :t 1917, pp.
389-390.
5The ~' November 21~, 1918.

/"

0

Ibid, December 9, 1918.

150
became a much-talked-about election issue.7

ry

The war had served to clari-

in the public mind the notion that ill health reduced human efficiency,

just as poor maintenance impaired the production capacity of machinery.
By the election of December 14, 1918, the majority of national opinion in
Brita~n

seemed committed to large-scale social planning that would ensure

that the nation's hum.an resources were well housed and healthy.
Led by Lloyd George, the coalition candidates were swept into the
House in overwhelming numbers.

Only three days later the new government

underscored its commitment to build homes fit for heroes by announcing
the availability of heme construction loans to all local authorities.
This first step, however, was little more

th~~

an indication from the gov-

ernment that it intended to make good on its promise for a comprehensive
housing scheme.

Despite this early start the shape of the government's

program remained largely unformed.

As the new President of the Local

Government Board, Christopher Addison was made responsible for drawing up
a bill which would add flesh to the coalition's campaign pledge,

By February, confident of the passage of the Ministry of Health Bill,
Addison began to apply his energies to the problem of building homes fit
for heroes.

He quickly drew up a legislative proposal entitled the "Housing

and Town Planning Bill", which was popularly known as the Addison Bill, and
laid it before the cabinet.

Much to Addison's personal disappointment, no

immediate action was taken and despite the government's pledge the conservative elements inside the coalition cabinet repeatedly delayed consideration

7Frank. Honigsbaum, The Struggle for the Ministry of Health, Occasional
Papers on Social Administration, No. 37 (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1970),
p. 52.
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of the proposal. 8

Frustrate:.l, Addison appealed to Lloyd George fer help

while the Prime Minister was in England during a break in the peace negotiations in Paris.

Lloyd George was shocked by the cabinet's inaction

and on March 3 he met with it and forcefully insisted that a full-scale
housing scheme be launched immediately.
on the continent

a...~d

Citing the political confusion

the dangers posed by Bolshevism and anarchy, Lloyd

George demanded that the cabinet fulfill its reform promises.

He noted

that during the war when the nation needed munitions, the government got
them, but he pointed out that "when it came to the question of providing
houses, the government was still talking and meanwhile people were without
homes."9

Action, the Prime Minister asserted, must be taken immediately

if the public confidence in the new government was to be maintained.

"The

people," he told the cabinet, "are bent on social reform--I am sure of
that. rrlO
Faced with Lloyd George's unwillingness to consider anything less
than an all-out assault on the housing problem, the cabinet lent its complete support to Addison's housing proposal.

With this unanimous backing,

Addison introduced the Housing and Town Planning Bill into the House on
April 7, 1919.11

During his address to Parliament, Dr. Addison pointed

out that there was "no dispute in any quarter that the matter is of the
utmost importance, from the point of view of not only the physical well9Ibid.' p. 143.
lOLord Riddell, Lord Riddell's Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference
and After (London: Victor Gollanex, 1933),,diary entry, April 11, 1919,
p. 50.
llHouse of Commons Debates, April 7, 1919, (cols. 1713-40).
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being of our people, but of our social stability a.11d industrial content. 11 12
The Members of the House, Addison suggested, could vote for the bill on

the basis of humanitarian concern or out of self-interest, but either way

the result would be the sa.me--new homes.

This double-edged argument in

favor.of the housing scheme and the acknowledged support of the cabinet
cleared the way for the housing bill in the House.

The lack of signifi-

cant resista...11ce to the measure increased the nation's hopes that the slums
would soon be cleared and new homes raised in unprecedented numbers.13
The Addison Housing Act, which received final approval on July 31,

1919, had two major sections.

The first of these made it the duty of each

local authority to provide housing wherever needed within their jurisdiction.14

To accomplish this, the act required each responsible local

authority to make periodic detailed housing surveys of their areas and
to formulate plans for solving any deficiencies.

These reports were then

required to be forwarded to the Minister of Health who was responsible
for overseeing the individual housing schemes.

Having shouldered the

nation's local authorities with solving the nation's housing problems,
the second part of the act promised Treasury funds to retire all debts
incurred by the local authorities above the revenue provided by the penny
rate.15

In this manner the government gave up the advantages of central

l2Ibid., (col. 1713).
l3The government was to provide money for at least 500,000 new homes,
all of which were to be built within three years. The New Statesman,
April 12, 1919, p. 35.
14"Housing and Town Planning Act," sections 1-4, part one, Sessional
Papers of the House of Lords, Public Bills, vol. 4, 1919.
15~., sections

5-6, pa.rt one.
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borrowing in favor of local control.

It promised to back all loans re-

gardless of their cost and, in its eagerness to get the program underway,
the government indicated that it would approve on sight nearly all proposed
home building schemes.

In the early summer of 1919, the cost estimates

for the housing proj€ct ran to only

~71 million. 16 Its most avid backers

argued that surely this was not too much for a victorious and grateful
nation to pay for homes fit for heroes.
By the time Christopher Addison assumed the reigns of the .rJ.inistry

of Health it appeared that all the pieces were in place and the road had
been cleared for the ministry to flex its administrative muscle.

Parlia-

ment was on the verge of giving its final approval to the Housing and Town
Planning Bill and Addison had persuaded Morant and Newman to come into
the new ministry as his chief advisors.

Most importantly, popular senti-

ment was thirsting for action on the housing scheme.

The Times reported

that since the government's announcement about the availability of money
for housing the previous December, less than six new houses had been
built."One may travel f'rom one end of the country to the other," the paper
noted, "without finding any visible sign that the task has ever been done. 11
The London paper complained that
Slums, the festering sores which increasingly poison the nation
that neglects them remain untouched. For lack of houses young
men who have come back from the war are unable to 'settle down'
and to acquire that special consciousness of citizenship which
belongs to householders. New houses are wa~ted and they are
wanted now.17
Late in June, Addison, in an effort to exploit this strong sentiment, set
16Gilbert, £E.· cit., p. 143.
l7The Times, June 19, 1919.

The estimate was made by Lloyd George.
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out on a nationa: tour to encourage local authorities to submit their
plans to the Ministry of Health.

The newly appointed minister claimed

during his appearances that with some hard work, 100,000 houses could
be erected by the following June and this annual total could be increased
to 200,000 units during the second and third years of the program.
Addison's optimism was matched by that of The Times, which, in a series
of· lengthy articles dealing with the housing scheme, declared that a
"strong sense of public duty would see the proposition through. 1118
Despite the fanfare with which the post-war housing program was
launched, its progress from the beginning was impeded by serious obstacles.
Shortly after his nation-wide tour, Addison began to receive reports from
local authorities that they were unable to hire enough union tradesmen to
work on the approved schemes.

Addison was surprised by these reports

because he and his fellow planners in the Ministry of Health had assumed
that labor was in plentiful supply.

The collapse of the gradual military

discharge plan thrust several million men onto the job market and by the
fall of 1919 the 1.lnemployment rate was climbing rapidly.19

Addison could

not understand why, under these conditions, the local authorities were
unable to locate enough men to work on their housing schemes.

After an

investigation the Minister of Health discovered that the shortage was not
one of :manpower but a lack of journeymen and apprentices in the building
trade unions.

Prior to the war the building trades had been severely de-

l.8Ibid., June 21, 1919.
l9P1an.s :for a gradual demobilization had been drawn up by the Ministry of Reconstruction, but these failed in the face of demonstrations by
active troops asking for their discharge tickets. Charles Loch Mowat,
Britain Between the Wars (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), pp. 22-23.
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pressed and many workers had

dese:;.~ted

the construction industry in order

to find steady work in other skilled or semi-skilled trades.

Because of

this situation, few new apprentices were accepted into the building
u.~ions

trad~s

in an effort to reserve the sagging market for the established

tradesmen.20

During the war, nearly all civilian building ca.me to a

standstill, and being members of an unprotected trade, construction workers enlisted and later were conscripted in large numbers.

In 1917, the

Ministry of Reconstruction recommended that the building trades be exempt
from military service and that men serving at the front be released from
the colors.

The request was denied and the depletion of the nation's pool

of skilled building tradesmen continued unabated.21

The 1901 census re-

corded a total of 73,012 masons and 256,000 joiners practicing their trades
in England and Wales.

This picture had changed dramatically by 1920 when

the Board of Trade estimated that the total number of masons and joiners
practicing their trades in England and Wales had been reduced to 128,509. 22
Even though on the surface it appeared that Britain had a plentif'ul supply
of labor which could be used to build houses, the number of these men with
construction experience and the all-important union card was too small to
meet the needs of the housing scheme.23

Dr. Addison realized that the only way to ease the shortage of skilled
20 christopher Addison, Politics From Within, Vol. 2 (London:
Jenkins, 1924), p. 216.
21Gilbert, 2.E..· cit., p. 145.

Herbert

22cited in Gilbert, p. 145.

23E. D. Simon, The Anti-Slum Campaign (Landon:
Co., 1933), p. 12.

Longmans, Green &
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labor was to persuade the trade unions to accept a large number of new
apprentices.

In a series of meetings throughout the fal.1 months of 1919,

Addison met with union leaders, but he quickly learned that they were not
as pliable as he had hoped.

T'ne unions flatly refused to relax their

trade restrictions and accept a large number of apprentices, who

mig..~t

in the future depress the trades job market once the housing scheme was
completed.

This unwillingness by the trade unions to increase their mem-

bership kept Addison in a constant rage.

He insisted that the building

trades were too concerned with short-term gain and not considering the
needs of the nation, of which they were a part.

This argument, however,

did little to sway the unions who, against the backdrop of a slumping
economy, became more adamant in their refusal.

In December 1919 Addison

asked Lloyd George to come to his aid, but even the presence of the
Prime Minister at a meeting failed to break the resistance of the unions. 24
The negotiations deteriorated as did Addison's patience, and by early
1920 forced dilution on the war-time model seemed to Addison to be the
only solution to the labor shortage which was preventing houses from being
built.

The

~linister

of Health, however, lacked the authority to act al.one,

so he appealed to the cabinet for the power to force the unions to relax
their trade rules.

Hesitant to increase industrial tensions, the cabinet

refused and Addison had no choice but to again trJ and negotiate a compromise with the building trades. 2 5

In a running series of conferences

24The Nation, December 20, 1919, p. 411.
25Dr. Addison unfortunately made it his habit to lecture the Conservative-dominated coalition cabinet on Liberal principles and the proper way
of doing things. This, Lord Curzon once said, made him a "notorious bore".
Lord Beaverbrook, The Decline and Fall of Lloyd George (New York: Duell,
Sloan and Pearce, 1963), p. 41.
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throughout 1920, Addison failed to budge the unions from their protectionist stance.

In September 1920, he was forced to report to the cabinet

that his efforts to arrive at a compromise had been a complete failure
and that many local schemes were stalled for a lack of labor.

Addison

revealed to the cabinet that in the pre-v"i.ous March there had been only
3,645 bricklayers at work on government sponsored housing projects in
the entire nation.26

Union rules allowed each Journeyman to lay only

400 br.icks per day and at that rate, Addison told the cabinet, it would
take ten years to complete 40,000 new homes.27

Despite this information

the cabinet who had been totally committed only a year before to see that
homes fit for heroes were built, refused to come to Addison's aid.

It

insisted that the Minister of Health had not only failed to arrive at a
compromise with the trade unions, but that he had completely alienated
the local authorities and financially mismanaged the entire housing scheme.
From January 1919 onward, Addison had been continually entangled in
a struggle with the local authorities who were at the srune time "tradition
bound and financially carefree" ,28

The local authorities were totally in-

experienced in matters of construction, yet the duty of carrying out the
most ambitious housing scheme in British history was laid on their relucta.nt shoulders.29

Christopher Addison was the man appointed to oversee

the program and in the eyes of most local authorities, he represented
Liberal radicalism which they uniformly mistrusted.

As if this wasn't

enough, Addison was viewed as solely responsible for the damage done to
27Ibid., p. 146.
29christopher Addison, Four and One Half Years, vol. 2, 3rd ed.,
(London: Hutchinson and Co., 1934), diary entry, -Dec. 2, 1918, p. 597.
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the Poor Law by the cr.eati.on of the Ministry of Health.

Addison under-

stood the resentment the local authorities felt towards him, but not its
depth and intensity.

He had hoped that once he

assu..~ed

the leadership

of the Z.Unistry of Health, the conservative local authorities would accept
their-defeat and lend their support to his housing scheme.
happen and they remained hostile to
name.

a.~ything

This did not

connected with the Doctor's

As Addison applied more and more pressure, many local authorities

simply ref'used to cooperate with the housing progrSJll.30
Addison had the f'u.11 and complete backing of the cabinet, at least
until the end or 1919.

With this support the Minister of Health felt it

safe to combine his pleas for cooperation with threats against the resisting local authorities, but his prodding only served to complicate the
housing scheme's mounting problems.

Construction materials were in short

supply and Addison had not bothered to establish a centralized procurement committee which could evenly distribute them.

As a result, local

authorities were placed in competition with each other and under these
circumstances prices rose sharply.

Manufacturers, hoping to make up war-

time losses, sometimes turned to profiteering by forming rings and held
necessary materials such as bricks and mortar from the market place.31

By early 1920 the competition among the local authorities had become very
intense and prices were pushed still higher.

The government was hesitant

to reapply price controls and enforce anti-profiteering laws which had been
part of the Defence of the Realm Acts.
30Gilbert, ~· cit.,

p.

147.

As a result, many local authorities
3lsimon, 2£.· cit., p. 112.
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reported that even if enough tradesmen were available, they simply could
not bU}· the necessary materials.3 2
The government's refusal to control prices of construction materials was to its own disadvantage.

As Addison applied pressure to the local

author'ities to get their schemes under way at all costs, they bought up all
the materials the manufacturers were willing to sell at inflated and stilted prices.

Each local authority was left to its own devices and because

they were not expected to pay for anything above the penny rate, some were
less responsible than others.
let a contract for

~2,000~000

For example, the Liverpool Housing Committee
to a firm with a paid-up capital of only

J..3,000. No inqu.iries of any kind were made by the housing committee into the
financial condition of the firm.
a

~350,000

When the contractor went bankrupt, despite

over-payment, the central government had to pick up the loss and

got only a handful of houses in exchange.33
area to area.

Costs, too, varied widely from

Lutton, for instance, proposed a scheme that calculated that

the cost of each house built would be

~350.

On the other hand, because of

the higher price of building materials and land, the local authority responsible for housing in Brighton submitted a similar plan for houses to be
constructeq at a cost of

~900

each.

Moreover, the Brighton proposal added

32 simon claims that everything was "done under the worst possible
conditions", p. 11-14. It was later calculated that the money paid to
build 176,000 houses under the Addison Act were applied in 1933; 1,000,000
houses could be built a.11d change half the rent. Cmd. 3937, "Twelfth Annual
Report of the Ministry of Health," §lessional Papers of the House of Commons,
Reports from Cc:mmissioners, Vol. 14, 1930-31.
33The Mancheste:r· Guardian, October 18, 1919.

160
an extra

~100

per dwelling for roads and sewers, thus making each small

two-bedroom working-class a very expensive proposition.34

The result of

the corruption, mismanagement, and inertia associated with the housing
scheme was one delay after another and skyrocketing costs which were unacceptable to the coalition government.
Britain, in late 1919, was already entering into its post-war slump
which followed the initial industrial boom at the time of the armistice.
In the growing conservatism of English political life, government expenditures and the management of the public purse took on an air of restraint.
Contemporary economic wisdom viewed the public budget in the same light
as an individual's.

Expendit-:.rres could not surpass incoming revenue and,

as available capital decreased, belts had to be tightened.

Reflecting

this concern, The Spectator published, on January 17, 1920, the findings
of the Deniscn House Public Assistance Committee.

The group had investi-

gated the cost of public social services to the nation and crone up with a
total of

il2~,000,000

for 1918.

The Spectator noted that "Few people rea-

lize what social reform means, wheri represented in rates and taxes or how
much the state is doing in this way for the masses of the population.
is of the first importance that the facts should be made known. "35
bottom of the same page the journal noted

It

At the

in a single line, "Bank rate,

6 percent, changed from 5 percent, Nov. 6, 1919."36 This increase meant
that the cost of "building ''homes fit for heroes" was going to get even
more expensive and the government would have to pick up most of the bill.

34Ibid., October 19, 1919.
35The Spectator, January 17, 1920, p. 67.

The Housing Finance Committee, in its report :is.ted November 27, 1919,
estimated that the capital required to build 500,000 houses by 1922 would
amount to ~429,750,000 for England and Scotland.
~800 in England and ~850 in Scotland.

Each house would cost

The houses could not possibly be

rented at anything near their economic value and the penny rate would not
even come close to making up the difference.

Therefore, the bulk of the

funds needed both to build the houses and to provide rent subsidies would
have to come from the public treasury.37

The prospects of adding on this

additional debt responsibility to the rapidly increasing cost of the other
state-supported services made the cabinet reconsider its commitment to
the housing scheme and large-scale social planning.
The rise in the bank rate was the result of discussions between Sir
Brian Cokayne, Governor of the Bank of England, and Austin Chamberlain,
Chancellor of the Exchequer,

which took place before the end of the war.

Their concern was centered on the

~1,000

million floating debt which

caused the government to periodically invade the money markets, thus upsetting normal financial business.

They argued that this was acceptable

in war-time, but that once peace came the practice would make it impossible
to preserve England's financial dominance; they pointed out that a tight
money policy was a necessity.38

The increase of the bank rate from 5 to

6 percent in November was the first action taken by the two men to implement their financial policy,

Addison was infuriated by the bank rate ad-

vance, seeing it as a threat to the housing scheme.

During the last week

37cmd. 444, "Treasury Committee on Housir~ and Finance," Sessional
Papers of the House of Lords, Reports from Com.missioners, Vol. 28, 1919.

38 Gilbert, £12.· cit. , p. 149.

of November he participated in a series of stormy cabinet meetings in
which he and Chamberlain came into sharp conflict.39

The Doctor admitted

that by early November only 43,299 housing units had been approved by his
department, even though 500 ,000 were needed.

Moreover, of those schemes

receiving the Ministry of Health's approval, few had been built.40

Dr.

Addison insisted that the local authorities were not getting the job done
because of a lack of initiative and experience, insufficient numbers of
workmen and materials, and a growing inability to raise money.

All ex-

cept the latter could be overcome with some hard work, but the money situation could only be eased if the government gave added credit support to
the project.

Addison warned that if this were not done, houses would not

be built in many of the poorest areas of the nation where they were most
desperately needed.

Chamberlain immediately objected to Addison 1 s pro-

tests by point.ing out that the best opinion in the city had urged the
government not to accept any more indebtedness and suggested that maybe
the entire scheme should be scrapped.

41

The cabinet accepted Chamberlain's opinion and agreed that it
should encourage the local authorities to make more prudent use of their
money.

Addison was again, as he had been so many times before, wedged

between strong forces which he was powerless to move by himself.

The

building trades refused to allow the entrance of new apprentices in an

40cmd. 1446, "Second Annual Report of the Ministry of Health,"
Sessional Papers of the House of Commons, Reports from Commissioners,
Vol. 13-14, 1921. In March 1920 plans for 161,837 houses and tenders
for 79,536 houses had been submitted. Of these 13,355 had been begun
and only 715 homes had been completed.
41

Gilbert,

~·

cit. , p. 149.

effort to preserve their economic position vithin a slumping economy.
Inflation spurred by shortages and profiteering forced the price of each
housing 1.Ulit up almost daily.

Tradition-bound local authorities often

simply refused to lend their full cooperation to the liberal housing
scheme and when they did the result was often inept management.

Finally,

the government, surrendering to traditional wisdom, supported tight money
policies which not only served to increase the cost of each house, but
made it impossible for many authorities to get their schemes under way.
Addison was effectively boxed in and, no matter which way he turned, he
was met by inflexible resistance.

The only way to save the scheme from

complete chaos and a certain collapse was to improve its financial footing, but Addison had attempted to do this earlier in the year and had
failed.
Seeing his program in deep financial trouble, Addison began early
in 1920 to encourage local authorities to issue their own bonds to private
investors as a way of raising capital, but they could not keep pace with
the bank rate, which again rose to 7 percent on April 14, 1920.
end of April, 80 percent of the London County Council issue of
was still in the hands of its underwriters.4 2

Near the
~7,000,000

Others who had tried to

raise additional capital in this manner found themselves in a similar
predicament.

The whole project was paralyzed and even the liberal press

began to complain about the "prolonged story of ineptitude".

The Nation

wrote on May 8, 1920
The municipalities asked for loans to f'ulfill their obligations-without which indeed :fulfillment was impossible. They were refused,
and told that they must raise the money for themselves. They could
not do it. Against the competition of perpetual governn:.ent borrow-

42The Times, April 15, 1920.
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ing at something like 6 percent, the offer of various past
government loans in the open market at over 7 percent, and
with a 7 percent bank rate the proposition became grotesque.
Birmingham and London tried on a large scale and failed.43
The complete and swift failure of the bonding scheme left Addison and his
department in complete turmoil.

The only recourse left was to try and

reduce the construction costs per unit in hopes of building more houses
with the shrinking real capital still available.

Throughout the summer

and fall of 1920, Addison tried to force costs down by putting pressure
on the local authorities.

These desperate and hurried efforts were met

by complaints that he was playing the part of the bully; as a result,
many local authorities simply ignored him.44
While Addison was fruitlessly trying to salvage some portion of
the housing scheme, the decision which would bring it to an end was being
In late November 1920, Chamberlain, still intent on reducing t.he

made.

government's debt, announced that he hoped to cut the floating debt by
~250

to

~300

million.

This was to be accomplished by slashing all depart-

mental budgets across the board by 20 percent and also by fixing an absolute ceiling on the number of houses the government would back.45

Addison

bitterly objected, insisting that this would be impossible and that the
taxpayer would be fortunate if the Ministry of Health did not ask for more
f'unds than it had been previously given.

Considering the economic situa-

tion and the condition of the housing program, no one was surprised when

43 11 The House Famine and Some Causes," The Nation, May 8,. 1920,
p. 163.
44Ibid.
45

Finance Committee Meeting Minutes, Ja..'luary 30, 1921, cited in
Gilbert,££· cit., p. 152.

the differences between the two l:len were resol-red sharply and without
much delay.

During a Finance Committee meeting on January 30, 1921, it

was decided that "There was no alternative open to the government but to
decide the housing question not on merit, but on financial considerations
only. ''.

46

Government spending had to come down and housing, which was

proving to be much too expensive and wasteful, became the first victim
or the post-war economy campaign.

On March 31, 1921, Christopher Addison

resigned as the minister of the department he had fought so long to
create, marking the failure of the large-scale social planning stemming
:f'rom the war-time desire for national efficiency.47

While there would be

some important and even imaginative reforms during the twenties and thirties, most were aimed at particular problems.

None of these would have

the social ideal, ambition, flavor, or desire to engage in comprehensive
social planning that was evident in the reform sentiment that grew out of
the First World War.
The rout of the housing scheme brought to an end the effort to win
a political victory for social planning in Britain between 1914 and 1921.
The attempt to massively build houses with state support was more the vietim than the cause of the failure of those forces favoring social planning.
The decisive defeat of reform occurred long before the war ended and the
economy campaign began.

While it is clear that the war did generate an

authentic desire for sweeping reform, few outside of the circle of Addison,

46Gilbert, 2£· cit., pp. 152-153.
47Ibid., p. 144. While the Addison Act was a dismal political failure,
it did manage to produce more houses than any other program except the
Wheatly Act of 1928 during the inter-war period. A total of 170,000 new
dwellings were built under the act w~th 80,000 of these being completed
in 1922.
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Newman, Morant, and Rhondda proposed concrete measures to enable reforms
to be carried out efficiently and effectively.

It became comfortable for

politicians of all political shades to identify themselves with reform
and it offended no one as long as positive action was not taken to make
good on their promises.

The reality of this situation is most clearly

reflected in the creation of the Vdnistry of Reconstruction.

Christopher

Addi.son was never allowed to become more than a second-class minister.
His department, which was charged with preparing plans for post-war reform, was incapable of making even the most basic administrative decisions.

Action was dependent on the good will of Addison's ministerial

colleagues who often viewed plans for reform as attacks on their personal
administrative empires.

Addison also had to deal with vested interests

outside of the government, who demanded that reform be routed around
their strongholds.

Misunderstandir. . gs, rivalries, and distrust among sup-

posedly cooperating agencies and private interests served to delay reform,
until its success was no longer possible.
The relegation of the Ministry of Reconstruction to the position of
a second-class ministry and the constant delays in creating the administrative power to back the reconstruction plans did a great deal to end
the prospects of comprehensive social planning.

Nonetheless, these are

perhaps considerations secondary to the larger failure of social reform
a~er

the war.

In a very real sense Christopher Addison, Newman, Morant,

and Rhondda were guilty of misunderstanding the impact of the war on
English society.

They, and especially Addison, saw it as a massive wave,

which in one great movement had replaced the social tension of the pre-war
days with a new sense of social harmony.

Wa:r spirit represented to them

the dawning of a new age in which all parts of society would cooperate
towards a common goal and for the betterment of each citizen.

The Minis-

try of Munitions had been able to break all the rules in the interests
of national efficiency and the final victory it would bring.

The reform-

ers were convinced that the same kind of action would be possible when
dealing with complex and politically explosive social issues.

Despite

these hopes the war-time interest in national efficiency was not strong
enough to support their optimism or their sweeping plans.

Old political

and social differences proved to be a much more potent force than what
remained of war-time harmony and common sacrifice.

While the nation was

willing to tolerate economic and social control in the name of victory
over the Kaiser, no matter how much reform was desired, it would not
accept rigid centralized control and be swayed by appeals for national
sacrifice in peace time.

Without the impetus provided by total warfare,

massive social planning, rooted in a desire to use all the nation's resources efficiently, collapsed, drained of its political. vitality.
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